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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
SALES TAX ENFORCEMENT: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE 
ENFORCEMENT METHODOLOGIES AND PATHOLOGIES 
by 
Philip Cary Christian 
Florida International University, 2010 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Howard Frank, Major Professor 
 Most research on tax evasion has focused on the income tax.  Sales tax evasion 
has been largely ignored and dismissed as immaterial.  This paper explored the 
differences between income tax and sales tax evasion and demonstrated that sales tax 
enforcement is deserving of and requires the use of different tools to achieve compliance.  
Specifically, the major enforcement problem with sales tax is not evasion: it is theft 
perpetrated by companies that act as collection agents for the state.  Companies engage in 
a principal-agent relationship with the state and many retain funds collected as an agent 
of the state for private use.  As such, the act of sales tax theft bears more resemblance to 
embezzlement than to income tax evasion.  It has long been assumed that the sales tax is 
nearly evasion free, and state revenue departments report voluntary compliance in a 
manner that perpetuates this myth.  Current sales tax compliance enforcement 
methodologies are similar in form to income tax compliance enforcement methodologies 
and are based largely on trust.  The primary focus is on delinquent filers with a very small 
percentage of businesses subject to audit.  As a result, there is a very large group of 
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noncompliant businesses who file on time and fly below the radar while stealing millions 
of taxpayer dollars. 
 The author utilized a variety of statistical methods with actual field data derived 
from operations of the Southern Region Criminal Investigations Unit of the Florida 
Department of Revenue to evaluate current and proposed sales tax compliance 
enforcement methodologies in a quasi-experimental, time series research design and to 
set forth a typology of sales tax evaders.  This study showed that current estimates of 
voluntary compliance in sales tax systems are seriously and significantly overstated and 
that current enforcement methodologies are inadequate to identify the majority of 
violators and enforce compliance.  Sales tax evasion is modeled using the theory of 
planned behavior and Cressey’s fraud triangle and it is demonstrated that proactive 
enforcement activities, characterized by substantial contact with non-delinquent 
taxpayers, results in superior ability to identify noncompliance and provides a structure 
through which noncompliant businesses can be rehabilitated. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 Tax evasion is widely recognized as a significant problem.  Estimates of federal 
tax revenue lost to evasion, known as the tax gap, exceeded $290 billion for tax year 
2001 not including evasion of taxes on illegal activities (Internal Revenue Service, 2006).  
State governments publish little information regarding state tax gaps, but indications are 
that states have multi-billion dollar tax gaps of their own.  For example, California 
estimates their tax gap related to the state income tax at $6.5 billion based on the IRS tax 
gap (State of California Franchise Tax Board, 2007).  Most states that levy an income tax 
use federal taxable income as a starting point in the calculation of state taxable income 
and the related state income tax liability.  Therefore, almost every state that has a 
corporate and/or individual income tax will have a tax gap equal to a percentage of the 
federal gap.1
                                                          
1 That percentage will generally be state income tax rate adjusted for allocation and apportionment of 
income to other states by multi-state tax filers. 
  The tax gap related to other taxes, such as the sales tax, is much more 
difficult to estimate and such estimates are rarely published.  Access to raw sales tax data 
for purposes of research is exceedingly rare and the sparse research that exists holds the 
assumption that the sales tax is nearly evasion free.  I have been granted the opportunity 
to study sales tax evasion in the field which not only allows access to raw data, but more 
importantly, enables the ability to match tax data to other informational sources.  This 
level of access allows the development of a typology of sales tax evaders; a clearer 
understanding of the true nature of sales tax evasion; the impact of current enforcement 
methodologies; and the gaps in enforcement capabilities that can be filled with innovative 
new approaches to enforcement. 
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Objectives and Study Focus 
 The primary objective of my study is to identify improvements in tax compliance 
enforcement methodologies with respect to the sales tax.  My study indicates that the 
amount of sales tax evasion is, contrary to popular belief, large and much greater than 
current accounts allow.  The existence of this larger tax gap is testament to the partial 
failure of existing compliance enforcement methodologies.  The scope of the problem is 
cloaked by compliance measurement based only on known delinquent taxes2
                                                          
2 “Delinquent taxes” means tax that has been reported by the taxpayer but not yet paid or estimated taxes 
due on returns that have not been filed and are past the due date.  In this respect, delinquent taxes represent 
taxes that are known to be due based either on taxpayer reporting or estimates based on previous taxpayer 
reporting. 
 and audit 
assessments.  Political expediency may drive continued focus on these factors at the 
expense of acknowledging and addressing the full impact of evasion.  While important, 
political issues are not the focus of this study.  I believe that evasion is a political problem 
for the enforcement agency only to the extent the agency ceases to innovate and improve.  
If agencies are better able to identify evasion, they may be able to turn potential political 
liabilities into assets.  Witness now the practice of publicizing arrests and prosecutions of 
those caught evading a tax.  Such activities are considered successes of the agency 
because the illegal activity was discovered and punished.  If the agency is able to catch 
evasion activities earlier to minimize the impact, or arrest and prosecute more flagrant 
evaders, the political impact is positive.  So it is not the amount of evasion exposed that 
becomes a political issue, but evasion that remains undiscovered that becomes a potential 
political vulnerability.  It may be perceived that political danger for an agency lies in the 
improvement being seen as an indictment of previous policy, but if goals and policies are 
geared toward continuous improvement, as many believe they should be, then a need to 
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constantly improve is communicated to stakeholders and improvements will be seen as 
the fruits of the positive enforcement culture created by the leadership of the agency.   As 
a result, research to improve enforcement methodologies becomes politically neutral to 
an agency that is constantly striving to improve and that rewards creative approaches and 
solutions.  My work during this study took place within such an environment.  I use a mix 
of quantitative and qualitative techniques to evaluate existing enforcement processes and 
to test new processes and approaches as they are being implemented. 
 The Florida Department of Revenue was chosen for this study because Florida is 
a large state that has no individual income tax and, therefore, depends heavily on the 
sales tax for state revenues.  The Florida Department of Revenue is considered a 
progressive and well-managed revenue agency.  This is demonstrated by the agency 
receipt of the Governor’s Sterling Award for Performance Excellence and the 
implementation of the Malcolm Baldrige Criteria for Performance Excellence in each of 
its business processes.  The American Society for Quality notes that representatives from 
other state and foreign governments visit the agency each year to learn more about 
Florida Department of Revenue quality programs (American Society for Quality 
Research Committee, 2003).  Agency leadership is amenable and interested in 
knowledge-based efforts to improve enforcement and has provided unparalleled access 
with respect to this study, limited only by Florida law related to the confidentiality of tax 
data.  It must be stressed, however, that the Florida Department of Revenue is in no way 
responsible for this study and has insisted that this study not be identified as a study 
undertaken by the Department.  Any conclusions and interpretations of data are strictly 
those of the author and the Department of Revenue may not officially agree with the 
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conclusions and interpretations contained herein.  This study is rather narrowly focused 
on intelligence, data analysis operations, and field techniques that may be employed at 
the local level and may lead to improved compliance enforcement outcomes, and does 
not purport to present or evaluate all of the Department of Revenue’s methodologies and 
tools currently used for enforcement purposes. 
 
Research Questions 
 This study addresses the following major questions:   
 
• How effective are traditional sales tax compliance enforcement efforts, 
especially in controlling sales tax theft?  
• What types of innovative enforcement methodologies can be utilized to 
improve compliance? 
 Secondary but potentially very important questions relate to the implications for 
the potential implementation of a national sales tax and calls within Florida to replace 
local property taxes with an expanded sales tax.  Current proposals for the national sales 
tax call for the replacement of all federal income and payroll-based taxes and cite the 
elimination of the Internal Revenue Service as a benefit of the change process 
(Americans for Fair Taxation, 2010) reflecting the conviction that retail consumption 
taxes are evasion free.   In Florida, replacement of the property tax, which is legitimately 
nearly evasion free, with the sales tax could be enormously expensive if the true nature of 
sales tax evasion and theft is not properly understood. 
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Significance of this Study 
 One of the more important tasks in this study was to demonstrate that general 
assumptions regarding the sales tax being nearly evasion free are unrealistic.  To 
determine voluntary compliance, state revenue agencies generally focus on accounts 
receivable, which is derived from estimates of delinquent taxes, reported but unpaid 
taxes, and amounts found due as the result of audit and discovery campaigns.  In other 
words, only known delinquent taxes and audit results are considered.  These estimates do 
not include tax losses from evasion, unidentified unregistered taxpayers, or sales in the 
underground economy3
 Imagine now that, in reality, 50 of the 100 businesses actually collected $10,000 
in sales tax ($500,000 total), but reported and remitted only $1,000 each ($50,000), and 
 that the revenue agency cannot estimate.   
 To illustrate, assume a revenue agent is responsible for 100 taxpayers, and each 
taxpayer files a monthly sales tax return reporting $1,000 in sales tax collected, for a total 
of $100,000 in sales tax.  All but one of the taxpayers submits a check with their return 
paying the full $1,000 owed.  So out of $100,000 in self assessed and reported sales tax 
on monthly sales tax returns, only $1,000 is delinquent.  An audit is performed on one of 
the other taxpayers (representing a one percent audit rate), and that taxpayer is found to 
owe an additional $500.  Therefore, the receivables identified total $1,500.  The state will 
represent a 98.5 percent voluntary compliance rate with respect to those taxpayers 
($99,000 properly reported and remitted divided by $100,500 total sales tax collected that 
should have been remitted).   
                                                          
3 Underground economy refers to businesses that deal in cash or barter or who use other methods to conceal 
their true tax liabilities from the government.  The term encompasses both legal and illegal business 
activities. 
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have thus evaded or stolen $450,000 in sales tax collections.  The state has no way of 
knowing this unless those 50 companies are audited or investigated.  Otherwise, their 
self-assessments are accepted.  So we see that in reality the amount due is $451,500, not 
$1,500, and the compliance rate is only 18 percent, not 98.5 percent.  While these 
demonstration numbers may appear to have been designed merely for shock value, the 
present study shows that the ratio of actual tax theft to delinquencies is this large or larger 
in at least one large industry, and likely so in many others on the basis of information and 
documentation reviewed during the course of this study.   The goal of the agency 
reporting compliance based on delinquencies and assessments is not to mislead, but 
merely to measure what is readily measureable, and to provide information that is 
available and verifiable.  There is no generally acceptable basis to estimate the total sales 
tax gap derived from audit and investigative results because such a tiny percentage of 
businesses collecting the sales tax are audited or investigated.  Since audits are strategic 
in nature rather than random, there is also no basis to generalize audit results to the entire 
population.  Even the process of estimating delinquencies involves a certain amount of 
guesswork.  Prior filing history provides an estimation tool that is useful provided the 
filer has not historically engaged in evasion behavior beyond delinquencies.  The fact that 
evasion behavior can distort delinquency and receivable analyses that are generally 
viewed as trustworthy is yet another indication of the difficulty in estimating the tax gap 
for the sales tax.  The significant amounts of tax revenue being lost every year at both the 
federal and state levels could balance budgets, reduce overall tax rates, and make funds 
available for important programs that currently go begging.  An assumption in this study 
is that rather than noncompliance rates of two to five percent ($4.8 billion to $12 billion 
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nationwide), the actual noncompliance rates for sales tax are a minimum of ten percent 
and may be as high as 28 percent.4
 The assumption that sales tax is nearly evasion free causes states to focus 
enforcement efforts on managing delinquencies rather than catching evaders, resulting in 
an allocation of maximum resources to efforts with the lowest yield in terms of additional 
revenue.  Amounts devoted to combating tax evasion are not insubstantial, but pale in 
comparison to resources devoted to resolution of delinquencies and assessments.  The 
large amounts of tax dollars that are being lost would appear to indicate that devoting 
even more resources to enforcement would be worthwhile.  It is well established that 
audit and investigative activities have a significant direct impact on compliance, and also 
generate significant “spillover” effects as taxpayers witness the punitive actions taken 
against evaders (Dubin, 2007).  Some argue that devoting additional resources to the 
problem of tax evasion has been found to be subject to diminishing returns (Alm J. , 
1999) (Mikesell & Birskyte, 2006).  While this is undoubtedly true, the real question 
concerns where the line of diminishing returns is crossed.  Consider that in the example 
above, doubling audit and investigative resources might mean auditing two of the 100 
companies instead of one.  In that example, the improvement might be substantial but not 
nearly sufficient.  If the size of the problem is as large as the results of this study indicate, 
state governments are a long way from reaching the point of diminishing returns with 
respect to adding sales tax enforcement resources.  An analysis of marginal revenue 
  This represents a range of $24 billion to $67 billion 
for sales tax theft in the 45 states that administer a sales tax.  Full compliance would not 
only balance budgets, but it would allow the reduction of tax rates.  
                                                          
4 This assumption is supported by calculations made by the author in a separate study of compliance rates 
in Florida, by industry, which is ongoing. 
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compared to marginal costs can and should be used to guide the expansion of 
enforcement resources to optimal levels.  Rather than simply increasing traditional 
compliance enforcement capabilities to optimal levels, governments must seek to 
improve tax compliance in an ever more cost-effective manner by employing innovative 
compliance enforcement solutions that produce better results than traditional methods 
without requiring large increases in the overall level of resource dedication.  Such 
solutions may involve reallocating and refocusing certain existing resources and greater 
investments in technology. 
 The current study demonstrates that current methodologies task 80 percent of 
compliance personnel to delinquency management and only 20 percent of compliance 
personnel to audit and investigations, resulting in extremely low audit rates and reliance 
on reporting honesty alone for compliance with respect to 99.53 percent of all the 
businesses in Florida.  A level of reporting honesty greater than 99 percent is impossible 
even in a tax system with the built-in verification of income and deductions of an income 
tax system, or the multiple reporting steps and cross-checks available in a value added tax 
system.  Such heavy dependence on natural honesty in a retail sales tax system is without 
merit and results in much larger levels of evasion than previously thought specifically 
because of the lack of verification and cross-checks.  Some view the collection of the 
sales tax by businesses as the essential third-party participation and reporting that makes 
the sales tax nearly evasion free.  In the present study it is made clear that the issue with 
sales tax is not evasion by the taxpayer, but theft of the sales tax collected by the business 
collecting the tax, the collection agent for the state, which is more similar to 
embezzlement than evasion. 
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 In order to better understand evasion in a retail sales tax environment, I advance a 
typology of sales tax evaders that is useful in understanding how and why people evade 
and the tools that are best suited to enforcement efforts for a particular type of evader.  
Upon examination of the typology, it becomes clear that existing enforcement tools are 
too narrowly focused and are ineffective in identifying most types of evader.  Contrary to 
existing beliefs, this study shows that delinquency status is a poor predictor of evasion in 
the sales tax environment. 
 In the current study I introduce a proactive methodology for addressing the 
enforcement gap that exists between delinquency management and audit and that 
addresses enforcement with respect to evader types that remain outside the influence of 
current methodologies.  This approach is the targeted industry enforcement program that 
is built on the foundation of current enforcement efforts known as lead development, 
discovery operations and campaigns.  This enforcement methodology is proactive; is 
based on employee expertise and the use of multiple data sources to effectively target 
evaders; and does not rely to any extent on the delinquency status of a particular 
company.   
 
Outline of the Chapters 
 The documentation of this study and the results obtained are presented in this 
paper as described in the following paragraphs. 
 In Chapter 2 the existing tax evasion literature is examined, which is heavily 
focused on the income tax, and the impact of third-party reporting on compliance in an 
income tax system is demonstrated.  Through an analysis of the Principal Agent Model 
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my study shows that high levels of sales tax theft should not be surprising, but rather 
ought to be expected because of the structure of the sales tax; heavy dependence on 
honesty; lack of incentives for the agent; and inability of states to properly manage the 
principle agent relationship because of the number of agents involved and the inability to 
control adverse selection.   
 Chapter 3 advances a theoretical framework that is based on Cressey’s Fraud 
Triangle for understanding the environment conducive to theft of the sales tax collected 
by the agent; and on the theory of planned behavior to understand the individual decision 
to steal a portion of the sales taxes collected.  This framework suggests appropriate 
enforcement approaches that include activities designed to affect the evader’s degree of 
perceived behavioral control over the decision to evade without discovery.  Chapter 3 
also includes my typology of sales tax evaders and a discussion of the appropriate 
enforcement tools for each type of evader. 
 Chapter 4 is an introduction to the environment for the study: sales tax 
enforcement within the State of Florida by the Florida Department of Revenue.  Chapter 
4 provides a description of Florida’s approach to enforcement, the resources dedicated to 
enforcement, and a summary of the results of enforcement activities. 
 Chapter 5 provides the methodologies and statistical tools utilized in the quasi-
experimental analysis of the targeted industry enforcement program in Chapter 8 and 
related processes covered in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 Chapter 6 covers an evaluation of the Department of Revenue’s Criminal 
Investigations Process task force participation and its impact on enforcement results.  The 
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review in Chapter 6 is preparatory to the introduction of alternative task force structures 
utilized in the targeted industry enforcement program. 
 Chapter 7 offers an evaluation of revenue agent observation and intuition as a tool 
in the identification of fraud indicators within an industry.  Utilizing a sample of 369 used 
car dealers, the ability to identify sales tax evaders based on the completion of an 
observational survey and review of filing history is tested. 
 Chapter 8 provides an analysis of a complete cycle of a targeted industry 
enforcement program as it was executed with respect to 192 used car dealers in Miami-
Dade County, Florida, who were identified as likely evaders during the data analysis 
portion of the project.  These 192 dealers were responsible for more than $21 million in 
sales tax theft yet had only $302,000 in delinquent sales tax identified and outstanding.   
 Chapter 9 provides a qualitative analysis of the project and how the results 
comport with the theoretical framework and typology of sales tax evaders advanced by 
this study. 
 Chapter 10 offers a discussion of how enforcement efforts can be strengthened 
through the addition of targeted industry enforcement programs to the arsenal of 
enforcement tools and its integration with existing tools and methodologies.  Also 
provided is an estimate of the marginal cost and estimated marginal revenues associated 
with such programs. 
 Chapter 11 contains concluding comments and directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Deterrence Model 
 One of the most enduring theories of tax evasion was set forth by Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) and is known as the deterrence model, criminal deterrence model, or the 
economics of crime argument (hereafter, “deterrence model”) and is based on expected 
utility theory.  Allingham and Sandmo theorized that the choice by a rational person to 
evade taxes is based on the expected gains or losses associated with the decision to evade, 
an argument that sets forth the objective of the evading taxpayer as maximization of 
utility through the decision to evade.  In the deterrence model the gain is represented by 
the money saved through evasion and the loss is the penalty attached to getting caught.  If 
the probability of getting caught is high and the penalties are severe, the utility 
maximizing taxpayer will not attempt to evade taxes.  The deterrence model is an 
extension of the theory set forth by Becker (1968) with respect to crime in general, and 
presents a simplified and straightforward approach to tax evasion.  The deterrence model 
became the underlying premise for nearly all approaches to tax evasion for decades and 
remains in wide use in practice even though it has been somewhat discredited in theory 
consistent with general criticisms leveled against expected utility theory with respect to 
rationality.  People generally do not behave as rationally as the deterrence model would 
predict in that taxpayers do not fully understand their alternatives or the related 
consequences of their actions (Tanzi & Shome, 1993).  Taxpayers do not know the 
probabilities of getting caught and generally do not know the penalties involved.  The 
deterrence model also ignores non-pecuniary costs of evasion activities such as loss of 
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self-esteem, embarrassment, and loss of reputation and social status (King & Sheffrin, 
2002).  Perhaps the most important criticism is that the deterrence model would predict 
much lower rates of compliance than presently achieved given low audit levels and the 
very small probability of getting caught evading taxes.  For this reason, the deterrence 
model is deemed a very poor predictor of evasion activities (Jones, 2003; Mikesell & 
Birskyte, 2006; Korobow, Johnson, & Axtell, 2007).  Results of surveys and experiments 
suggest that most taxpayers would never consider tax evasion even though the 
probabilities of audit are tiny (Long & Swinjen, 1991).  Varma and Doob (1998) found 
that penalties are ineffective in controlling tax evasion and the size of legal sanctions is 
not important if people believe they will not get caught.  However, they found that 
deterrence had an impact if people could be convinced that the probability of getting 
caught was high.  They also found that whether the consequences of evasion were 
criminal or not clearly matters and that compliance may have more to do with individual 
personal beliefs such as a moral obligation to be honest.   
 Sociological models of deterrence, as opposed to the economic model, begin to 
add psychological and sociological considerations, particularly ethical considerations, to 
the deterrence equation and contemplate a taxpayer’s attitudes toward social obligations 
and self-image to be important factors in deterrence.  In the sociological model of 
deterrence, ethical considerations act to set bounds on the choices available to the 
taxpayer (Reckers, Sanders, & Roark, 1994) and account somewhat for compliance above 
the levels that would be predicted by the econcomic deterrence model. 
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Competing Theories 
 To address the perceived shortcomings in concepts of tax evasion based on the 
deterrence model, researchers have proposed alternative theories to guide evasion 
research efforts.  Equity theory posits that when the system of taxation is considered fair, 
compliance will be high, or at least higher than when the system is considered unfair 
(Thibalt, Fredland, & Walker, 1974; Smith & Kinsey, 1987).  Equity theory looks to the 
horizontal equity of the tax system and presumes the taxpayer will be satisfied as long as 
his burden is fair when compared to other taxpayers.  Exchange equity theory moves the 
equitable comparison from other taxpayers to the mode of what the taxpayer receives in 
return for their tax dollars and holds that individuals evaluate the fairness of their tax 
burdens based on the benefits they receive from the government.  Exchange equity theory 
also posits a link with the popularity of the public goods purchased with taxpayer’s tax 
dollars (Kinsey, Grasmick, & Smith, 1991).   
 Prospect theory models evasion decision making in terms of gains and losses 
similarly to deterrence theory.  However, the framing of the tax evasion decision 
becomes more important than under the deterrence model, equity theory, or exchange 
equity theory (Chang, Nichols, & Schultz, 1987; Robben, et al., 1990).  Under prospect 
theory, a decision to evade is framed in terms of gains and losses with respect to a 
particular reference point, such as the taxpayer’s withholding position, rather than an 
overall decision to evade tax as in the deterrence model/expected utility theory.  Prospect 
theory predicts that when individuals are faced with a loss, they will be encouraged to 
adopt more risk-seeking, noncompliant behavior.  For example, when taxpayers are in a 
situation where their withholding is insufficient and tax is due with the return, taxpayers 
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will be more noncompliant than when they find themselves in a refund position.  The 
withholding position becomes the referent point in the taxpayers framing activities 
(Blanthorne, 2000).   
 King and Sheffrin (2002) experimentally compared evasion under equity theory 
using a framework of prospect theory with the deterrence model and found that criticisms 
of expected utility theory were valid, but that prospect theory was not superior in terms of 
predictive value in a scenario of inequity.  They instead found support for expected utility 
theory in scenarios depicting inequity.  Results were generally not consistent with equity 
theory.  They found that responses to control questions were consistent with prospect 
theory but the responses to framed questions were not.  They noted that none of these 
theories were particularly robust and none faired any better than the others in their 
testing. 
 Nwogugu (2005) criticizes both prospect theory and expected utility theory for 
failure to address the real process of decision making.  He posits that decision making 
involves the evaluation of many factors and is a multi-dimensional process that cannot be 
accurately portrayed by imposing rigid models on the process.  Instead, he recommends 
studying decision making through the analysis of completed real life decisions on issues 
that have several dimensions, such as situation contexts and risk/loss management 
capabilities, and over several time frames.  In his opinion, expected utility theory and 
prospect theory are derived from questionable experiments, limited in dimension and the 
nature of the questions asked. 
 In the continuing search for a robust theory of tax evasion, researchers have built 
upon the deterrence model and evaluated cultural, administrative, and individual factors 
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that act as potential determinants of evasion behavior.  Among these factors are the 
quality of services provided by the government, the existence of high tax rates, the 
complexity of tax laws, social norms, morality, tax amnesty policy, income levels, size of 
businesses, tax ethics, and source of income (Madeo, Schepanski, & Uecker, 1987; 
Reckers, Sanders, & Roark, 1994; Alm J. , 1999; Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee, 
& Torgler, 2004; Torgler & Murphey, 2004; Christian & Frank, 2006; Hyun, 2006).  
These determinants can be thought of as contributors to tax morale, defined by Torgler 
and Murphy (2004, p. 4) as “the intrinsic motivation one has to pay their tax.”  All of 
these determinants have been empirically shown to have a statistically significant impact 
on tax evasion. 
 Alm (1991) stated that theoretical models of individual choice are too simple to 
adequately address the decision to evade taxes.  He notes that the Internal Revenue 
Service had, at that time, listed 64 factors that may affect the reporting decisions of 
taxpayers, but theoretical models are not capable of including very many of these factors 
in a single analysis, which limits their explanatory power.  Many other factors have been 
added to the list of potential determinants since then, as noted in the previous paragraph.  
Alm’s calls for broader, theory-based approaches to the problem obviously were not a 
deterrent to investigating every conceivable factor for its impact on the evasion decision 
process. 
 Behavioral decision theory examines how decisions related to compliance are 
affected by the way in which the risks of noncompliance are presented or are otherwise 
perceived.  Behavioral studies focus on the way people subjectively evaluate and choose 
among risks but reject the rational choice methodology in favor of a more boundedly 
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rational approach.  In an application of behavioral decision theory in an experimental 
setting, Casey and Scholtz (1991) found that the design of compliance strategies to 
provide for variation in the probability of getting caught adds ambiguity to taxpayer 
assessments of audit chances and increases compliance.  Greater confusion about 
detection activities leads to more compliance in situations where deterrence is actually 
relatively weak, but to less compliance where deterrence is relatively strong.  Sheffrin 
and Triest (1992) found evidence that taxpayers who perceive a higher probability of 
detection are less likely to evade taxes and that the perceived probability of detection may 
be more important than the actual probability of detection.  Collins and Plumlee (1991) 
note that theoretical models of compliance generally assume that individuals face a fixed 
random probability of audit, whereas the Internal Revenue Service determines audit leads 
partially based on the information supplied by the taxpayer on their tax returns.  As such, 
audits are not fixed or random, but rather are strategic, and studies have shown that 
strategic audits significantly affect individual taxpayer behavior and lead to more 
compliance with reporting requirements.  Therefore, strategic audit schemes can have the 
capability of creating within the taxpayer a belief in a higher probability of audit than 
actually exists. 
 
The Theory of Planned Behavior 
 The theory of planned behavior evolved from the theory of reasoned action 
developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) and 
posits that intentions to engage in behaviors of different kinds can be predicted with 
accuracy from attitudes toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral 
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control (Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen, 1988; Ajzen, 1991).  In an investigation of the application of 
the theory of planned behavior to tax evasion, Bobek and Hatfield (2003) equated the 
beliefs held by the taxpayer about what would occur if they engaged in evasion as the 
attitude; the influence of referent groups or individuals as the subjective norms; and the 
degree of control an individual perceives he or she has to engage in the evasion activity 
as the perceived behavioral control.  An additional variable was added for the impact of 
moral obligation, which the authors thought would be a moderating influence.  Control 
beliefs relate to the individual’s beliefs about the presence or absence of resources and 
opportunities, or obstacles and impediments to their performance of the specific behavior, 
in this case evasion.  The authors note that this includes perceptions regarding income 
visibility and the probability of detection.  They found that moral obligation alone was 
not sufficient to reduce evasion behaviors to zero but that subjective norms and perceived 
behavioral control were consistently significant.  Bobek and Hatfield note that the theory 
of planned behavior does not refer to how easy it is to cheat in general, but applies to 
specific behavioral choices and how much control an individual has to carry out that 
choice, such as taking an unauthorized deduction.  More importantly, they note that 
perceived behavioral control must exist before any other construct can exert influence on 
behavior.  If an individual does not believe that the behavior is within their control, then 
subjective norms, attitudes, morality, and ethics are immaterial.  An individual who 
believes the government is unfair; believes taxation is unconstitutional; has friends and 
relatives who perpetually cheat on their taxes; and who is generally immoral and 
unethical; will satisfy the subjective norms and attitude constructs but still will not 
engage in tax evasion if he or she believes they do not have enough control of the activity 
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and ability to engage in the behavior without getting caught.  Therefore, it would appear 
that an individual’s perceived behavioral control would be a primary target in the taxing 
authority’s efforts to enforce compliance. 
 In another study utilizing the theory of planned behavior, Blanthorne (2000) 
found that taxpayers that have the opportunity to underreport income actually 
underreported more income than taxpayers lacking such an opportunity, affirming the 
impact of perceived behavioral control but finding that subjective norms were not 
significant.  The author also used an ethical beliefs component in the study which was 
found to be the strongest indicator of the intention to underreport income and the actual 
underreporting behavior. 
 
Opportunity to Evade 
 Madeo, Schepanski, and Uecker (1987) found that taxpayers were three times 
more likely to evade taxes with respect to income not reported to the Internal Revenue 
Service.  Klepper, Mazur, and Nagin (1991) found that tax compliance increases with 
respect to items of income that are unambiguously defined, such as wages, and decreases 
with more ambiguously defined items such as employee business expenses.  Work by 
Erard (1993) provided further support for the correlation between the opportunity to 
evade taxes and the act of evasion, finding that tax compliance was not dependent on the 
level of income but on the source of income.  According to King and Sheffrin (2002), the 
Internal Revenue Service estimates that 99 percent of wage income is correctly reported 
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but less than 70 percent of income from unincorporated businesses is properly reported.5
 The preceding discussion highlights a critical point about sales tax evasion: sales 
taxes are not subject to third-party verification of amounts collected.  Third parties collect 
as agents of the state and are trusted to remit.  Thus, the potential to evade sales taxes 
relative to income taxes is much greater.  In fact, the issue is not evasion at all, but rather 
theft of the sales tax collected by the agent from the actual taxpayer.  The question must 
be asked whether research on income tax evasion provides any basis at all for 
understanding sales tax evasion.  Watrin and Ullmann (2008) found significantly lower 
compliance rates with respect to consumption taxes versus income taxes, and noted 
significant differences in reactions towards changes in detection probabilities based on 
the results obtained from an experimental multi-stage game.  Specifically they found that 
individuals react more strongly when detection probabilities are increased with respect to 
  
It is exceptionally difficult to evade taxes on income reported to the tax authorities by 
third parties, since mismatches between income reported by the third party and income 
reported on the individual’s tax return are electronically matched and flagged for review 
without human intervention.  Taxpayers understand that attempts to evade tax on income 
reported by third parties yields a high probability of detection and are much more likely 
not to report income they believe cannot be traced (Madeo, Schepanski, & Uecker, 1987).   
 
Differences between the Income Tax and the Retail Sales Tax 
                                                          
5A portion of the income of unincorporated businesses is also subject to third-party reporting on Form 
1099, so the actual amount of unreported income from unincorporated businesses that is not subject to 
third-party verification is likely even higher. 
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consumption taxes than when the detection probabilities are increased with respect to the 
income tax. 
 It was previously noted that the deterrence model has lost much of its credibility 
because most people appear to be honest and, if the theory underlying the deterrence 
model were correct, evasion would be far more common than it actually is.  However, 
when it is considered that most work on tax evasion has been with respect to the income 
tax, and that it is extremely difficult to evade taxes on income that is subject to third-
party verification, compliance might not be nearly as universal as some studies might 
claim.   
 A review of the data contained in the Internal Revenue Service Source of Income 
Bulletin for each filing year provides insight into the impact of third-party reporting on 
tax compliance.  Utilizing the data from 2007 (Internal Revenue Service, 2007), the 
following analysis was performed to demonstrate the percentage of taxable income that 
was subject to third-party verification and the results obtained are summarized in Table 
2.1.  The details of the analysis are included in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 2.1 Percentages of Individual Income Tax Income and Deduction Items 
Subject to Third-Party Verification 
 
Category Total Verifiable Percentage 
Income items $8,793,560,693,000 $7,262,331,438,000 82.59% 
Deductions for 
AGI $122,922,183,000 $89,313,528,000 72.66% 
Other deductions $2,930,389,570,000 $1,597,353,028,000 54.51% 
 
 The analysis of Internal Revenue Service data demonstrates that a large majority 
of the items that compose adjusted gross income, the “income items” and “deductions for 
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AGI” in the table, are subject to third-party verification.  Further, since a substantial 
number of returns utilize the standard deduction rather than itemizing deductions, more 
than half of the amounts claimed as deductions are also not at issue and not subject to 
evasion because they are statutorily defined.   
 Other research bears out the theory that compliance may be less than universal.  It 
has been found that there is a positive correlation between under-withholding of income 
tax and a subsequent underreporting of the tax liability based on the 1982 Taxpayer 
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) audit data (Chang & Schultz, 1990).  
Martinez-Vazquez, Harwood, and Larkins (1992) observed that people with liquidity 
problems were less likely to pay commercial debts and theorized that liquidity problems 
may have the same effect on the behavior of taxpayers.  In two sets of experiments they 
found that if the possibility of evading taxes in a safe manner existed, a near-majority of 
people would take that chance, and the proportion of individuals choosing to evade who 
were in an illiquid position was significantly larger.  Blanthorne (2000) found that 
taxpayers who have the opportunity to underreport income actually underreported more, 
in both frequency of underreporting and in the amount underreported, and had lower tax 
reporting ethics than taxpayers who did not have the opportunity to underreport.  Carnes 
and Englebrecht (1995) found that tax compliance increases as the visibility of income to 
the taxing authority increases.  Antonides and Robben (1995) found that the probability 
of tax evasion was related to the opportunity available to the taxpayer to conceal income.  
Given that the sales tax is not subject to any third-party verification, these preceding 
findings portend dire consequences for compliance under a sales tax regime.  Yet Watrin 
and Ullman (2008) note that their work is the first to explicitly focus on the behavioral 
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differences between compliance in the realm of income tax versus compliance related to 
consumption taxes.  The lack of specific research related to tax evasion in a consumption 
tax environment is surprising given the core differences between how income taxes and 
consumption taxes are administered and given the lack of third-party controls in a 
consumption tax system.  It should also be noted that Watrin and Ullman (2008) found 
that in their review of the literature, none of the models developed for the analysis of the 
usefulness of consumption taxes and optimal mixes of taxation regimes have even 
allowed for the possibility of tax evasion in a consumption tax setting, and there has 
never been a model that allows for evasion in income tax and consumption tax regimes at 
the same time.  To set this glaring omission in its proper context, it must also be 
understood that research related to evasion in value-added consumption taxes (VAT) are 
inapplicable to this study since VAT regimes are more easily enforced because the tax is 
collected at multiple stages during the production process.  If the tax is not collected at 
one stage, it can still be collected at a subsequent stage of production.  Additionally, the 
VAT calculations at each stage of production leave a paper trail that makes it easier to 
find and prove evasion, and provides an incentive for proper reporting because of the 
built-in credit structure (Garner, 2005).  This verification and incentive structure does not 
exist with a retail sales tax.   
 
Fraud Theories 
 Donald Cressey (1953) developed a conceptual context known as the “fraud 
triangle” on the basis of research findings from the study of several hundred instances of 
internal fraud.  Three factors were present in each case he studied: the perpetrators felt 
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perceived pressure from financial needs; they had access to funds; and they had the 
ability to rationalize their illegal behavior.  While tax evasion is not internal theft or 
embezzlement in the traditional sense of the crime, the theft of sales tax is virtually 
identical to embezzlement.  As mentioned earlier, with respect to the sales tax, the 
taxpayers are not the businesses that collect and report the tax, but the customers of these 
businesses.  It is not the taxpayers per se who evade the tax, it is rather the agent of the 
state, the business that collects the tax, which retains the funds for their personal use and 
thereby commits the crime.  It is literally the same as embezzlement, skimming, or any 
other of a number of frauds employees perpetrate on their employers by taking money 
before their employers realize it has been collected.  In fact, in 1978 the Florida Statutes 
addressed theft of sales tax by providing that then Section 812.10, relating to 
embezzlement by state, county, or municipal officers, would apply to every person who 
collected sales tax on behalf of the state.6
 A portion of Cressey’s (1953) study dealt with “independent businessmen” who 
were in business for themselves and received and converted deposits entrusted to them by 
customers or others to their personal use.  These businessmen typically explained and 
excused their conversion of funds by asserting that they were merely “borrowing” the 
  The statute was amended in 1979 to provide 
separate specific penalties for theft of state funds by those who collect sales tax on behalf 
of the state.  With respect to the sales tax, the business collecting the tax has access to and 
control of the funds, so all that is needed is a reason to take the money (the perceived 
financial pressure) and a rationalization to do so for the fraud triangle framework to be 
applicable.   
                                                          
6 Florida Statutes Section 212.15(1), Fla. St. 1978, Supp. 
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money, or that the funds were really theirs and they could not steal from themselves 
(Wells, 2005).  The situation described and the excuses provided mirror the situation of 
the businessman caught stealing tax dollars collected as an agent of the state. 
 The fraud triangle concept was formally adopted by the auditing profession in 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99: Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2002).  This pronouncement 
was issued after the accounting scandals at Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, and Adelphia and 
the levying of criminal charges against the accounting firm Arthur Andersen & Co. that 
increased pressure on the accounting profession to identify fraud in the corporate 
financial statements they audit.  The fraud triangle is generally recognized as a useful tool 
in indentifying potential fraud by the accounting profession and fraud examiners 
(Albrecht & Wernz, 1993; Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004; Sacchetti, 2005; DeFatta, 2005; 
Murdock, 2008; McNeal, 2009; Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2009). 
 
Agency Theory 
 Since the sales tax is administered by utilizing retail businesses as collection 
agents for the state, agency theory yields additional important insights in the analysis of 
sales tax compliance enforcement.  Two concerns addressed by agency theory are the 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard (Droege & Spiller, 2009).  Adverse 
selection occurs when a principal selects an inappropriate agent because of false or 
inaccurate information.  Moral hazard refers to the situation where the agent does not 
provide appropriate effort to achieve the goals of the principal.  Agency theory assumes 
adverse selection can be controlled if the principal has access to all available information, 
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and that the required information can be obtained for a price.  The principal must balance 
the cost of acquiring the information needed with the potential gain from selecting an 
appropriate agent.  Moral hazard can be controlled through either behavioral contracts 
designed to control the activities of the agent, or through outcome-based contracts which 
are designed to align the goals of the principal and agent and allow the principal to 
monitor specific outcomes produced by the agent rather than the agent’s activities 
(Droege & Spiller, 2009). 
 Both adverse selection and moral hazard are problems encountered by the state in 
its dealings with its collection agents, but the state has several unique problems that must 
be addressed: 
 First, the state cannot choose the collection agents it wishes to work with.  If a 
business meets the minimal requirements to obtain a sales tax license, they become an 
agent of the state.  There are few reasons for disqualification and even new businesses 
owned by known tax cheats or their family members cannot be denied a license.  As a 
result, the state is guaranteed an adverse selection problem regardless of the information 
available to it. 
 Second, agency theory assumes a direct relationship between the principal and the 
agent that makes it possible to either monitor the agent’s activities, or require specified 
results based on contract specifications.  Since all retail businesses engaged in the sale of 
tangible personal property become agents, there are too many agents for the state to 
devote direct monitoring to each one.  Outcomes cannot be predicted or planned for with 
respect to sales taxes since sales tax collected will be proportional to the sales the 
business is able to make and the mix of taxable and exempt items sold.  Setting quotas for 
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tax collected would be poor public policy given such a policy’s similarity to organized 
crime protection schemes.  The agent’s duty is simple: collect the tax on all sales of 
taxable items, and account for and remit the total amount of sales taxes collected on sales 
of taxable goods.  To ensure that the agent carries out this duty, the state must either 
allocate the resources required for direct monitoring, or develop methodologies for 
predicting outcomes at the single-business level for use in direct monitoring by 
exception. 
 Third, agency theory assumes that the agent will perform well for the principal 
based on incentives provided by the principal.  In Florida there is a minor collection 
allowance given to the sales tax collection agent for his efforts that is a small percentage 
of the tax collected and is capped at $30 per month.  The result of this provision is that 
the agent has no incentive at all.  In fact, the payment of the collection allowance may be 
counterproductive and contribute an inducement to skim.  Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) 
found that adding compensation for an activity that has a motivation of its own, such as a 
sense of duty to the community, may replace and reduce the intrinsic motivation 
associated with the activity.  In experiments designed to test this hypothesis, they found 
that where money was offered, higher monetary rewards resulted in greater efforts, but 
that overall, subjects offered monetary rewards did not perform as well as those offered 
no reward.  They did acknowledge that subjects paid a small fixed amount regardless of 
performance did not show a reduction in intrinsic motivation, which suggests the use of a 
collection allowance may do no harm, but it is certain that the collection allowance does 
not provide an incentive to the agent to do a better job.  Additionally, Miller and 
Whitford (2006) point out that incentives large enough to induce an appropriate level of 
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effort in the agent are prohibitively expensive for public agencies, who rely more on 
coercive monitoring and sanctions.  
 Fourth, agency theory presumes that the principal is risk neutral and the agent is 
risk averse, which speaks to a dynamic that does not exist in the sales tax principal-agent 
relationship.  The risk presumptions of agency theory assume the agent is being 
incentivized under the contract in a manner that takes into account the fact that the risk of 
failure in the subject matter of the contract is borne by the principal, who has a wide 
enough portfolio to absorb the risk of failure.  In the sales tax collection contract, the 
agent has no incentive at all, other than possibly the incentive to steal as much tax money 
as possible.  The agent bears no risk from subpar sales tax collections and only 
encounters risk in any form if the agent decides to steal tax monies.  That risk, of course, 
is the risk of civil or criminal sanctions.  The principal is not risk neutral because, 
especially in Florida, the sales tax collection process is the life blood of the state.  The 
state has few other sources that are capable of replacing lost sales tax revenue. 
 Finally, the premise that information is a commodity where all information can be 
known and purchased is simply unrealistic in the sales tax collection principal-agent 
contract since the state must deal with nearly a million separate retail establishments.  
The cost of acquiring the level of information required to effectively monitor every agent 
would be cost prohibitive as is indicated by the reliance of tax agencies on audit regimens 
rather than contract management activities to enforce compliance. 
 These problems might be interpreted to mean that agency theory is only 
contingently valid in the case of the sales tax collection principal-agent relationship, and 
it is apparent that major presumptions of the theory are, indeed, invalid in this 
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relationship.  But agency theory is instructive nonetheless in that agency theory will 
predict very poor results for the state as principal for the reasons discussed above.  
 Indeed, an analysis of the state’s position in the sales tax collection principal-
agent relationship using agency theory provides ample reasons why compliance is 
significantly lower with respect to retail consumption taxes versus income taxes, where 
third-party verification removes the opportunity to evade with respect to a large portion 
of taxable income.  Agency theory is designed to assist the principal in the design of 
contracts that control adverse selection and moral hazard, but in the instant case, it is 
impossible for the principal to follow that guidance.  Agency theory provides the warning 
that in the sales tax collection process, the agency must find alternative means to monitor 
and enforce compliance because standard methods of controlling adverse selection and 
moral hazard will be of little use. 
 The Principal Agent Model (PAM) has been criticized because of its implicit 
assumption that the agent is dishonest, but this assumption contributes to the theory’s 
power to predict poor results for the principal when the principal’s control over agent 
dishonesty is not perfected (Bohren, 1998).  It is difficult to acknowledge that so many 
people will choose to evade or steal tax monies when faced with the opportunity to do so, 
but the research on evasion presented in this chapter continually points to the fact that 
this is so regardless of the theory or determinant of evasion under study.  The corporate 
world takes a more realistic view of opportunistic crime and commits vast sums of money 
each year on internal controls, corporate security, employee screening, and outside 
consultants in an attempt to control employee theft or embezzlement.  In spite of these 
efforts U. S. organizations still lose almost five percent of their revenues to fraud, an 
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estimated $652 billion in 2006 (Ramamoorti, 2007).  In the private sector it is deemed 
reasonable to assume that many will choose to steal and to be forthright in accepting that 
premise and take steps to minimize the damage from theft.  For unknown reasons we 
expect our citizens, who are the same individuals corporations pay to protect against, to 
be much more ethical and honest in their dealings with the government.  In government, 
we audit less than one percent of accounts each year for compliance, and at the state 
level, audit activity is so low that it is almost nonexistent.  How can government agencies 
assume that fraud will not occur?  In an environment where there are no third-party 
controls to help enforce remittance of sales taxes collected, how can we assume that theft 
will not be rampant?  It is my hypothesis that we cannot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THIS STUDY 
 
 The theoretical framework for this study of sales tax evasion has been derived 
from Cressey’s fraud triangle and the theory of planned behavior, a blending of 
components to form a complete model of the sales tax evasion process.  The fraud 
triangle provides the overall structure of the theft process while the theory of planned 
behavior provides the understanding of the specific decision to steal sales tax funds in a 
given month, and perhaps the decision not to steal in another.  The fraud triangle is 
particularly robust with respect to understanding sales tax theft because of the similarities 
between sales tax theft and embezzlement.  Under the fraud triangle, sales tax theft by an 
agent of the state will exhibit three characteristics: 
1. The individual or business committing sales tax evasion/theft will have access to 
the funds of the state.  This is a physical truth with respect to sales tax since the 
agent collects the tax from the taxpayer as an agent of the state.  Further, there is 
no third-party verification of the tax funds collected, so the state must rely on the 
honesty of the agent to remit the correct amount of sales tax collected7
2. The individual or business will have a financial incentive to retain the state’s 
funds and conceal the theft by underreporting their revenues and the amount of 
. 
                                                          
7 Third-party data can be obtained for use in verifying amounts reported as sales for sales tax purposes, but 
such records are obtained only if a taxpayer is selected for audit or investigation.  These records, such as 
merchant account credit card sales data or purchases of items for resale from vendors, are not available 
unless requested or subpoenaed with respect to a particular taxpayer.  Additionally, after such request or 
subpoena results in the production of such records, the process of compiling these voluminous records and 
comparing the results to reported data is extremely time consuming and can be carried out for only a small 
percentage of taxpayers.  Contrast this with the 100 percent availability of a Form W-2 for every employee 
in the nation resulting in an ability to match data 100 percent without the need for a records request, 
subpoena, or labor-intensive compilations of data. 
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sales tax collected.  The financial incentive may be a financial strain such as 
needing money to pay bills, or it may be a social strain, such as needing more 
money to retain or improve social status, or as Cressey describes it, status-seeking 
or status-maintaining activities (Cressey, 1953). 
3. The individual or business will have a rationalization or justification for retaining 
the sales tax and filing fraudulent returns to conceal the theft.  Rationalizations 
will generally be internal, designed to deflect guilt, but may be voiced if the 
perpetrator is caught.  For example, a business may rationalize the theft with the 
reasoning that it serves society for the business to remain open because it employs 
others or provides a valuable service, and if it did not retain the sales tax funds it 
would no longer be in business and society would suffer. 
 While the fraud triangle offers a framework for understanding sales tax theft, it 
does not immediately recommend a solution to fraud other than cutting off unrestricted 
access to funds, which is impossible in the sales tax principal-agent relationship.  The 
theory of planned behavior works in complementary fashion with Cressey’s fraud 
triangle.  The fraud triangle describes the characteristics most universally associated with 
theft or embezzlement.  The theory of planned behavior addresses an individual’s 
intention to engage in a particular behavior, in this case theft, through three independent 
determinants of intention: attitude, social norms, and perception of behavioral control 
(Ajzen, 1991).  The fraud triangle charts the beginning of the process by providing a 
“need” element not addressed by the theory of planned behavior.  From that point, the 
theory of planned behavior’s perception of behavioral control aligns with and strengthens 
the understanding of the fraud triangle’s access to funds leg; and the theory of planned 
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behavior’s subjective norms and attitude components helps to illuminate the decision 
process and provide additional explanatory power to the fraud triangle’s rationalization 
leg.   
 The “need” function in the fraud triangle is an important component not 
specifically addressed by the theory of planned behavior, where need might be assumed, 
but is not explicitly provided.  A need can cause an otherwise honest and ethical person 
to steal available funds, and can increase the likelihood of “borrowing” funds to cover 
near term shortages.  Sales taxes are collected monthly and remitted in the following 
month.  When sales taxes collected become due, other liabilities may be more pressing, 
such as a mortgage payment, or payments to a vendor who is a major supplier to the 
business, or payroll.  Since sales tax liabilities are reported on the honor system, amounts 
due to vendors and employees are much more difficult to avoid.  A missed payroll means 
employees may walk out.  A missed vendor payment may mean lost access to products to 
sell.  A missed mortgage or rent payment, and the business premises may no longer be 
available.  Furthermore, these results occur quickly.  If the business underpays the sales 
tax liability it is highly probable that no one will notice since the audit rate is extremely 
low.  Therefore, if funds are short, the sales tax is more likely to remain unremitted, or 
under-remitted, than other payments.  B. F. Skinner (1953) would assert that this is an 
example of the theory of operant conditioning.  The dire consequences of missing 
payroll, vendor, rent/mortgage payments and other expenses absolutely necessary to 
continued business operations condition the business owner to pay those expenses above 
all others.  Likewise, the lack of consequences for underpayment of sales tax liabilities 
emboldens the business owner to continue that behavior when necessary.  However, it is 
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important to remember that “need” can mean many different things to different people.  
Need does not always mean deciding which bills not to pay, because some evaders have 
sufficient funds to pay them all.  Need also arises from a desire to further improve one’s 
lifestyle or social standing or, in some cases, just to increase profitability or horde money. 
 Many scholars have studied and written about the factors that influence tax 
evasion as discussed in Chapter 2.  Many of the social and psychological factors 
identified, such as grievances against the government, for example, represent 
rationalizations in the fraud triangle and subjective norms and attitudes in the theory of 
planned behavior.  There have always been ethical arguments in favor of tax evasion, 
from the extreme of “all government is illegitimate” to a milder view that evasion may or 
may not be ethical depending on the circumstances.  For example, if government lies to 
the people, government has breached its contract with the people and the people no 
longer have the obligation to tell the truth to the government (McGee, 2006).  Therefore, 
even generally honest people can find a rationalization for tax fraud or be negatively 
affected by subjective norms that subtly inform their attitudes toward evasion.   
 Some researchers have chosen to explicitly declare an additional component to 
the theory of planned behavior to account for ethics or moral obligation.  Attitude and 
social norms probably can be conceived to include these determinants and this study 
assumes they do.  Additionally, the rationalization leg of the fraud triangle represents 
consideration of an ethical or moral response to the issue, albeit a response to justify a 
departure from ethical or moral behavior.  On the basis of the preceding analysis, the 
guiding theory for my study becomes the theory of planned behavior incorporated into 
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the framework of Cressey’s fraud triangle (See Figure 3.1).  In this model, an agent of the 
state who chooses to steal state funds can be characterized as follows: 
1. The agent develops an intention to retain state funds collected from taxpayers 
based on need.  
2.  The attitudes of the agent related to retaining state funds are favorable because of 
experience, views of government, perceptions of tax inequities, and other factors 
that have been empirically shown to influence tax evasion behaviors.  Ethical and 
moral considerations are part of the agent’s attitude toward evasion and are 
countered by rationalization that helps reduce tension and enable the act of theft. 
3. The agent is under no pressure from social norms to avoid the illegal behavior.  It 
is likely that members of his peer group, particularly those in the same industry, 
are also engaged in the illegal conversion of state funds.  In some industries, 
members share information on how best to cover their theft of sales tax.  Some 
accountants actively train businesses in the finer points of avoiding detection.  
These factors, too, have been empirically shown to impact tax evasion. 
4. The agent perceives that he or she has the opportunity and resources necessary to 
successfully convert state funds to their use without discovery, i.e., they have 
behavioral control over the decision to retain state funds.  They may have 
operated for years without interventions by the state; may have been successfully 
involved in sales tax theft for many years; and/or may have knowledge of others 
who are successfully engaging in sales tax theft.  They perceive that they 
understand how to report and remit taxes in such a way as to “fly under the radar” 
and avoid detection. 
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Figure 3.1 Sales Tax Theft Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The model depicted in Figure 3.1 has the advantage of incorporating much of the 
existing research on the drivers of tax evasion into a decision model that comports with a 
well-accepted framework for understanding fraud found in Cressey’s Fraud Triangle.  
When considering this model it becomes obvious that the access to funds, as viewed 
through the agent’s perception of behavioral control, should be the primary target of 
enforcement efforts.   While the business collecting the sales tax as an agent of the state 
does, in fact, have physical access to the funds, enforcement operations must be designed 
to cause the subject to perceive that behavioral control does not include the ability to 
retain those funds for their own use without discovery.  Social norms and attitude can 
also be important targets of enforcement efforts because they not only help in explaining 
why a taxpayer might decide to steal tax funds and justify doing so, but can be targeted 
by taxpayer education initiatives that might help mold the attitudes and impact social 
norms in a more positive manner.  Such education efforts should be a component of even 
the more punitive enforcement actions.  This model responds to Alm’s (1991) call for 
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broader, theory-based approaches to the problem of tax evasion and compacts the too 
numerous identified drivers of evasion activity into the components of attitude and 
subjective norms. 
 The present study is not modeled after the deterrence model, but the explanatory 
power of that model cannot be dismissed.  A greatly increased probability of detection of 
evasion is an important element in the effectiveness of deterrence policy, and of great use 
in impacting the subject’s perception of behavioral control.  Deterrence activities and 
schemes thus become a tool for use in managing the subject’s perception of behavioral 
control and his or her choice to evade.  Ben-Akiva, et. al. (1999) assert that choice 
behavior can be thought of as a decision process that is influenced by perceptions and 
beliefs and by emotional state, psychological tendencies, goals, and preferences.  
Compliance enforcement interventions must impact this decision process to be effective 
in reducing tax evasion.  The present study shows that increasing taxpayer awareness of 
the certainty of detection, or alternatively increasing the perception that the probability of 
getting caught is high even when it is not, is a proper approach to compliance 
enforcement.  Since deterrence activities are always limited by available resources, such 
activities should be highly visible and designed to appear as though the state has far more 
resources allocated than are actually available.  The present study posits that one of the 
better ways to impact the subject’s perception of behavioral control is the utilization of 
business intelligence by experienced enforcement personnel to strategically identify 
potential enforcement targets, and then increase contacts with those targets and require 
justification for identified weaknesses in reporting or explanations related to indicators of 
fraud.  The increased contact also allows the agent to address attitudes and social norms 
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by using the enforcement process as an opportunity to teach and influence.  This yields 
two hypotheses which can be stated in the alternative form as:  
H1: The effectiveness of compliance enforcement efforts will be improved if 
active, well-informed enforcement activities characterized by substantial contact 
initiated by the agents of the state are substituted for passive or reactive activities.   
H2: Agent intuition applied to intelligence data yields effective identification of 
candidates for targeted enforcement efforts beyond audits and general collection 
activities. 
 Increasing compliance enforcement activities, especially in times of budget crises, 
can be a costly proposition.  Police and other law enforcement agencies are generally 
impacted less by budget constraints than regulatory agencies.8
 The development of a model that aids in understanding sales tax evasion and the 
identification of improvements in enforcement methodologies are both important goals 
and contributions of the present study.  Perhaps of more importance is the use of 
  To the extent other law 
enforcement agencies have interests in targets identified for tax enforcement activities, 
the pooling of efforts and resources can result in significant magnification of perceived 
enforcement capabilities on the part of the taxing authority.  This becomes the third 
hypothesis which can be stated in the alternative form as: 
H3: Joint investigations with other federal, state, and local agencies result in 
improved enforcement outcomes, including greater restitution for the same level 
of resource output.   
                                                          
8 While this premise is generally true under all conditions, it has become more so because of increased 
Homeland Security funding of first-responder agencies. 
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qualitative data obtained through this study to gain more insight into why people seek to 
evade taxes and the characteristics shared by these people. 
 
Sales Tax Evader Typology 
 Generalized theories of tax evasion, including adaptations of behavioral, decision, 
and rational choice theories, are often too simplistic to adequately address what 
enforcement officials encounter in the field.  The quest for parsimony in the explanation 
of the multi-dimensional decision to evade taxes naturally results in this flaw upon 
application; a flaw that must necessarily be applicable to the theoretical framework of my 
study as set forth in the previous section.  It is necessary to understand that evasion is not 
one-size-fits-all, and that people evade for different reasons and in different ways.  Many 
are noncompliant with no overt intent to evade.  It is necessary to expand the theory to 
understand that different tools are required to address different formulations of 
noncompliant activity.  To address these theoretical shortcomings, I have devised a 
typology of sales tax evaders to guide the appropriate choice of enforcement measures 
that is based on the results of my study, on my previous personal experience in the field, 
and on communications with collectors, auditors, and investigators responsible for 
compliance enforcement.  An analysis of this typology provides a basis from which a 
realistic evaluation of current and proposed methodologies can be based.  A summary of 
this sales tax evader typology is presented in Table 3.1 and is followed by a discussion of 
each type of evader and the current methodologies and tools utilized with respect to each 
type of evasion. 
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Table 3.1 Sales Tax Evader Typology 
Type Subtype Description 
Delinquents  The most recognized type.  Delinquents are the current 
referent group for calculations of voluntary compliance. 
Incompetents Inadequate 
training 
These individuals exhibit a lack of understanding of at 
least some portion of their responsibilities for sales tax 
collection and remittance. 
 Poor 
business 
skills 
These individuals run their business from a checkbook, 
i.e., “if there is money in the account, I must be 
profitable.”  They maintain no, or very poor, sales 
records, resulting in poor reporting compliance and 
under-remitted sales tax. 
 Illness of 
the owner 
Reporting and remitting of sales tax suffers because of 
the extended medical problems of the primary 
responsible party. 
Survivors  These individuals do not want to evade, but do so to 
remain competitive with other companies who are 
deriving economic benefits from evasion.  This group is 
a victim group in reality. 
Negligent 
Evaders 
Absentee 
owners 
Those who trust others to manage their business but do 
not institute adequate internal controls to prevent theft or 
evasion. 
 Poor 
control 
over 
associates 
Those who allow others to use their business name, 
licenses, and other resources for a fee, but do not 
maintain required control over tax reporting.  This group 
essentially allows non-qualified people to operate a “sub-
business” from within their organization. 
Borrowers  These individuals do not intend to steal, but reduce 
remittance of sales tax to “tide them over” until their 
financial condition improves, at which point their intent 
is to make up payments in arrears. 
Hardcore 
Evaders 
 This group has learned, through experience or 
counseling, to “fly below the radar” to conceal their sales 
tax theft.  They conceal the theft by appearing to comply 
by always filing a sales tax return and paying the reduced 
tax reported.  When caught, they will generally become 
compliant for a time. 
Proficient 
Evaders 
 Similar to the hardcore group, this group makes every 
effort to conceal their theft of state funds, and have 
become quite proficient at eliminating all indicators of 
fraud.  This group is the most difficult to catch evading, 
and when caught, will adjust their methods rather than 
become compliant. 
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Delinquents 
 When a business fails to file a sales tax return, or files a return and does not remit 
the taxes reported with the return, they are termed delinquents, and failure to file or pay: a 
delinquency.  These evaders are identified easily because they are registered businesses 
that are required to file periodic sales tax returns.  The absence of a sales tax return, or 
absence of a payment accompanying a return, is instantly flagged.  This type of evader is 
the most recognized and best understood, and is the only type generally considered by tax 
agencies when they calculate voluntary compliance with respect to the sales tax.  Agency 
collections personnel are in constant contact with delinquent taxpayers until 
delinquencies are resolved through proper reporting and collection of the tax due or 
through the filing of tax liens to protect the interests of the state.  More extreme action 
may be taken when required, including revocation of the license to collect sales tax, 
seizure of property to recover the tax, or referral for criminal prosecution. 
 Audit assessments that are not timely paid can also be considered delinquencies 
and are dealt with in similar fashion.  
 Current enforcement methodologies are adequate for addressing this type of 
evader and generally result in favorable outcomes. 
  
Incompetents 
 There are several subtypes of incompetents.  Some have inadequate training in 
maintenance of the records required to properly report and remit sales tax, or problems in 
determining what is taxable and what is exempt.  Others have a far more basic problem, 
with little understanding of how to operate a business and no understanding of 
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bookkeeping or tax reporting.  Operating their business utilizing only a checkbook, sales 
records do not exist to allow adequate reporting of sales tax collected.  Some suffer from 
incompetence as a result of medical issues that render the primary responsible party 
unable to properly account for the results of their business operations or sales tax 
collected. 
 Sales tax evasion because of incompetency is generally discovered only when 
delinquencies occur as a result of the incompetency or an audit is performed on the 
business.  Agency educational initiatives properly applied can counteract evasion as a 
result of lack of knowledge of the sales tax rules and can, in some cases, provide enough 
information to the more generally incompetent business owners to allow them to at least 
maintain sales records that allow compliance with sales tax law even if they cannot 
perform simple bookkeeping.  The major obstacle to the success of such initiatives is that 
they must be requested by the taxpayer and are generally not required as a condition of 
obtaining a sales tax license. 
  
Survivors 
 Survivors do not necessarily set out to evade sales taxes.  They do so to compete.  
A business stealing sales taxes in Florida gains a six to seven and a half percent profit 
advantage over their competitors.  In many low profit margin business models this 
advantage results in doubling profit or better.  Such increases can make it possible to 
force compliant competitors out of business.  Business owners do engage in intelligence 
gathering and often know when these unfair situations exist and must decide whether to 
compete by becoming noncompliant themselves or by taking alternative action.  In other 
43 
 
situations, an unfair tax advantage may not be specifically identified by the compliant 
competitor, but the competition may nevertheless force the same choice.  A complete 
example of such a situation is offered in Chapter 4. 
 The preferred tool for ensuring compliance among survivors is the fair application 
of the law to everyone.  If it becomes impossible to fairly apply a specific statute, then it 
is imperative that the statute be changed so that it can be enforced.  A lack of fair 
enforcement causes distortions in the market and damages the tax morale of compliant 
businesses, making them more likely to be noncompliant.   
 Additionally, compliant businesses should be encouraged to file complaints 
against businesses taking unfair advantage by retaining sales tax collections rather than 
becoming noncompliant themselves.  For this strategy to work, the agency must be able 
to immediately take action against lawbreakers or risk further reducing tax morale and 
sending a message that the agency is powerless to enforce compliance. 
 
Negligent Evaders 
 Negligent evaders are typically absentee business owners that do not institute 
appropriate internal controls to control sales tax theft by those hired to manage the 
company.  Numerous cases have been reviewed where owners found themselves facing 
very large sales tax liabilities, penalties, and interest, as a result of managers operating a 
side business within the structure of the owner’s enterprise.  Because these additional 
sales that benefitted only the manager were consummated in the name of the owner’s 
business, the owner remains liable unless positive proof can be provided to implicate the 
manager.  In this scenario, the manager prepares a sales tax return reporting only sales the 
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owner is aware of, and presents it to the owner who unknowingly signs and files a 
fraudulent return. 
 In some cases, the owner knows of the additional business activity taking place 
within the structure of the enterprise, and receives a fee or a profit share for allowing the 
associate to use his or her business resources.  In some cases, the owner may actually 
report the sales taxes collected from the sub-business, if they are properly accounted for 
by the associate.  In other cases, the owner ignores that aspect of the enterprise and likely 
understands that the associate is not reporting the sales tax.  When caught, however, the 
owner is charged with the responsibility because evidence of the additional sales and tax 
collections will normally exist within his or her books and records.  There was one 
arrangement identified during this study where a used car dealer allowed up to 48 
individuals at any one time to use his Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles 
dealer’s license to purchase and sell cars.  The owner received $250 per car sold by these 
associates.  None of the sales transactions or sales tax collected by these 48 individuals 
was reported.   
 The negligent evader is normally discovered only when an audit or criminal 
investigation is undertaken.  Even if the negligent evader becomes delinquent, collections 
activity will generally not be sufficient to identify the additional tax due.  When pressed 
to file a return or provide sales and tax information, the owner will provide information 
with respect to his sales only, not those of his associates, and those sales will likely be 
consistent with prior filings, ending any further inquiry on the part of collectors. 
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Borrowers 
 Borrowers do not begin with the intent to steal sales taxes collected.  They are 
usually confronted with severe cash flow problems that force them to make a decision 
between paying the rent, making payroll, or sending in the full amount of sales taxes 
collected during the previous month.  They “borrow” the money from the state, mentally 
pledging to repay the taxes when financial conditions improve.  In rare cases the 
borrower may actually repay the borrowed tax money.  In most cases, if they are not 
caught they will simply keep the money.  In the worst cases, they learn from not getting 
caught and begin “borrowing” some of the tax money every month, making the 
transformation from Borrower to Hardcore. 
 Borrowers keep only a portion of the sales tax collected and retain a portion of the 
sales tax collected only when financial pressures require.  They continue to file a sales tax 
return every month reporting less sales tax collected than actual for those months where 
borrowing occurs, and send in a check or make an electronic payment equal to the 
amount of tax they report.  There are no delinquencies to raise alarms.  If analysis of the 
account is performed, it may be noted that sales tax collections decrease periodically, 
sometimes dramatically, which might contribute to selection for audit if other indications 
of potential fraud are also evident. 
 
Hardcore Evaders 
 Some evaders have learned through experience or counseling that filing a return 
every month, reporting a reasonable amount of tax collected, and paying that tax with a 
check or electronic transfer that is not dishonored by the bank virtually guarantees that 
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the business will escape scrutiny.  They understand that delinquencies receive instant 
attention and should be avoided.  They also understand that the majority of agency 
personnel are tasked with resolving delinquencies.  These evaders are betting against 
being selected for audit as long as the amounts they report are relatively reasonable, i.e., 
they are playing the “audit lottery.”  Generally their theft is only discovered if they are 
selected for audit or criminal investigation based on other indications of fraud or a 
criminal complaint initiated by a third party.  When caught, these evaders will likely 
become compliant for a period of time but will return to evasion activities when they 
perceive the agency’s attention has been turned elsewhere. 
 
Proficient Evaders 
 Proficient evaders are an advanced version of the hardcore evader, but are careful 
to cover every potential indication of fraud.  In that respect, they are hardcore evaders 
who have become very adept at sales tax theft.  They understand how to use the laws to 
their advantage and generally limit their exposure to misdemeanors rather than felonies 
by manipulating the types of evidence available if they are caught.  For example, in many 
cases they will raise prices and refuse to charge sales tax, a misdemeanor, rather than 
charging the sales tax and retaining it, a felony.  The company receives the same amount 
of money from the customer but structures the transaction to manage the risk.  When 
caught, proficient evaders do not become compliant; they adjust their methods and 
continue to steal sales tax.  Proficient evaders frequently close businesses that have been 
in operation for several years and open new business entities owned by relatives, 
understanding that closed corporations pose more difficult enforcement scenarios for tax 
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authorities and helps to bury the audit trail.  Many Proficient Evaders also operate 
businesses that deal with substantial amounts of cash, and use cash to pay bills rather than 
depositing cash into bank accounts that leave evidence of greater sales. 
 
Enforcement Tools 
 The general enforcement tools available to state tax agencies can be summarized 
as follows: 
1. Collections staff who instantly address failures to file returns or failure to pay 
amounts reported as due on returns received without payment. 
2. Audits of companies identified via a strategic lead development operation that 
utilizes data from a variety of sources to identify potential fraud and evasion. 
3. Criminal investigations of companies suspected of fraud or sales tax theft derived 
from referrals from collections, audit, and lead development processes, or derived 
from complaints received from outside the agency. 
4. Discovery operations and campaigns designed to identify companies that are not 
registered with the agency for the tax obligations related to their business 
operations.  
 Collections efforts are adequate with respect to Delinquents and many 
Incompetents.  Discovery operations are effective in identifying Delinquent evaders that 
fail to register.  However, in most cases audit and criminal investigations resources are so 
limited that the chance of identifying Survivors, Negligents, Borrowers, Hardcore 
Evaders, and Proficient Evaders is extremely small.  This gap in enforcement coverage is 
discussed more specifically in Chapter 4.  The proactive methodologies introduced in the 
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present study are designed to address these types of evaders.  In the framework 
introduced here all strategic lead development activities will be directed into targeted 
industry enforcement programs.  It is also recommended that a substantial portion of 
audit activities be redirected from strategically developed leads to a completely random 
audit process designed to identify those evaders who have been successful in eliminating 
outward signs of fraudulent activities that would result in identification utilizing other 
methods, primarily the Proficient evaders.  Table 3.2 provides a summary of the 
recommended tools for each type of evader. 
 
Table 3.2 Enforcement Tools by Evasion Type 
Evasion Type Current Tools Proposed Tools 
Delinquents Collection activity; 
discovery operations 
Collection activity; 
discovery operations 
Incompetents Collection activity; strategic 
audits 
Collection activity; targeted 
industry enforcement 
Survivors Strategic audit; criminal 
investigations 
Law changes; successful 
enforcement efforts against 
other types of evaders; 
targeted industry 
enforcement 
Negligents Strategic audit; criminal 
investigations 
Targeted industry 
enforcement 
Borrowers Strategic audit; criminal 
investigations 
Targeted industry 
enforcement 
Hardcore Strategic audit; criminal 
investigations 
Targeted industry 
enforcement 
Proficient Strategic audit; criminal 
investigations 
Random audit; criminal 
investigations 
 
 The goal is to find an optimal mix of enforcement methodologies that produces 
the greatest gain in compliance with minimal increases in additional resources.  The 
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implementation of targeted industry enforcement programs accomplishes that goal.  
Targeted industry enforcement programs are similar to current discovery and campaign 
operations, but are planned and executed wholly at the local level by local employees, 
and represent a continuous process rather than an isolated compliance exercise that may 
not be repeated for several years.  The employees given responsibility for a particular 
industry will not approach their responsibility as a linear process of research, target 
identification, and intervention, but as one of continuous research and target 
identification simultaneous with engagement.  The approach is one of consistent 
compliance pressure on the industry utilizing a minimum amount of resources prepared 
with the maximum amount of knowledge and information.  The key is activity informed 
by intelligence that is accurate and actionable. 
 
Why People Evade 
 A large percentage of sales tax revenues are collected in spite of fairly large gaps 
in compliance enforcement capabilities.  There are two primary reasons for this.  First, 
larger companies tend to have strong internal controls that act to limit evasion activities.  
Evasion would require collusion among many employees from different departments 
within the organization and management would have to be convinced none would ever 
break ranks.  Large companies utilize expensive legal and accounting services to exploit 
any loopholes or gray areas in the law, but outright evasion is rare because the potential 
impact on corporate reputation would be much more expensive than any state sanctions.  
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 Second, as noted in the literature review, there are a substantial number of 
business owners who would not evade taxes under any circumstance because of moral 
and ethical considerations.   
 Based on my review of existing research, previous experience, review of 
hundreds of case files, communications with enforcement agents in the field, and the 
results of this study, it is clear that, aside from these two groups, substantial numbers of 
small- to medium-sized businesses do engage in tax evasion and sales tax theft.   The 
evidence indicates that Survivors, Negligents, Borrowers, Hardcore, and Proficient 
evaders ultimately steal sales tax collections simply because they can.  In terms of the 
theory of planned behavior, they steal because they perceive that they have behavioral 
control in the decision process.  The circumstances that lead them to the decision point 
are certainly different, and many times based on some form of need.  Some need the 
money to survive; others to maintain a lifestyle.  Regardless of the circumstances that 
lead them to the decision to evade or their original intent, they would not steal if they did 
not strongly believe that they can retain sales tax monies collected from their customers 
without suffering consequences.  They understand the criteria currently used to identify 
tax cheats to varying degrees, but each type of evader understands it well enough to know 
their chances of getting caught are minimal.  Many also understand that getting caught is 
not the end of the story; they may still be able to offer explanations that mitigate the 
consequences or hide evidence to confound investigations.  Under present conditions, the 
risks associated with sales tax theft are acceptable and manageable, if not nearly 
irrelevant. 
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 While perceived behavioral control is a necessary precedent to sales tax theft, 
subjective norms and individual attitudes are no less important as targets for enforcement 
action.  There exists substantial anger toward governmental institutions, and politicians 
often fan the flames for their own ends.  Anger leads to rationalizations that sales tax 
theft is not immoral and peer groups tend to strengthen such beliefs.  There needs to be a 
realization that government serves a fundamentally required function in society and that it 
must be properly financed to be effective.  Tax agencies must address this anger with 
increased taxpayer education and more focus on less punitive measures to enforce 
compliance, at least in the case of first-time evaders who are not of the Hardcore or 
Proficient variety.  It is my belief that an emphasis on proactive engagement with the 
taxpayer contributes to changing attitudes and subjective norms.  It is important that 
noncompliant taxpayers are approached with an understanding and helpful attitude 
throughout the enforcement process as long as the taxpayer is cooperating and making an 
effort to become compliant and resolve prior obligations.  My main critique of the 
specific application of the deterrence model in tax enforcement is that taxpayers are 
immediately subjected to harsh treatment (guilty until proven innocent) and massive 
penalties with few good options available for rehabilitation.  The deterrence model does 
not require the immediate application of draconian punishment against offenders without 
first the application of more reasoned measures, but this concept seems to have been lost 
when deterrence theory was conceptually applied to taxation.  Few deterrence model 
economists conclude that punishment is the single best social response to crime and 
instead view deterrence as only part of the model of society’s response (Palmer, 1977).  
More often the not, the result of the application of the deterrence model in tax matters is 
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personal ruin.  If there is an opportunity to effectively rehabilitate the taxpayer, it lies in 
engagement rather than punishment.  More severe penalties and punishment should be 
reserved for Hardcore and Proficient evaders who resist rehabilitation.  An approach 
based on engagement should allow rehabilitation of nearly all Survivors, Negligents, and 
Borrowers. 
 The targeted industry enforcement program introduced and tested in my study 
provides a method of identifying evaders that escape detection under the current 
enforcement paradigm and engages them in a process designed not only to bring them 
into compliance with the tax laws, but to provide education and understanding of the tax 
law and agency enforcement efforts that may help change attitudes and prevent 
recidivism.   
 
Importance of This Study 
 Existing tax evasion research is focused primarily on the income tax with 
international studies related to the value-added tax a step behind.  There are, in fact, few 
studies that deal primarily with sales tax issues, and most of those do not address evasion.  
Evasion is never addressed in any fashion differently than evasion in the case of the 
income tax.  One possible reason for this is an assumption that the study of tax evasion 
can be equally applied to different types of taxation, and this may be true to a certain 
extent, but the sales tax creates an agency relationship between government and business 
that is not present in income taxes.  A second reason is that a number of researchers 
believe that there is less evasion with the sales tax than with the income tax even though 
there are no data to support this assumption.  As noted previously, evasion is three times 
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more likely when there is no third-party reporting of income (Madeo, Schepanski, & 
Uecker, 1987).  With sales tax there is no third-party reporting; the business collecting 
the tax has unrestricted access to the funds; and there is no structure or process to 
guarantee proper reporting and remittance other than honesty.  As a senior tax 
administrator with the Department of Revenue admitted, it is estimated that up to 60 
percent of small businesses in Florida engage in sales tax theft.  The experiences of tax 
collectors, auditors, and criminal investigators in the field bear out that estimate.  The 
aforementioned administrator drew an allegory to speeding: if you drive on the interstate 
in Florida at the speed limit, you will be the slowest car on the road by far.  Unless there 
are state troopers positioned at regular intervals on the highway, everyone will speed 
(Anonymous, 2006).  Department of Revenue agents must be just as visible as those state 
troopers on the roadway to prevent open season for sales tax theft.  Sales tax evasion is 
fundamentally different from income tax evasion, represents a very large portion of lost 
state revenues, and deserves dedicated research.   
 In Florida, there has been much discussion of lowering, or even eliminating, 
property taxes and compensating with an increase in the sales tax.  Ignoring the 
regressivity of such a proposal in an already regressive, narrow, and outdated tax 
structure, it must be noted that the property tax is truly nearly evasion free.  Undoubtedly 
those who propose such a change do not understand the true cost of the proposal in terms 
of increased sales tax theft and rate increases far in excess of those envisioned if revenue 
is to remain stable.  
 Perhaps more importantly, at least one proposal for a national sales tax calls for 
an elimination of the Internal Revenue Service under an assumption that the sales tax is 
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evasion free, even though, as mentioned previously, substantive research does not exist to 
support this assumption.  Talk of eliminating the Internal Revenue Service is likely no 
more than rhetorical “red meat for the masses” but may be a political liability if 
consumption tax evasion assumptions are erroneous.  Furthermore, under most economic 
theories, either rational or boundedly rational, the increase in the sales tax rate to a 
combined federal and state rate that exceeds 30 percent would increase the benefits 
related to evasion to the point where the risk of getting caught and the penalties involved 
would have to be enormous and especially serious to have any deterrence impact at all 
(Tait, 1988).  Mikesell (1997) also notes that considerable enforcement resources would 
be required to supplement existing state administrative capacities because of the much 
higher evasion rewards that would exist with a high national sales tax rate.  But even 
though Tait and Mikesell understand the issues with evasion as the sales tax rate rises, 
they still appear to believe, as most others do, that evasion at the lower rates levied by the 
American states is inconsequential.  It is my hope that this study will cause researchers to 
reexamine that belief and begin to question some of the assertions made by state agencies 
regarding voluntary compliance rates9
                                                          
9 Calculation of an evasion rate for sales tax is very difficult.  Using the theory that large companies are 
generally compliant and the estimate of 60% noncompliance to some degree on the part of most small 
companies, an estimate of sales tax theft and evasion in Florida would be likely within a range of $2.1 
billion to $6 billion annually (10% to 28%).  The size of the range is indicative of the difficulty in 
determining an appropriate cutoff between large and small companies, since the real issue is not size, but 
the extent to which appropriate internal controls exist.  Even at the low end of the range, 10%, the impact of 
evasion greatly exceeds the popular estimates of 2% to 5% and represents $24 billion in annual sales tax 
theft nationwide. 
. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TAXATION IN FLORIDA 
 
The Florida Department of Revenue 
 The current study reviews and analyzes tax compliance enforcement activities 
within the Florida Department of Revenue (“DOR”).  There are three major functional 
groups called Programs within DOR: Child Support Enforcement, Property Tax 
Oversight, and General Tax Administration (GTA).  The GTA program is structured 
functionally into the following Core Processes: Account Management, Compliance 
Determination, Compliance Support, Receivables Management, Resource Management, 
Return and Revenue Processing, Taxpayer Aid, and Taxpayer Services.  Each Core 
Process consists of Business Processes that focus on different functions.  My study 
focuses on specific Business Processes within the Compliance Determination and 
Receivables Management Processes that relate directly to the enforcement of sales tax 
laws and identification of evasion, which can be generally and simply described as, and 
will be referred to throughout this study as audit, collections, and criminal investigations.  
Audit includes tax enforcement campaigns and lead development.  Lead development 
involves the strategic analysis of data to identify taxpayers for audit.  Campaigns are 
likewise derived from strategic data analysis but are focused on enforcement problems 
within a particular industry or with respect to a particular issue.  The Collections Process 
includes enforcement operations, which include the filing of liens, property seizures, 
license revocations, and similar activities.  A partial organization chart for the Florida 
Department of Revenue is presented in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 DOR Partial Organizational Structure  
 
Source: Florida Department of Revenue (2010) 
 According to the 2006-2007 annual report (Florida Department of Revenue, 
2007), GTA administers 33 taxes and fees, and more than $39 billion in taxes annually, 
including almost $23 billion in sales tax.  Other major taxes and annual amounts are: fuel 
related taxes and fees, $3.2 billion; documentary stamp taxes $3.1 billion; corporate 
income and excise tax, $2.4 billion; communications services tax, $2.4 billion; and 
unemployment tax, $1 billion.  Florida has no state individual income tax.   
 At June 30, 2008, GTA had 2,278 employees, and this number has declined 
almost ten percent over the previous six-year period.  The GTA program processed more 
than 9.4 million returns during the fiscal year ending June 30, 2008, and issued 11,580 
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Notices of Proposed Assessment worth $421 million, issued one million bills for $315 
million, and issued more than 900,000 delinquency notices.  Enforced tax collections 
were more than $770 million and 876 criminal cases were closed resulting in 137 
prosecution referrals and 286 Tax Collection Enforcement Diversion Program referrals to 
State Attorney’s Offices.  There were 3,679 sales and use tax audits during the fiscal year 
carried out by 410 auditors resulting in an average assessment of $6,900 (General Tax 
Administration, 2008).  
 In administering the sales tax, DOR relies on businesses that collect the tax from 
their customers.  The taxpayers are the individuals who purchase from the businesses that 
collect the tax as agents for the State.  Businesses file a Sales and Use Tax Return each 
month (generally)10
 Most businesses report and remit taxes on time.  The percentage of unpaid taxes 
at June 30, 2008 was 1.63 percent.  This percentage is the outstanding receivables divided 
by the total tax due as reported on returns filed plus estimated delinquent amounts and 
 to report the amount of sales taxes collected and remitted with the 
return.  The return for the previous month is due on the first day of the following month 
and is delinquent after the 20th day of the month following the month during which the 
tax was collected.  For example, sales taxes collected during May 2009 must be remitted 
with a return filed by June 20, 2009.  If the 20th day of the month falls on a holiday or 
weekend, the due date shifts to the next business day.  So continuing the example, June 
20, 2009 is a Saturday, so the return and payment are due by Monday June 22, 2009.   
Taxpayers are required to file and remit taxes electronically if their annual tax liability 
exceeds $30,000. 
                                                          
10 Companies collecting smaller amounts of sales tax on an annual basis are allowed to file quarterly, semi-
annually, or annually depending on the amount of sales tax collected in the previous year. 
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amounts determined through audit and discovery activities.  Even though the percentage 
is small, the amount exceeds $500 million.  It is important to note that this figure 
accounts only for self-reported sales tax that has not yet been paid, estimated 
delinquencies of businesses that file late, and audit assessments that have not been paid.  
Estimates are based on amounts generally reported by the business.  The outstanding 
receivables used in this calculation do not include an estimate of tax evaded or stolen and, 
to the author’s knowledge; no such estimate is produced by DOR. 
 When a business does not file their return and pay the taxes on time, collections 
personnel start the collection effort by contacting the delinquent taxpayer in an attempt to 
bring them into compliance with the law.  In some cases, the taxpayer continues to be 
delinquent and may not file returns for an extended period of time.  When taxes remain 
outstanding and collection efforts have failed, a tax warrant (lien) will be filed at the 
courthouse in the county in which the business operates, or in multiple counties if 
applicable.  This lien works best if the business owns real property that cannot be sold 
with clear title until the lien is cleared.  In those cases the buyer may insist on the lien 
being paid or modifications to the purchase contract, such as reserves held in escrow for 
the payment of the liability, before completing the purchase.  Where the business does 
not own real property, the lien can attach to personal property but, from a practical 
standpoint, DOR would have to contact the buyer to inform them of the lien and potential 
levy and execution of the levy on the property.  In practice, however, DOR will rarely be 
aware of any potential sale of personal property or the name of the potential buyer.  The 
DOR has the authority to seize and sell personal property to satisfy the lien, but seizing 
and selling property is rarely done, except in the case of bank accounts, which are 
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frequently frozen pending the levy and ultimate seizure of funds up to the amount of the 
tax liability, penalties, interest, and fees. 
 Except when real property is involved, tax warrants are generally not much of an 
incentive for delinquent filers to file and remit the taxes owed.  In the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 2008, only 8.67% of tax warrants filed were cleared, paid in full, or subject to a 
payment agreement within 90 days of filing, and 39.52 percent were deemed 
uncollectible (Florida Department of Revenue, 2008).  Taxes are deemed uncollectible 
when, for example, the business owing the tax has closed or declared bankruptcy and 
neither the business nor the shareholders have any assets that can be levied.    
 Collectors have a very heavy workload.  In December 2008, the Service Centers 
around the state had 236,074 cases open representing more than $589 million in 
receivables.  In South Florida, where this study takes place, the workload is heavier than 
in other areas with 68,278 cases in Miami-Dade County alone out of a total of 152,852 
registered businesses.  This represents a staggering 44.67 percent of all businesses in 
delinquent status as opposed to an average of 20.46 percent for the rest of the state.  The 
result is that collectors have very little time to spend on any given delinquency since the 
ratio of open delinquencies to collectors is 785 to one in Miami-Dade County.   
 Businesses that are chronically delinquent and show little interest in compliance 
may also be subjected to a revocation hearing.  If their sales tax registration is revoked, 
they are essentially out of business since it is illegal to operate the business without a 
certificate of registration.  Revocation is used as a last resort, after virtually all other civil 
collection efforts have failed.  Specific guidelines exist and must be followed if a 
revocation is attempted.  At the revocation conference, the business may present a case 
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for why their registration should not be revoked; they may enter into an agreement to 
bring their business into compliance; or the result of the conference may be a 
recommendation that the certificate of registration be revoked. 
 Collectors and their supervisors may decide to refer a particular taxpayer for audit 
or for criminal investigation if the facts and circumstances warrant such a 
recommendation.  Audit selection is performed centrally in Tallahassee and selected 
cases are assigned to the local Service Centers, so a referral for audit may or may not 
result in an actual audit being performed.  Criminal investigation referrals are evaluated 
locally and accepted if there is probable cause that a crime has been committed.  If 
probable cause exists and certain other policy requirements are met, the Criminal 
Investigation Process is required to open an investigation. 
 Auditing remains an efficient and effective means of discovering additional tax 
liabilities for DOR based on the return on investment of additional budget dollars 
allocated for audit.  Currently, 76 percent of audits yield an assessment of additional 
taxes due to the state, a fact recognized by the Florida Legislature when they approved an 
additional 50 audit positions in the midst of deep cuts required to balance the fiscal 2009 
budget.  The problem with auditing in Florida is the same as it is at the federal level: 
there are so few auditors that the percentage of audits in a given year is very low.  As 
noted previously, there were 3,679 sales and use tax audits in Florida during the fiscal 
year ended June 30, 2008.  As of December 31, 2008, there were 972,977 registered 
businesses in the state.  That represents an audit rate of .38 percent (.0038).  While the 
literature states that there are diminishing returns to additional enforcement expenditures 
(see Alm, 1999 and Mikesell & Birskyte, 2006), it would appear that Florida has much 
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ground to cover before experiencing diminishing returns since the audit effort would need 
to almost triple to reach a one percent audit rate.  The state has been doing the opposite 
with the number of auditors dropping from 585 to just over 400 over the past eight years.  
The decision in the current budget year to add 50 audit positions because of serious 
budget shortfalls is an indication that the cost effectiveness of auditing is recognized.  It 
is also an indication that prior year reductions were based on ideology rather than a belief 
that additional audit resources would be a poor investment. 
 The Criminal Investigations Process has seen a drop in resources as well, though 
not as steep as the decline in audit resources because the process is smaller to begin with 
(34 investigators at December 2008).  In Miami-Dade County there are four investigators 
with two support staff and the region’s Investigations Manager is located there.  A review 
of data from the Criminal Investigations Case Management System revealed that at 
month end December 2009 the four investigators had 154 criminal investigations in their 
case inventories.  Assuming an average investigation requires 200 person hours,11
 
 that 
case inventory represents approximately four person-years of work per investigator.  An 
additional 15 to 30 criminal complaints are received each month that must be evaluated 
with an average of 14 of them qualifying for investigation.  Even though the statute of 
limitations for sales tax theft is five years rather than the normal statute for civil 
enforcement of three years, these data mean there are legitimate criminal investigations 
that simply cannot be carried out within the statute of limitations period given current 
resource levels and current policies.   
                                                          
11 In addition to cases averaging 200 investigative hours, investigators in Miami-Dade County are 
frequently involved in larger cases requiring 2,000 hours or more that span fiscal years. 
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Technology 
 Resource limitations at all levels cause the DOR management team to be very 
interested in efficiency improvements, and particularly improvement spurred by 
technology.  The implementation of SUNTAX (System for Unified Taxation) was begun 
by DOR in 2001 to replace the various antiquated mainframe programs accessed through 
DOS- or UNIX-based client systems in use at that time.  The SUNTAX system is now 
integrated with web-enabled applications that allow taxpayers to register, file reports, and 
pay tax bills online.  Additionally, electronic data interchange (EDI) and electronic funds 
transfer (EFT) capabilities are integrated that allow the Department to support electronic 
filing requirements mandated by the legislature.  For employees, rather than consulting a 
separate computer program, with a separate login, for each tax administered by DOR, 
SUNTAX allows a DOR employee to review all taxes to which a business is obligated 
from one system, and receive a status overview of all the taxes on a single screen.   
 The Department has expanded the SUNTAX system to include the use of MySAP 
Customer Relationship Management in the call center and SAP Business Intelligence 
technology to identify gaps in compliance patterns across industries and regions.  This 
data-warehousing technology has now been expanded to provide management staff with 
real time data reporting capability that enhances the management of day-to-day 
operations. As a result of this technology integration and reengineered administrative 
procedures, GTA has saved more than $96 million in cumulative budget allocations 
during the past five years.  It is further estimated that SUNTAX has produced $848 
million in increased revenue as a result of efficiency gains, improved audit and discovery 
leads, and identification of unregistered taxpayers (Florida Department of Revenue, 
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2007).  During the first six months after the data warehouse was brought online, DOR 
recovered more than $30 million in unpaid taxes from unregistered commercial rental 
properties with a continuing impact of $10 million per year. 
 The SUNTAX system is currently the nation’s largest (in terms of dollars 
administered and the range of taxes involved) integrated tax-administration system based 
on enterprise resource planning software and was featured in an article published in 
eWeek Magazine (Chen, 2005).  According to the article, the Department has hosted 
representatives from other states and 24 foreign governments who look to the Florida 
system as a model for their own technology efforts.   
 
Business Strategies 
 The DOR has invested heavily not only in technology, but in the development of 
strategic initiatives and the restructuring of the organization along business process lines.  
Each strategic initiative is decomposed into specific goals and tasks.  Each initiative is 
assigned to a team given the responsibility of evaluating the tasks required to accomplish 
strategic goals and to constantly monitor DOR’s progress toward achievement of these 
goals.  The strategic planning process is continual and fluid, with goals and objectives 
being updated as conditions dictate. 
 Performance accountability measures are monitored on a monthly basis and the 
annual results are shared with the legislature as part of DOR’s negotiations for positions 
and funding.  Performance accountability measures are coupled with quarterly strategic 
planning sessions to continuously evaluate organizational performance and develop 
strategies needed to achieve organization goals. The accountability process provides 
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DOR’s leaders with information that is used to deploy resources effectively and 
efficiently, and to select key strategic initiatives to make significant improvements to 
processes and performance. 
 The department has initiated a comprehensive leadership development system 
designed to recruit and hire talented people, train all managers in proven management 
techniques, provide cutting-edge feedback and evaluation tools, and make management 
decisions based on facts and organizational performance data.  Feedback and evaluation 
is provided using 360-degree feedback surveys for supervisory employees, climate 
surveys to monitor employee beliefs and opinions regarding DOR, and Employee 
Evaluation and Development Plans (EE&Ds). 
 Most DOR employees will tell you that their work is meaningful and satisfying.  
In the 2009 Climate Survey, almost 79 percent of employees stated they were proud to 
work for DOR, 77 percent were satisfied with their job, and more than 93 percent stated 
that their job was important to the success of DOR.   
 As in any successful organization, the people of DOR are one of its most 
important strengths.  Its management team is sophisticated and technically capable 
measured in terms of the interest in DOR’s quality programs on the part of other states 
and foreign countries and the awards garnered by the agency they manage.  Management 
has developed and nurtured an excellent relationship and reputation with the Governor, 
the Cabinet, and the legislature over the last 20 years indicating the management team is 
politically savvy as well.  The DOR won a Sterling Award in 1998 and used the Baldrige 
Criteria for Performance Excellence as the basis for development of DOR’s vision, 
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mission and core values statements, in the development of DOR strategic initiatives, and 
the restructuring of business processes within the organization. 
 As a group, the employees of DOR are dedicated to DOR’s mission, vision and 
values, and are well-matched to the positions they fill.  World-class technology and 
management accomplish little without the willing and committed participation of 
employees who understand the tasks assigned to them, have the training and abilities to 
perform efficiently and effectively, and believe in the goals and objectives enumerated by 
management.   
 
The Compliance Enforcement Environment 
 The DOR is well organized and generally well-positioned to function as a truly 
world-class tax administration organization.  But for all the technological advantage and 
human capital available to DOR, the probabilities are solidly stacked against DOR when 
it comes to stopping tax evasion and sales tax theft for one simple reason: the system is 
built on trust and has too few verification tools built in. 
 As noted in the discussion of theory, it is vital to understand that the sales tax 
functions differently from the income tax.  The business remitting sales tax to DOR is not 
a taxpayer: it is an agent of the state in a principal-agent relationship.  There are no third-
parties involved to supply information to DOR that could be used to verify the amounts 
of sales tax reported and remitted to DOR on any given monthly return.  The DOR must 
rely on the filing business to honestly report and remit the tax.  As long as a business 
does not become delinquent, they are generally left alone except for the .38 percent that is 
audited each year.   Many business owners understand that if they file a return every 
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month, on time, and pay the sales tax they report, they are unlikely to ever receive a call 
or notice from DOR.  In 2005, DOR prosecuted an accountant who facilitated a $2.3 
million sales tax theft by a used car dealer.  As part of his plea agreement the accountant 
spoke with members of the DOR Criminal Investigations Process frequently and admitted 
that he advised his clients to pay whatever they wanted to pay each month, but warned 
them to file on time and make sure the check did not bounce (the Hardcore Evaders in my 
typology).  Criminal investigators have documented this same pattern on numerous 
occasions in investigations covering many different types of businesses.  Small business 
owners and the accountants and bookkeepers who serve them are intimately familiar with 
the concept and benefits of “flying below the radar.”  
 Accountants and tax preparers who coach their clients on how to evade taxes is 
not a problem isolated to Florida.  In late 2007, the Criminal Investigations Division of 
the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance launched an initiative to 
determine to what extent tax professionals assisted their clients in the commission of tax 
fraud.  Investigators were sent undercover posing as taxpayers who hired more than 170 
tax preparers to prepare income or sales tax returns.  The result was that 31 percent of the 
preparers, including some licensed Certified Public Accountants, engaged openly in fraud 
by coaching their new “clients” on how to evade state and federal taxes.  Suggestions 
ranged from maintaining two sets of books to not keeping records of all cash receipts and 
skimming those proceeds not recorded.  Part of the solution in New York will be a push 
to regulate all tax preparers and enact standards of conduct and continuing professional 
education requirements for all tax preparers (Commiskey, 2010).  In a similar initiative to 
combat tax fraud perpetrated by tax preparers at the federal level, the Internal Revenue 
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Service has just announced their intention to expand preparer regulation to those tax 
preparers who are not currently regulated (Internal Revenue Service, 2010). 
 In some cases the boldness of the evader is striking.  In a detailed review of more 
than one thousand registered businesses, a significant number of them were found 
reporting exactly the same amount of sales tax collected every month, which is virtually 
impossible in a retail environment where customer purchasing patterns and customer mix 
are random.  Numerous convenience stores were found reporting varying amounts of 
gross sales each month, but the exact same percentage of exempt sales every month 
carried to two decimal places.  These examples are frequently noted and identified by 
those within DOR who develop audit and investigation leads, but the vast majority of the 
resources available to DOR are targeting delinquencies rather than analyzing reporting 
patterns that might indicate fraud.   
 It is my opinion that this problem is caused by the mindset that equates sales tax 
enforcement to income tax enforcement.  Sales tax enforcement operations are 
administered and structured in the same manner as income tax compliance systems.  The 
same trust placed in voluntary income tax reporting is erroneously granted in the setting 
of the sales tax, even though the sales tax does not enjoy the same reporting verification 
that exists, primarily through use of Forms W-2 and 1099, in an income tax system.  
Sales tax enforcement bears more resemblance to a contract management function than to 
income tax enforcement.  Contract management-type enforcement efforts would mean 
more departmental contact with non-delinquent business filers and much more attention 
paid to the indicators and evidence of fraudulent reporting gleaned from intelligence-
gathering operations.  Such a replacement of reactive responses to perceived 
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noncompliance with proactive action would represent a sea change in how DOR and 
other state revenue agencies approach enforcement.  The questions become whether such 
a change would be effective and, considering the current state of the budget, how could 
such a change actually be effected? 
 It is my opinion that the needed approach is relatively inexpensive in that it pays 
for itself and does not require the addition of a large number of personnel.  Rather, it 
requires a change in focus to recognize and account for the boundaries of the sales tax 
gap.  With respect to Florida, the change in focus takes the form of an expansion and 
modification of programs already in place that rely on the expertise and experience of the 
agency’s employees supplemented by available technology. 
 
Knowledge-Based Enforcement 
 Teaching its managers to use knowledge effectively in the performance of their 
assigned duties and to share that knowledge with their assigned personnel is an important 
priority for DOR.  All managers are required to engage in formal Knowledge Based 
Learning (KBL) projects.  I had the opportunity to assist in the KBL project carried out 
by the Investigations Manager of the Southern Region.  The results of this study are 
illustrative of how field expertise can be applied to a problem to develop potential 
solutions.  It is also an example of the difficulties involved in measuring compliance and 
how widespread noncompliance can be. 
 On the basis of an increasing number of business owner complaints, it became 
apparent that the sale of telephone calling cards represented a problem with respect to 
collection of the sales tax.  Business owners complained that none of their competitors 
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were charging tax on the sale of the calling cards.  As a result, customers were refusing to 
buy the cards from these compliant businesses, accusing them of attempting to “rip them 
off” since “no one else charged tax” on the cards.  It appeared that customers had become 
convinced that calling cards were nontaxable.  A review of   numerous investigation files 
confirmed that failure to collect tax on the cards was common.   
 On its face, it might appear that calling cards might represent an immaterial 
amount of tax revenue to the state.  It is true that many stores sell only $100 to $200 
worth of cards per month.  However, DOR identified many thousands of stores statewide 
that were likely to sell the cards.  Additionally, some stores sell a large quantity of cards.  
South Florida in particular is home to many people of foreign nationality who frequently 
call relatives outside the country, and rely on telephone calling cards to do so at 
discounted rates.  There are also smaller stores that have developed a solid business by 
relying on sales of calling cards to the crews of cruise ships at ports throughout the state.   
 In an attempt to arrive at an estimate of phone card sales in South Florida, 
investigations personnel obtained the sales records for several major wholesalers in the 
area and sales were traced to their customers.  Many of the customers were wholesalers 
themselves.  The total wholesale cost of telephone calling cards sold in 2005 identified 
through this process was $323,425,517, with a retail value of $404,281,896.  Not all sales 
of telephone calling cards in South Florida were identified through this process since the 
study focused on only a few wholesalers, but it did provide some perspective on the 
scope of the potential problem.  The sales tax on these sales would be $24,256,913.76 for 
the year 2005.  The project was not conceptualized as a scientific endeavor with a 
representative sample of wholesale dealers for generalization of the results, but rather a 
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selection of some of the larger independent dealers to arrive at a reasonable estimate 
based on volume.  On its face, the amount of sales tax represented by the sales reviewed 
during this study is significant. 
 To estimate compliance, a representative sample of businesses was selected 
from those in Miami-Dade County that sell calling cards, concentrating on grocery stores, 
convenience stores, and gas stations with convenience stores.  Investigators were 
dispatched to each location in the sample to answer two key questions: 
1. Does the store sell prepaid calling cards? 
2. If so, does the store collect sales tax on the sale of prepaid calling cards? 
 Investigators visited each store in the sample and purchased a telephone calling 
card from each store that sold them, obtaining 127 usable responses after eliminating 
businesses that had closed and those with invalid addresses.  The overall confidence 
interval for the sample results was +/- 8.41 percent at the 95 percent confidence level.  
The actual confidence interval related to a specific response varies based on how skewed 
the response level is and is noted in the results below.  The overall results of the survey 
were as follows: 
 
Table 4.1 Prepaid Calling Card Sales Including Chain Stores 
Percentage of businesses selling prepaid calling cards a 85.0 
Percentage of businesses collecting tax on prepaid calling cards b 20.4 
Percentage of businesses that were part of major store chains 12.6 
a  Confidence interval +/- 6.00 percent 
b Confidence interval +/- 6.77 percent 
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 All of the major chain stores collected sales tax on prepaid calling cards.   The 
estimation of the total sales of calling cards in South Florida was based on wholesalers 
who did not sell to major chain stores.  Therefore, a separate analysis was performed on 
the responses of those stores that are not part of a major chain.  There were 111 valid 
responses from stores not part of a major chain.  The overall confidence interval for this 
group is +/- 9.03 percent at the 95 percent confidence level.  Again, the actual confidence 
interval related to a specific response varies based on how skewed the responses were and 
is presented below.  The results of this analysis are as follows: 
 
Table 4.2 Prepaid Calling Card Sales Excluding Chain Stores 
Percentage of businesses selling prepaid calling cards a 82.9 
Percentage of businesses collecting tax on prepaid calling cards b 6.5 
a Confidence interval +/- 6.80 percent 
b Confidence interval +/- 4.45 percent 
 
 The preliminary conclusions of the study were that major chain stores are 
properly collecting sales tax on the sale of prepaid telephone calling cards, and only a 
small percentage of independent stores are collecting tax on the sale of prepaid telephone 
calling cards.   
 When these results were combined with the estimate of the retail sales value of 
prepaid telephone calling cards sold in Miami-Dade County by the wholesalers reviewed, 
the study concluded that only $1,576,699 of $24,256,913.76 of potential annual sales tax 
on prepaid telephone calling cards sold in Miami-Dade County is being collected.  It was 
conservatively inferred that total sales tax lost statewide on an annual basis is 
approaching the $80 million to $90 million range. 
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 The next step in the project was to evaluate potential responses to the problem 
identified.  Florida Statutes Section 212.05(1)(e)(1)(a) makes it clear that prepaid calling 
arrangements, including recharge of a prepaid calling arrangement, is taxable at a rate of 
six percent.  There are no gray areas, planning opportunities, or legal challenges related 
to this statute, yet it is routinely ignored by a large majority of businesses to which it 
applies.  When confronted with the illegality of not charging the sales tax on prepaid 
calling cards, many business owners decided not to sell them at all, citing the fact that if 
they charge the tax, they will not make the sale.  Businesses that have complained to 
DOR cite that not collecting the sales tax gives their competitors an unfair advantage over 
businesses that prefer to obey the law, and that is precisely what makes this situation so 
serious.  When businesses begin competing by not collecting the tax to gain a pricing 
advantage and are not penalized for doing so, subsidizing their profit margins by keeping 
a portion of the taxes they do collect becomes attractive. The state loses credibility when 
it cannot enforce the law, so corrective action is critical, but what options are available?   
 Some business owners decided to sell the calling cards and pay the taxes 
themselves.  However, Florida Statutes 212.07(2) and (4) require the tax be added to the 
purchase price and prohibits the dealer from holding out to the public, in any manner, that 
the dealer will absorb or pay the sales tax.  While it may be admirable that certain dealers 
are honest enough to pay the tax themselves, it is poor public policy to count on dealers 
to break one law in order to comply with another. 
 In certain cases where it is not practicable for a dealer to add the amount of tax to 
the purchase amount, DOR is granted the authority by Florida Statutes 213.07(2) to 
establish an effective tax rate for that industry.  Common examples are alcoholic drinks 
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sold in a bar or goods sold through vending machines.  Rather than calculate the tax and 
add it to the selling price, an effective tax rate is applied to the sale to determine the 
amount of tax collected that must be remitted.  While this could be an option for the 
prepaid calling card industry, it would require adjustment of the cost and profit structure 
within the industry, and would probably result in either the tax being absorbed, which is 
against the law, or the tax being avoided by not reporting the sales, which is common 
under current law. 
 The legislature could decide to make prepaid calling cards exempt from tax.  This 
would effectively forfeit the state’s claim to the $80 million to $90 million in additional 
revenue that would result from these sales.  Given that more than 60 percent of the dollar 
amount of transactions in Florida is already exempted from tax, with the amount 
exempted increasing annually, (Florida Department of Revenue, 2010) it could be argued 
that the state needs fewer exemptions, not more.  However, it may be better to forgo the 
additional revenue than to maintain a law that cannot be enforced for reasons already 
discussed.  
 A logical question at this point is: why not just enforce the law?  The answer is 
simple: the cost will exceed the benefit.  In determining the estimated sales tax revenue 
from prepaid calling card sales, only data from convenience stores, gas stations, and 
independent grocery stores were used.  There were approximately 16,000 of these in the 
state at the time the data were gathered.  But prepaid calling cards are sometimes sold in 
beauty salons, drug stores, dollar stores, restaurants, coffee shops, and many other types 
of general retail stores.   This expands the number of businesses that sell the cards to 
more than 100,000.  It is not possible to tell if a business is reporting their calling card 
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sales by reviewing their Sales and Use Tax Return.  The return contains no detail.  The 
only way to know, and therefore to enforce, the collection of tax on the sale of the cards 
is to audit the business or otherwise obtain records in a criminal investigation.  Either 
solution is costly and would require personnel expansions that could not be justified from 
increased calling card tax revenues alone.  Recall that DOR’s 410 auditors carried out 
3,679 audits in 2008.  Resources simply do not allow auditing these 100,000 businesses 
to make sure they are collecting the tax on calling cards. 
 It has been hypothesized that a better approach to the problem might be obtaining 
the records of the wholesalers and tracking those sales to the retail stores to make sure the 
sales are reported.  But many of a particular wholesaler’s customers are also wholesalers, 
who sell to other wholesalers.  Once transactions are traced through the wholesale chain 
to the ultimate retail dealer, the lack of detail on the Sales and Use Tax Returns submitted 
by the retail dealers makes it impossible to determine if the sales of the calling cards are 
actually included.  For example, assume you trace the sales records from a wholesaler to 
a retailer and determine that the retailer purchased $200 worth of calling cards for resale 
during the month.  The retailer is a convenience store and also sells beer, cigarettes, soda, 
snack foods, and household items.  The retailer reports $70,000 in sales for the month.  
How do you determine if the $200 of calling cards is included in the $70,000 of sales 
reported?  You cannot without auditing or otherwise reviewing the retailer’s sales 
documentation to determine what is included in the $70,000 reported.  Unfortunately the 
card sales are individually immaterial but have cumulative potential for large revenue 
losses. 
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 While tracing the sales from wholesaler to retailer to the sales tax return will not 
solve the problem, an approach at the wholesale level may still be the answer.  Years ago 
Florida had similar compliance problems with fuel taxes on the sales of gasoline.  The 
state solved this problem in 1996, as many other states have done, by beginning to collect 
all taxes on fuel “at the rack.”  In other words, when delivery tanker trucks bring the 
gasoline to the retail gas station, the tax has already been paid.  The dealer has no returns 
to file to report fuel taxes and does not need to collect the taxes from their customers 
since they are included in the price of a gallon of gasoline.  The same could be done with 
respect to prepaid calling cards.  If the tax is collected at the wholesale level for all 
calling cards distributed or recharged within Florida, the state gets its sales tax revenues 
and the retailers no longer have an issue with unfair competition.  Auditing becomes 
easier because there are now only a few larger wholesale businesses collecting the tax 
rather than tens of thousands of smaller retail businesses. 
 By utilizing the expertise of employees, as in this example, and channeling that 
expertise into a targeted focus on the tax enforcement gap that exists between “chasing 
delinquencies” and full audits and investigations, the gap can be attacked using 
intelligence-gathering techniques and existing enforcement tools to identify issues and 
problems and determine the appropriate enforcement approach to use.  Employees of 
DOR have exhibited the ability to successfully engage in this type of activity.  Employees 
participate in discovery operations and campaigns that function in a similar manner, an 
example of which is the aforementioned commercial rental project that produced $30 
million in new tax revenue from unregistered landlords.  In order to expand these 
operations sufficiently to attack the tax gap, DOR must reallocate time and resources, but 
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it is unlikely that large numbers of additional employees or enforcement infrastructure 
expenditures will be required.  Employees already have access to a wide array of 
intelligence tools and enforcement mechanisms and some have the expertise and 
experience required to perform the extended functions.  The task is not one of expanding 
the bureaucracy, but one of re-tasking a portion of the existing enforcement capabilities 
of the Department to an expanded role for discovery and campaign-type operations at the 
local level and changing their character from one-time compliance efforts to continuous 
enforcement. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 The primary hypothesis in this study is that the effectiveness of compliance 
enforcement efforts will be improved if active, well-informed enforcement activities, 
characterized by substantial contact initiated by agents of the state, are substituted for 
passive or reactive activities.  This hypothesis recognizes the very large gap in 
compliance that exists in the current enforcement regime as illustrated in Figure 5.1.  The 
bulk of enforcement activities are reactive in nature: a business fails to file a return and 
receives a contact from a collector.  Proactive discovery operations, audits, and criminal 
investigations constitute a minute percentage of enforcement efforts.  As a result, the 
compliance gap has the potential to be enormous with more than 99 percent of all 
businesses in the category of trust without verification. 
 
Figure 5.1 Focus of Sales Tax Enforcement Efforts in Florida 
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 The methodology employed in this study involves a preliminary study of the 
current enforcement regime in Florida, which was presented in Chapter 4; followed by an 
analysis of two enforcement tools that the author believes are critical to the success of the 
design; and finally the conduct of a quasi-experimental project applying the tools and 
concepts of discovery operations to a targeted industry enforcement program.  The 
proposed enforcement design is summarized in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2 Proposed Enforcement Design for Closing the Tax Gap 
 
 
 
 The enforcement design works as follows: 
 
1. A DOR employee or employees with industry experience evaluate the target 
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customer traffic information, and other financial and nonfinancial information 
related to cost and profitability. 
2. On the basis of the business profiles, the employee evaluates the businesses 
within the industry to identify targets for possible enforcement action.  For 
example, a business that appears to be extremely profitable but reports very low 
gross sales per month. 
3. The employee engages the business to determine compliance.  The engagement 
may take the form of a site visit, a letter, or a phone conversation.  Multiple 
contacts serve the dual purpose of beginning the compliance process with respect 
to the individual companies contacted and alerting the industry in general that the 
state has the ability and the will to enforce the tax laws. 
4. On the basis of the results of engagement, the employee must determine what 
additional action is warranted: referral for audit, referral to collections after the 
identification and documentation of the liability, referral for criminal 
investigation, or enlisting other interested agencies in a more comprehensive 
compliance effort if indicated.  In some cases the result of engagement will be 
immediate compliance. 
5. The evaluation and engagement cycle is continuously applied to the industry. 
The end result of the industry enforcement activities is assumed to be greater 
compliance industry-wide than what would be achieved using only traditional 
enforcement tools, i.e., audit and collection activities.  The impact of the industry 
enforcement activities is reinforced as news of the enforcement activities is 
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communicated through both formal and informal channels.  The continuous looping of 
the process prevents recidivism. 
This design is very similar to current discovery and campaign operations carried 
out by DOR.  The main difference is that the proposed targeted industry enforcement 
program is planned and executed wholly at the local level by local employees, and is a 
continuous process rather than an isolated compliance exercise that may not be repeated 
for several years.  The employee or employees given the responsibility for a particular 
industry will not approach their responsibility as a linear process of research, identify 
targets, and engage, but as one of continuous research and target identification 
simultaneous with engagement.  The approach is one of consistent compliance pressure 
on the industry utilizing a minimum amount of resources prepared with the maximum 
amount of knowledge and information.  The key is activity informed by intelligence that 
is accurate and actionable. 
There are two tools that are indispensible to the efficient success of this process: 
the intuition of the employee performing the research and analysis function, and the use 
of task force structures to expand resources at little or no cost.  The presentation of the 
author’s proposed methodology includes an analysis of the effectiveness of task force 
operations; an exercise utilizing an observational survey to measure the effectiveness of 
intuition in identifying noncompliance; and finally, an analysis of a complete cycle of a 
targeted industry enforcement program. 
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Baseline Activities  
 Interviews of DOR field personnel were conducted and current and historical 
management data, reports, and other relevant documents were reviewed to construct a 
baseline for compliance activities currently carried out by DOR personnel.  This provided 
an understanding of the current enforcement paradigm.  Much of the information 
contained in Chapter 4 was gleaned from these interviews and document reviews, and 
information from this work will be referenced throughout the discussions that follow. 
 
Analysis of the Effectiveness of Task Force Utilization 
In this section the impact of the Region 5 Investigation Unit’s participation in task 
forces composed of multiple federal, state, and local agencies on coordinated large case 
efforts is evaluated.  The results of task force utilization versus the results of regions that 
do not utilize task force operations are evaluated using descriptive statistics comparing 
investigative hours required to complete cases, cost to complete cases, and tax, civil 
liabilities, and restitution realized per case.  Means, mean differences, and significance 
tests are presented using the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) format.12
 Investigative hours per case, cost per case, and the amount of tax, civil liabilities 
and criminal restitution were obtained from the Criminal Investigations Process (CIP) 
Case Management System for each case.  Cases that are investigated as part of a task 
force with at least two other federal, state or local agencies are classified as task force 
cases, while cases that are originated in-house and worked in-house with only minor 
outside assistance from no more than one outside agency are classified as standard cases. 
   
                                                          
12 The data gathered is an enumeration of the entire population of data rather than samples and significance 
testing is unnecessary.  ANOVA tables are used for reporting convenience. 
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Tax Evasion Predictors from Industry Samples  
 To build comfort in the level of sales reported on a sales tax return, it is possible 
to develop a “feel” for the business and the level of sales it should be reporting.  This 
process is highly subjective, but could be developed into a systematic ritual for evaluation 
of potential sales tax theft.  To test this hypothesis, I began with the data accumulated for 
the targeted industry enforcement study discussed in the next section.  These data include 
reporting and compliance information for 192 used car dealers that have been identified 
as targets for compliance enforcement activities.  Since these data included only dealers 
where sales tax theft was probable, an additional 238 dealers selected at random were 
added and any overlap with existing data was eliminated to provide the study with a 
number of dealers not involved in sales tax theft.  An observational survey was 
completed for each dealer within the sample.  The survey contained twenty-four 
characteristics designed to measure the robustness of the business environment.  The 
survey was designed as a proxy for the judgment DOR personnel should use to identify 
leads when reviewing industry data.  Additional data on property rentals, property 
ownership, community demographics, and corporate ownership was obtained from public 
databases and added to the data obtained through direct observation. 
 A dichotomous tax evasion construct was developed for use as the dependent 
variable in binary logistic regression analysis.  Tax evasion is indicated for any dealer 
where the tax reported and remitted is less than 90 percent of the sales tax collected.  
With respect to car dealers, tax evasion at the rate of ten percent can be very substantial, 
and a number closer to five percent would be preferable.  However, the observational 
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survey as designed is a blunt instrument and is not sensitive enough to provide for a 
smaller threshold. 
 The survey responses have been operationalized as constructs representing cost 
structure, profit structure, and management and are the primary independent variables in 
my analysis.  Two additional independent variables were added to measure the impact of 
prior participation in an amnesty program in 2003 and to test whether businesses that 
were chronically delinquent were higher risks for sales tax theft than those who were 
more compliant than chronic delinquents. 
 The cost structure construct is developed from the evaluation of survey responses 
for neighborhood type (wealthy to poor), high-rent area versus low-rent, customer 
activity (customer traffic) at the site, and whether they offer in-house financing.  For 
example, a dealership near middle-class neighborhoods, in a relatively high-rent business 
area, with lots of customer activity, and that internally finances its sales represents a large 
fixed cost structure.  The final independent variable for cost structure derived from the 
survey responses is dichotomous and is judgmentally derived from a review of observed 
characteristics.  It indicates the extent to which the cost structure suggested by these 
factors is consistent with the level of sales reported on a monthly basis. 
 The profit structure construct is developed from the evaluation of survey 
responses for the condition and type of cars sold and the cleanliness and maintenance of 
the facility.  A business selling late model cars that are in good condition from an 
immaculate lot indicates a profitable business.  The profit structure variable is 
dichotomous and is judgmentally derived from a review of observed characteristics. It 
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indicates the extent to which the profit structure suggested by survey responses is 
consistent with the level of sales reported on a monthly basis. 
 The management construct is developed from the evaluation of survey questions 
related to a history of filing sales tax returns with “round” numbers, a history of filing 
returns with incomplete data, and a history of late-filed sales tax returns.  Historically, 
these are factors that have been deemed to indicate a business that is underreporting gross 
sales and sales tax collected.  If any of these three factors is present, the variable is 
assigned a dichotomous value that indicates “poor reporting history,” and therefore likely 
evasion activity. 
 Filers who are chronically delinquent are identified as those who were delinquent 
or had returned checks in more than ten percent of the periods for which returns were 
required of them. 
 Prior amnesty participants were identified through research in the System for 
Unified Taxation, which denotes participants but provides no additional data relating to 
the amnesty claim. 
 Binary logistic regression analysis was used to test the predictive ability of the 
observational survey and, by proxy, the potential value of observational judgments by 
Revenue employees when appropriately channeled. 
 
Targeted Industry Enforcement Program Analysis 
This section evaluates my proposed compliance enforcement design, which is 
supplementary to current enforcement activities.  As a result of budgetary restrictions, it 
is necessary to find new techniques to magnify the resources available for enforcement 
85 
 
and achieve more with less.  One approach is to target a specific industry and focus 
enforcement efforts on the basis of combined intelligence from a variety of sources.  This 
approach represents a strategy derived from the theory of planned behavior to impact the 
perception of behavioral control by increasing the perceived probability of being caught 
evading taxes.  The industry targeted for this coordinated effort was the used car industry.  
A review of the history of collections, audit, and criminal investigations indicates that 
compliance in this industry has been consistently low and tax theft cases are normally 
large in terms of tax dollars stolen.  It is notable that this is an industry regulated by 
another state agency that cooperatively collects data that can be used to verify whether a 
dealer has remitted all of the sales tax it collects.  Even given this ability to check third-
party records, my review indicates dealers still commit sales tax theft with astonishing 
regularity while reporting correct data to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor 
Vehicles.  It is also notable that cross-checking methodology for this interagency data has 
not been automated.  An important caveat to this verification process is that if this cross-
check indicates that all sales tax collected has been remitted by a dealer, it does not 
necessarily mean that dealer has not converted sales tax collected to personal use.  It 
simply means that if that dealer has stolen sales tax, he or she was diligent enough to 
cover their tracks by making sure the amounts reported to the Department of Highway 
Safety and Motor Vehicles was consistent with amounts reported to the Department of 
Revenue, i.e., they are Proficient Evaders. 
Vehicle sales transaction data are provided quarterly by the Department of 
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) on compact disks that include all sales 
transactions for which Florida titles were issued during the quarter.  Currently, the 
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number of transactions is approximately three million per year by more than 12,000 
dealers.  Since these databases include new car sales, RV sales, mobile home sales, lien 
maintenance transactions, and other transactions outside the scope of this study, the data 
have been edited and the quarterly databases compiled into a single database containing 
only used car transactions for the periods July 2003 through May 2008.  This database 
contains more than 3,200,000 individual transaction records.  Additionally, this new 
database has been divided into five separate regional databases so that analyses can be 
carried out on a region-by-region basis.  Cross reference tables were created that match 
the DHSMV dealer numbers with DOR taxpayer identification numbers for Miami-Dade 
County dealers.  Individual sales transactions and the associated sales tax collected were 
accumulated and the results compared with the sales tax returns filed with DOR for all 
dealers located in Miami-Dade County.  Sales tax return data was exported from DOR’s 
System for Unified Taxation (SUNTAX) and matched with the sales transaction data 
dealer-by-dealer for Miami-Dade County to identify the total amount of potential sales 
tax theft and the amount of potential theft by dealer.  This process is diagramed in Figure 
5.3. 
 The potentially tax evading dealers in Miami-Dade County were selected from the 
analysis above.  For policy reasons, companies that were currently under audit, were the 
subject of active collection activity, or were under criminal investigation were excluded 
and removed from the analysis.  Companies that were closed or inactive were also 
removed.   
Companies that exhibited very large amounts of potential sales tax theft or very 
high percentages of sales tax theft were segregated for full criminal investigation.  These 
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are companies where the discrepancy between the amount of sales tax reported to 
DHSMV and the amount reported to DOR was so large or so great a percentage of total 
taxes collected that the possibility of mistake or other good explanation would appear to 
be implausible.  For example, the top company in this group shows possible tax theft in 
 
Figure 5.3 The Auto Dealer Tax Return to Title Application Comparison Process 
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forces with a South Florida task force dedicated to auto theft, dealer fraud, and similar 
crimes related to the auto industry.  Working these cases in task force format is an 
extension of techniques successfully applied to large groups of related companies to large 
groups of similar but unrelated companies.   
 The remaining companies exhibit significant amounts of potential sales tax theft, 
but the amounts and percentage of total taxes not remitted were low enough to potentially 
be the result of errors, repossession credits that were not properly documented, or 
otherwise subject to reasonable explanation that might preclude criminal prosecution.  
These remaining dealers were randomly assigned to one of seven groups.  Because of the 
nature of the subject matter and the requirements for fair application of the law, 
development of an experimental model for this portion of the study based on random 
assignment was not possible.  However, the groupings were maintained to enable 
working with only as many entities at one time as resources would allow.  The activities 
carried out during this phase of my study were carried out solely within CIP which, at the 
time of the study, had only four investigators for all of Miami-Dade County and only one 
that could be assigned part-time to this project. 
 The targeted industry enforcement program analysis was implemented as a quasi-
experimental time series design involving pretesting and post-testing one group of 
subjects at various times to determine the effect of enforcement interventions over time.  
While random assignment to groups was used, the design is not experimental because the 
treatments between the groups could not be varied and, while a control group existed for 
comparison between the application of the first intervention and the first measurement 
date, it was not possible to shield the control group from “spillover” effects of 
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enforcement activities on the first wave of interventions.  The control group was also 
subject to interventions at a later date. 
 The final intervention study group was composed of 110 dealers with potential 
sales tax theft of $6,371,914.18, or 22.31 percent of the total taxes collected by these 
companies. 
 The Major Case group was composed initially of 43 dealers with potential sales 
tax theft of $14,164,214.64, or 60.44 percent of the total taxes collected by these 
companies. 
 There were an additional 34 dealers with total potential tax theft of $606,016.  
This group was dubbed the “Low Theft” group.  The amount of potential theft by each 
dealer was small enough that the decision was made to monitor this group throughout the 
study and apply interventions to them last if it appeared that the potential theft amount 
was growing or had not been resolved by timing differences. 
 Five dealers with potential tax theft of $279,167 were removed from the study 
because they were identified for criminal investigation, audit, or other enforcement 
activities during the preparatory stages of the study. 
 Each of the dealers in the intervention study group was contacted by the 
investigator to obtain an explanation and reconciliation of the differences between the 
amount of sales tax reported to DHSMV and the amount reported to DOR.  As a result of 
the serious nature of the potential tax crime being investigated, all dealers were subject to 
the same treatment, both because it is fair and because it is required by DOR policy.  The 
only difference in the initial intervention approach is that dealers subsequent to the first 
wave received a letter that emphasized the potential criminal nature of the investigation 
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because a significant number of the dealers contacted in the first wave ignored the letter.  
While it was done for practical reasons that had nothing to do with this study, this change 
did offer the opportunity to gauge the difference in response when it is made clear the 
potential ramifications are criminal rather than civil.  The difference in response between 
the two treatments was analyzed using a one-way ANOVA. 
 An immediate indication of success of the intervention is the collection of tax 
evaded in prior periods as a result of the intervention, but the longer term success of the 
contact with the taxpayer is of equal importance.  It has been hypothesized that the 
dealers will become newly compliant and more compliant in the future if they believe 
their reporting is being monitored and that the opportunity for sales tax evasion or theft is 
not available.  The longer term success of these interventions is determined by applying 
repeated-measures ANOVA to measures of the amount of sales tax theft in lagging 
periods after the intervention.  For the second wave of interventions, only one 
measurement period after the intervention is available at the time of this writing, so a 
paired samples t-test was used to evaluate the impact of the intervention at the 
measurement date.  One would expect compliance improvement during the short term 
following the intervention with the possibility of a return to evasion activities in the 
longer term if contact is not maintained in some way.  The indirect impact of 
interventions on companies not subject to direct intervention was also measured using 
paired samples t-tests. 
 The construct to be measured is compliance with the sales tax laws as measured 
by the amount of tax theft on a monthly basis by each car dealer within the study group, 
both before and at various points after the interventions.  The monthly tax theft 
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compliance measure was used as the dependent variable in the repeated-measures 
ANOVA and in paired samples t-tests.   
 The overall success of the interventions with respect to the entire pool is 
determined by comparing the results obtained through the application of the interventions 
to the proforma results had the interventions not been applied using one-way analysis of 
variance.   
 Additionally, the interactions with dealers during the intervention process have 
been documented and qualitatively analyzed to gain insight on the motives and needs of 
the dealers that led to noncompliance, attitudes with respect to compliance, and peer 
support structures within the industry that contribute to subjective norms. 
 Search warrants were drafted, approved, and executed on the companies 
comprising the Major Case group by a newly formed task force comprised of DOR 
investigators, members of the Auto Theft Task Force of the Miami-Dade Police 
Department, representatives from the Department of Highway Safety and Motor 
Vehicles, and representatives from the Miami-Dade County State Attorneys Office.  The 
results of the handling of the Major Case group were subject to qualitative analysis 
regarding the efficiency of applying large related-group task force techniques to a large 
group of unrelated companies within the same industry. 
 
Reliability and Validity 
According to Neuman (2003), reliability and dependability are achieved when the 
results produced by the indicators utilized do not vary because of the characteristics of 
the measurement process itself.  All constructs utilized in this study were clearly 
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conceptualized and are easily measured and subject to precise measurement, with the 
exception of the observations reflected in the predictors of tax evasion survey.  The 
survey was specifically designed to represent the judgment and analysis processes of 
experienced DOR personnel rather than a precise measurement of the subject matter.  The 
measurements, computations, and tests presented in this study are easily replicable and 
are designed specifically with replication in mind since the methodology is intended for 
constant-cycle utilization in compliance enforcement operations. 
Internal validity refers to the “approximate truth about inferences regarding cause-
effect or causal relationships” (Trochim, 2006).   Internal validity has been addressed 
through the use of random samples to supplement the data in the survey portion of this 
study and random assignment in the quasi-experimental portion of this study.  Perhaps of 
greater importance, the subjects in this study to which interventions are applied and 
causal relationships are assumed represent the entire population of tax evaders within the 
industry chosen and not a sample.  As a result, the statistics offered are descriptive of the 
population and threats due to sampling errors are not relevant.  Social interaction threats 
are also not threats to validity in this study because the study relies on social interaction 
as part of the stimulus to achieve the desired change in behavior.  The theory of planned 
behavior specifically includes components for social norms and attitude which are also 
targets of the enforcement methodology being tested here.  Rather than controlling for 
and attempting to eliminate social interaction as a causal effect, this study attempts to 
exploit social interaction as a component of the compliance enforcement effort.   
All access to government documents, reports and personnel required to complete 
this study were permitted; all data required to complete this study were made available; 
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and Department of Revenue personnel were cooperative throughout.  All data utilized in 
this study were accumulated specifically with this study in mind, so there were no issues 
with appropriate units of analysis, theoretical definitions, lack of control over how data 
were collected, or changes in definition over time.  Statistical procedures were chosen 
based on how well they addressed the specific issues and questions under consideration 
and all assumptions of specific statistical procedures were met.  All statistical operations 
were carried out using SPSS statistics software.  External validity, in the sense of 
generalizing the results of this study to other settings, is enhanced by these same factors 
and by the very salient fact that the study was centered within the active enforcement 
operations of a state revenue agency.   
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CHAPTER 6 
TASK FORCE UTILIZATION: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 Since 2004, DOR Southern Region Investigations has been actively participating 
in task force operations.  In this study, “task force” refers to coordinated enforcement 
efforts with two or more other agencies that have enforcement interests with respect to 
the same businesses or individuals.  As homeland security issues have become more 
important after the events of September 11, 2001, local law enforcement agencies have 
been tasked with greater security and first-responder responsibilities and, likewise, have 
seen their budgets augmented with federal funds for homeland security that can indirectly 
benefit DOR’s enforcement efforts.13
                                                          
13 As a state regulatory agency, DOR does not qualify to directly receive Homeland Security funding and 
grants. 
  Further, federal agencies, primarily the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), often have an interest in foreign-born U. S. businessmen 
who transfer or carry large sums of money from U. S. business operations out of the 
country, particularly when those funds are traced to locations associated with terrorist 
activity.  The businesses or individuals who attract such interest do not do so simply 
because they transfer money outside the country: there are generally other factors that 
identify these individuals and their activities as suspicious.  Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) may also have an interest because workers are sometimes brought 
into this country illegally to work in otherwise legitimate businesses for what amounts to 
slave wages.  While the transfer of monies overseas or using illegal immigrants to work 
in U. S. businesses is not within the purview of DOR employees, it has been noted that 
these same businesses are usually involved in sales tax theft as well.  In fact, in several 
recent cases investigated by DOR Southern Region Investigations, a substantial portion 
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of the “profits” from local businesses transferred overseas was, in fact, stolen Florida 
sales tax.  This adds a homeland security interest to sales tax enforcement.  Therefore it 
becomes doubly important for DOR to be involved in these cases, first because 
significant amounts of sales taxes are being stolen through these illegal operations, and 
second, because stolen sales tax in these cases not only allow the illegal businesses to 
gain a competitive advantage over legitimate businesses, but those advantages are 
accruing to and financing those who seek to harm our country.  It is clear that DOR has a 
vested interest in these cases which, in itself, is enough to justify participation.  It is 
likewise true that other federal, state, and local agencies involved in homeland security 
have broad resources to bring to the table and are keenly interested in doing so.  
Frequently, the state tax charges are more easily proven and provide the shortest route for 
law enforcement to shut down these illegal operations and gain valuable insight and 
intelligence.   
 Southern Region Investigations has found that participation in these task forces 
leads to less expensive investigations because other agencies cover much of the cost by 
providing surveillance and intelligence and by paying for information obtained through 
third-party subpoenas.  Moreover, the entities that are the targets of these investigations 
are generally larger and, in theory, yield much higher revenue recoveries per investigative 
hour than non-task force cases.  On the other hand, task force cases can take longer to 
develop because of the diverse interests in the case.  Participation requires an 
acknowledgement that other agencies have their own interests to pursue which may 
require additional time.  However, in addition to cost savings and larger recoveries, task 
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force participation generally allows action against much larger entities and groups of 
entities than DOR would otherwise be able to manage.   
 A recent example of this was the February 2009 execution of 30 separate search 
warrants, statewide and simultaneously, on a single day that involved more than 200 
federal and state agents.  The search warrants were part of a case that had evolved over 
more than a year with involvement of the FBI, ICE, the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement, local State Attorneys, the Office of Statewide Prosecution, and local law 
enforcement agencies statewide.  Other agencies assumed more than $30,000 in direct 
subpoena costs, provided hundreds of hours of surveillance and intelligence gathering, 
and supplied the manpower that made it possible for DOR to have all 30 search warrants 
executed simultaneously.  Working alone, DOR would have been able to execute only 
five of those search warrants on that one day and the other 25 targets would likely have 
immediately destroyed any useful records.   
 To determine the impact of task force participation, data from all cases statewide 
that were approved for prosecution over the last six years were reviewed.   All cases 
covered by the Tax Collection Enforcement Diversion Program (TCEDP), which are 
essentially an extension of collection activity and are part of a program jointly managed 
by DOR and local participating State Attorney’s Offices, were excluded.  Because not all 
regions participate in this program and because the cases within this program are 
collections-oriented rather than criminal in nature, their inclusion in the analysis would 
skew the results.  There have been 1,424 cases in this program representing $26,565,419 
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dollars in delinquent sales tax.14
 A few definitions are required for an understanding of the data in Table 6.1.  “Tax 
Liability Identified” is the sales tax liability only, with no interest, penalties, or 
investigative costs added.  This is the actual amount of sales tax theft.  “Total Civil 
Liability Identified” is the sales tax, regular late filing and late payment penalties, 
specific penalties for fraudulent return filing, interest, and investigative costs.  “Criminal 
Restitution” includes the sales tax, interest, and investigative costs.
  Statewide cases other than TCEDP cases approved for 
prosecution over the last six years are as indicated in Table 6.1.  Region 5 is the Southern 
Region which includes task force cases.   
15
 The results of Region 5 activities were compared to Regions 1 through 4 using 
one-way ANOVA.
   
 The data in Table 6.1 shows that Region 5 had fewer prosecution cases but those 
cases were, on average, larger and generated greater amounts of sales tax theft, civil 
liabilities, and restitution identified per investigative hour.  To determine how much of 
this difference is due to Region 5 task force participation the data for Region 5 was 
decomposed into non-task force and task force case data as reflected in Table 6.2.   
16
                                                          
14 This program is used for certain types of delinquency cases and is not available for cases involving sales 
tax theft.  The program allows certain delinquent taxpayers who meet strict qualifications to make 
arrangements to pay their tax liabilities and avoid criminal prosecution for offenses other than theft. 
15 It should be noted that only about one in six criminal investigations result in referral for prosecution.  The 
remainder may be closed, for example, with a civil collection of tax due based on a finding of no intent to 
commit a crime, or closed because of a finding that no tax is due and no violation was committed. 
16 The means and mean differences presented here are population parameters that have been evaluated 
using standard financial analysis techniques to compare.  While significance testing is not required, it is 
nonetheless a familiar and convenient way to present the data. 
  Region 5 results showed higher civil tax theft identified (M = 
119,406.36, SD = 289,009.34) than Regions 1 through 4 (M = 58,544.61, SD = 
133,373.70).  This difference (M = 60,861.75) was significant, F(1, 721) = 12.182, p = 
.001. 
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Table 6.1 Summary of DOR Criminal Prosecution Cases 2003 - 2009 
 Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 
Number of 
Prosecutions 
Approved 130 207 130 150 105 
Tax Liability 
Identified $7,884,088 $11,695,303 $6,482,774 $10,059,859 $12,537,668 
Total Civil 
Liability 
Identified $13,590,964 $22,969,254 $10,371,302 $17,417,015 $25,341,780 
Criminal 
Restitution 
$10,329,900 $14,645,478 $8,050,095 $13,121,638 $15,561,245 
Mean Tax 
Liability 
Identified Per 
Case $60,647 $56,499 $49,867 $67,066 $119,406 
Mean Civil 
Liability 
Identified Per 
Case $104,546 $110,963 $79,799 $116,113 $241,350 
Mean 
Criminal 
Restitution Per 
Case $79,461 $70,751 $61,924 $87,478 $148,202 
Mean 
Investigative 
Cost Per Case $3,928 $2,940 $2,717 $5,052 $5,155 
Investigative 
Hours Per 
Case 
187.71 141.61 166.36 228.27 209.36 
Tax Liability 
Identified Per 
Investigative 
Hour $323.09 $398.98 $299.75 $293.80 $570.34 
Civil Liability 
Identified Per 
Investigative 
Hour $556.95 $783.58 $479.68 $508.67 $1,152.80 
Criminal 
Restitution Per 
Investigative 
Hour $423.32 $499.62 $372.23 $383.22 $707.88 
Data Source: DOR Criminal Investigations Case Management System (2009) 
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Table 6.2 Breakout and Analysis of Region 5 Task Force Cases and Comparison to 
Means for Regions 1 through 4 
 
Regions 1-4 
Means 
Region 5 
Total 
Region 5 
Non-Task 
Force 
Region 5 
Task Force 
Number of 
Prosecutions 
Approved 154 105 95 10 
Tax Liability 
Identified $9,030,506 $12,537,688 $5,420,588 $7,117,080 
Total Civil Liability 
Identified $16,087,134 $25,341,780 $9,171,803 $16,169,977 
Criminal Restitution $11,536,778 $15,561,245 $6,736,777 $8,824,468 
Mean Tax Liability 
Identified Per Case $58,545 $119,406 $57,059 $711,708 
Mean Civil Liability 
Identified Per Case $104,293 $241,350 $96,545 $1,616,998 
Mean Criminal 
Restitution Per Case $74,793 $148,202 $70,913 $882,447 
Mean Investigative 
Cost per Case $3,615 $5,155 $3,708 $15,394 
Investigative Hours 
Per Case 180.99 209.36 159.82 679.98 
Tax Liability 
Identified Per 
Investigative Hour $323.47 $570.34 $357.02 $1,046.66 
Civil Liability 
Identified Per 
Investigative Hour $576.24 $1,152.80 $604.09 $2,378.01 
Criminal Restitution 
Per Investigative 
Hour $413.25 $707.88 $443.71 $1,297.75 
Data Source: DOR Criminal Investigations Case Management System (2009) 
 
 The Region 5 results also showed higher total civil liability identified (M = 
241,350.29, SD = 716,219.10) than the Region 1 through 4 results (M = 104,292.60, SD 
= 251,986.28).  This difference (M = 137,057.69) was significant, F(1, 721) = 13.125, p < 
.001. 
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 The Region 5 results also showed higher restitution identified (M = 148,202.33, 
SD = 351,639.34) than the Region 1 through 4 results (M = 74,792.72, SD = 173,580.62).  
This difference (M = 73,409.61) was significant, F(1, 721) = 11.081, p = .001. 
 The analysis presented in Table 6.2 makes it clear that task force cases in Region 
5 drive the entire difference between the overall prosecution results of Region 5 activities 
and the other regions because:  
1. The liabilities identified in the ten task force cases exceed the liabilities 
identified on the remaining 95 cases combined, and   
2. The means for non-task force cases in Region 5 are similar to the means for 
Regions 1 through 4. 
 The clearest indication of the benefit of task force participation is the increased 
liability and restitution identified per investigative hour.  The primary goal of criminal 
investigations is deterrence and not necessarily the collection of tax dollars.  However, 
the total civil liabilities identified will nonetheless be secured by a lien against the 
taxpayer’s property, and criminal restitution amounts will be payable under court order 
and, generally, as a condition of probation if such is granted.  Task force participation has 
resulted in an additional $576.56 per investigative hour of civil liability identified 
($1,152.80 vs. $576.24) and an additional $294.63 per investigative hour of criminal 
restitution identified ($707.88 vs. $413.25) when compared to the means of the other 
regions.  The more important point is that these increases are achieved at no additional 
cost to DOR due to the leverage obtained from utilizing the resources of other agencies. 
 To determine the impact of task force cases on Region 5 results it is necessary to 
compute proforma statistics for Region 5 activities by converting investigative hours 
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spent on task force cases (6,799.80) to equivalent non-task force cases at the mean rate of 
159.82 hours per case.  This calculation yields an additional 43 cases which are assumed 
to produce the same mean tax liability, civil liability, and restitution amounts as the 
historical non-task force cases.  The summarized proforma results of investigations 
activities computed in this manner are presented in Table 6.3. 
 Results of Region 5 activities were compared to the proforma results using one-
way AVOVA.17
                                                          
17 As noted previously, the means and mean differences presented here are population parameters that have 
been evaluated using standard financial analysis techniques to compare.  Significance testing is not 
required but the ANOVA presentation provides a familiar way to present the data. 
  The Region 5 results showed higher actual civil tax theft identified (M = 
119,406.36, SD = 289,009.34) than the proforma results (M = 57,058.88, SD = 
46,032.22).  This difference (M = 62,347.48) was significant, F(1, 241) = 6.223, p = .013. 
 The Region 5 results also showed higher total civil liability identified (M = 
241,350.29, SD = 716,219.10) than the proforma results (M = 96,545.20, SD = 
80,959.89).  This difference (M = 144,805.09) was significant, F(1, 241) = 5.555, p = 
.019. 
 The Region 5 results also showed higher restitution identified (M = 148,202.33, 
SD = 351,639.34) than the proforma results (M = 70,913.30, SD = 55,886.24).  This 
difference (M = 77,289.03) was significant, F(1, 241) = 6.461, p = .012. 
 The results of the proforma calculations and comparison to Region 5 historical 
results indicates that investigative hours devoted to task force cases yielded better results 
than what could have been achieved if those same resources had been applied to 
additional non-task force cases.  It is particularly pertinent to note that while 33 
additional cases could have been investigated by abandoning task force operations, total 
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Table 6.3 Summary of Region 5 Criminal Prosecution Cases 2003 – 2009 with 
Proforma Results Excluding Task Force Cases 
 
Region 5 
Actual 
Region 5 
Proforma 
without 
Tax Force 
Difference: 
Proforma - 
Actual 
(Memo) 
Region 5 
Task Force 
Number of Prosecutions 
Approved 105 138 33 10 
Tax Liability Identified $12,537,688 $7,848,272 $(4,689,416) $7,117,080 
Total Civil Liability 
Identified $25,341,780 $13,279,438 $(12,062,342) $16,169,977 
Criminal Restitution $15,561,245 $9,753,843 $(5,807,402) $8,824,468 
Mean Tax Liability 
Identified Per Case $119,406 $57,059 $(62,347) $711,708 
Mean Civil Liability 
Identified Per Case $241,350 $96,545 $(144,805) $1,616,998 
Mean Criminal 
Restitution Per Case $148,202 $70,913 $(77,289) $882,447 
Investigative Hours Per 
Case 209.36 159.82 (49.54) 679.98 
Tax Liability Identified 
Per Investigative Hour $570.34 $357.02 $(213.32) $1,046.66 
Civil Liability Identified 
Per Investigative Hour $1,152.80 $604.09 $(548.71) $2,378.01 
Criminal Restitution Per 
Investigative Hour $707.88 $443.71 $(264.17) $1,297.75 
Data Source: DOR Criminal Investigations Case Management System (2009) 
 
civil liability and restitution identified would have decreased by $12,062,342 and 
$5,807,402, respectively, representing a permanent loss of the potential ability to 
recapture that revenue.  On the basis of this analysis, the null hypothesis is rejected and 
the alternative set forth in Chapter 3 is accepted: 
H3: Joint investigations with other federal, state, and local agencies result in 
improved enforcement outcomes, including greater restitution for the same level 
of resource output.   
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 The purpose of this analysis is not to suggest that DOR criminal investigations 
units should pursue every case in the task force format; but to suggest that where 
possible, and where it enhances efficiency for all agencies involved, cooperative 
enforcement activities allow leveraging of resources and allow DOR to expand its 
capabilities to larger cases that provide higher recovery per investigative hour.  To date 
the task force methodology has been utilized for groups of companies related by common 
ownership, but it will be demonstrated in Chapter 8 that this concept can be expanded to 
include cases that are related by industry or other subject matter and not just by 
ownership.  
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CHAPTER 7 
PREDICTORS OF TAX EVASION: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 One of the best tools an auditor or investigator has is intuition based on 
experience and expertise.  A tax agency employee is beset with mountains of data 
provided by hundreds of thousands of tax filers.  Information provided on a sales tax 
return, unlike federal income tax returns, is minimal, providing little information to frame 
the data being reviewed.  If business A reports $100,000 in gross sales for the month, an 
agent cannot readily determine if that amount is reasonable without learning more about 
the business.  Filing history may indicate the return is consistent with prior filings, but 
consistency does not equal accuracy.  The majority of the enforcement employees of 
DOR are dedicated to resolving delinquencies: the failure to file a return or pay the tax 
due on the return.  These employees are collections personnel, or collectors, and are not 
tasked with determining whether the filings are accurate, but just that they are filed.  It 
must be stressed that verifying the correctness of returns is not in the job description for 
this group of employees.  The assumption is that the amount the tax filer reports to the 
state is correct.  It is left to a small group of auditors and investigators to determine if 
what was filed was accurate or if sales tax theft occurred.  As a result, the odds of 
catching those filing inaccurate returns or stealing sales tax dollars are enormously 
against DOR with the probability of any company in Florida becoming subject to an audit 
or investigation equal to approximately .0046 (odds 213:1 against)18
                                                          
18 The probability calculation is based on numbers presented in Figure 5.1 on page 77 and does not give 
weight to the fact that audit selection is weighted toward larger companies which tends to lower the 
probability of audit for those companies most likely to be involved in evasion. 
.  The very real 
impact of this mismatch of resources is apparent in interviews during criminal 
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prosecutions of accountants and bookkeepers that occurred over the past several years.  In 
reviewing the files, I found where one such accountant very candidly stated that he 
advised his clients to always file a return on time and claim some level of sales.  The 
amount claimed does not matter, but should be somewhat consistent from month to 
month.  He further advised them to remit whatever tax they claimed they collected, and 
make sure the check does not bounce.  He advised his clients that if they follow these 
directions, they will never have a problem with the Department of Revenue, because the 
Department focuses on delinquencies.  If you are not delinquent, you will “fly below the 
radar.”  The client that ultimately got him into trouble reported almost $6.7 million in 
gross sales and more than $400,000 in sales tax collected over an eighteen month period.  
On the surface, there did not appear to be anything wrong with the amounts being 
reported.  But suspicion of money laundering attracted the attention of a Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement Special Agent who had previously worked for DOR.  
He brought DOR into the case and it was ultimately found that the business had more 
than $48 million in gross sales and had stolen more than $2.3 million in sales tax during 
that 18-month period.  This case illustrates that raw numbers without context are 
meaningless.  The reporting of $6.7 million in gross sales was substantial enough for a 
small business not to raise suspicion, but was less than 14 percent of the actual gross 
sales. 
 My review of some accounts yielded shocking revelations.  It is relatively easy 
to find accounts where the business reports exactly the same amount of gross sales every 
month, even though they are a retail store and the odds of the sales in any two months 
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being the same are microscopically small.  Many stay in operation for many years and 
never once have monthly sales that exceed the amount of their rent. 
 With convenience stores it is common to see high amounts of exempt sales, 
much higher than supermarkets, even though their primary sales items are beer, soft 
drinks, and cigarettes, all taxable items.  It is also not uncommon to see them claim the 
exact same percentage of exempt sales every single month.  Sales may vary but the 
exempt portion is always exactly 82.00 percent, for example, each and every month. 
 These types of anomalies are not within the purview of the collection staff.  
Auditors and investigators will review only a tiny fraction of the tax filings for a given 
year.  There are dedicated staff members who review data to identify audit or 
investigative leads from the data, but there are so few performing this function and so few 
employees investigating the leads provided that the advice of the prosecuted accountant 
still works quite well for the vast majority of sales tax filers.  In essence, no one is 
looking at the information filed because most resources are devoted to delinquencies or 
other non-verification tasks such as taxpayer services and tax processing. 
 It is not the intention in the present study to indicate that delinquencies are 
unimportant: they represent hundreds of millions of dollars annually in lost revenue that 
collectors recover or secure by filing liens against estimated amounts due.  My study 
instead asserts that delinquencies are the tip of the tax fraud iceberg.  In the next chapter, 
192 dealers are examined with potentially $21,421,312 or more in theft of sales tax 
collected from their customers.  Those 192 dealers had delinquencies booked of just over 
$300,000 and most had no delinquencies.  When tax filers fail to file a return, collections 
personnel can only estimate the amount of tax due.  If the tax filer never reports the 
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correct amount of tax collected, then the estimates will always be wrong.  Working 
delinquencies recovers funds but because of the assumption that nobody steals, sales tax 
theft cannot be uncovered through collection activity alone. 
 Personnel assigned to “discovery” operations or those who develop leads for 
audit take a higher level look at those filing returns.  They look for indicators of fraud not 
only in the data compiled by the Department, but by combining those data with data from 
other sources, such as from returns filed with the IRS, customs declarations, property 
records, business license filings, and similar records.  Analysis of this type yields 
actionable results and helps to produce hundreds of millions of dollars in audit and 
discovery assessments every year.  My study holds that the discovery model must be 
devolved to the local level and adapted for more widespread use if sales tax enforcement 
is to become more effective and efficient. 
 Using the data accumulated on car dealers involved in sales tax theft (next 
chapter), I undertook an exercise to predict sales tax theft on the basis of observation, 
filing data, and a minimal amount of additional information provided by public 
information available online.  Since all of the dealers in this group were likely involved in 
sales tax theft, the group was supplemented with a random sample taken from the 
population of dealers located in Miami-Dade County.  Since this random sample was 
chosen from the entire pool of dealers there was some overlap with the dealers already 
included in the theft group.  Some dealers from both groups had to be excluded from this 
test because they had gone out of business and were no longer available for observation.  
The end result was a total of 369 observable dealers.   
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 I prepared a survey to be completed for each dealer.  Survey questions were 
divided into three major categories: cost structure, profit structure, and management.  A 
copy of the survey is included in Appendix 2.  The idea behind the survey is to formally 
conceptualize a high-level review of an account by an agent supplemented by observation 
and readily available public data.  Table 7.1 lists the categories and questions or 
observations included in the survey. 
 Each section of the survey also includes space for additional observations.  The 
completion of a survey requires a site visit or access to pictures of the site, reference to 
the Miami-Dade County property records website, and reference to the Florida 
Department of State, Division of Corporations website.  In reality, DOR employees also 
have access to other non-public databases for additional information but these were not 
used for this study.19
                                                          
19 The non-public databases could have been used for the companies suspected of sales tax theft, but could 
not be legally used for the companies with no theft.  Therefore, these databases could not be used for any of 
the companies in this study. 
  A single observer collected the survey data. 
 The results of the specific survey responses were used to make judgments and 
assign fraud flags to the three categories covered by the survey.  The purpose was not to 
use the survey answers as variables, but for the answers to guide intuition about whether 
the answers taken as a whole raised red flags about the tax filer.  For example, company 
number nine was a large dealer with a very large inventory of moderately expensive cars.  
The cars were well maintained, the premises were clean, and the business was located in 
a high traffic, high rent area.  The average monthly sales reported meant that the business 
would have difficulty carrying such a large inventory and other high costs associated with 
the location and status of the business.  Intuition led to a determination that the company 
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Table 7.1 Survey Questions and Observations 
Category Question or Observation Measurement 
Cost 
Structure 
Surrounding neighborhood type – poor to 
wealthy 
4-point Likert scale 
Surrounding neighborhood type – industrial to 
retail 
4-point Likert scale 
Property appearance – appears low rent to 
appears high rent 
4-point Likert scale 
Rent analysis Based on square footage from 
property records and average rental 
rates for area 
Rent coverage Sales reported divided by rent 
Type of dealer Other, office/warehouse, repair 
shop, traditional 
Size of operation Small, medium, large, multi-
location 
Profit 
Structure 
Condition and type of cars – inexpensive to 
expensive 
4-point Likert scale 
Condition and type of cars Disrepair, fair, good, excellent 
Condition and type of cars General, mixed, luxury, specialty 
Cleanliness and maintenance of facilities – 
dirty to very clean 
4-point Likert scale 
Cleanliness and maintenance of facilities – 
poorly maintained to well maintained 
4-point Likert scale 
Location – low traffic to high traffic 4-point Likert scale 
Location – difficult access and parking to easy 
access and parking 
4-point Likert scale 
Location – not meant for retail to meant for 
retail 
4-point Likert scale 
In-house financing provided? Yes or no 
Inventory size 0–15 cars; 16–30 cars; 31–45 cars; 
45 cars or more 
Management Historical filing review – files returns with 
round numbers 
Yes or no 
Historical filing review – files incomplete 
returns 
Yes or no 
Historical filing review – late filing Number of returns filed late and 
number of months reviewed 
Historical filing review – returned checks Number of returned items (bounced 
checks, failed EFT items) 
Historical filing review – exempt sales Average exempt sales claimed 
Registration status – other taxes Whether or not registered for other 
taxes for which they are obligated, 
such as corporate or documentary 
stamp tax 
Churn – whether there has been a string of 
corporations owned by the same owners or 
related parties with corporate changes every 
couple of years 
Yes or no. 
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could not carry the cost structure observed with the sales reported so the company was 
flagged for potential fraud with respect to the cost structure of the company.  Developed 
in this manner, the independent variables in this study are all based on observation and 
available financial data.  As such they provide a basis for determining whether intuition 
informed by objective observation and data can be efficiently used to bolster compliance 
enforcement efforts.  The present study also assists in determining what types of 
indicators are most useful in identifying potential fraud.  The basis for this type of 
analysis is simple: if a business is to stay in operation for a long period of time, it must 
produce enough revenue to cover its costs and produce a profit to make operations 
justifiable.  Further, people who do not manage their filing obligations properly may be 
more likely to be involved in tax evasion or fraud than those who do manage their 
obligations properly. 
 The dichotomous dependent variable was computed and set on the basis of sales 
tax collections not reported and remitted in excess of ten percent of the total sales tax 
collected.  Sales tax theft has been measured in this study by comparing sales tax 
collections reported to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles on title 
applications to the sales taxes reported to the Department of Revenue on sales tax returns.  
Ten percent was chosen as the cutoff for theft because timing differences in reporting can 
occur that create temporary but persistent differences that will not resolve until the 
business closes.  Additionally, as mentioned previously, the survey used in this part of the 
study is a blunt instrument that would not be useful in identifying smaller amounts of 
theft. 
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 Of the 369 companies in the survey, 216 had sales tax theft in excess of ten 
percent of sales tax collected.  Interestingly, only 190, or 51.5 percent, of the dealers were 
traditional car lots.  A high percentage, 31.7 percent, operated out of office/warehouse 
facilities and carried little or no inventory.  The remaining dealers were repair shops, used 
part dealers, or other businesses where car sales were more of a sideline than the main 
thrust of the business.  Small- to medium-sized dealers accounted for 84 percent of the 
companies in the survey.  Eighty dealers, 21.7 percent of the total, offered financing of 
cars directly with no lending institution involvement.  These dealers are typically known 
as “buy here, pay here” dealers.  (See Appendix 3 for case frequencies). 
 From the review of the survey data, the fraud flags were set for the cost 
structure, profit structure, and management variables.  A classification table was prepared 
comparing these flags to the theft status of each company indicating that 244 of the 369 
companies were correctly classified (66.12 percent).  Of these, 185 of the companies with 
sales tax not remitted were identified out of 216 (85.65 percent).  However, 94 companies 
that had no unremitted sales tax were falsely flagged out of 153 (61.44 percent).  The 
survey flags successfully identified companies representing $15,331,235 in sales tax theft 
out of the total $20,452,673 (74.96 percent). 
 These results were compared to the results of using only the chronic 
delinquency flag to identify potential fraud.  Using this greatly simplified method there 
were fewer false positives, only 32 out of 153 (20.92 percent), but also only 87 out of 216 
companies that had unremitted sales tax (40.28 percent) were identified.  More 
importantly, this simplified analysis only identified $6,216,452 of the total theft of 
$20,452,673 (30.39 percent).  This last statistic provides a critical insight: companies that 
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steal the most file their returns on time and do not submit payments with insufficient 
funds.  Table 7.2 provides a summary of this data. 
 Binary logistic regression was used to further analyze the results of the survey.  
The dichotomous indicator for sales tax theft in excess of ten percent was used as the 
dependent variable.  The three fraud flags for cost structure, profit structure, and 
management were used as the independent variables.  The flag for chronic delinquencies 
was included as a component in the management variable.  The results of this analysis are 
presented in Table 7.3. 
 The results of the regression indicate that an analysis of the cost structure and 
management practices of a business can provide results that are useful in identifying 
companies involved in fraudulent activities.  Further, the independent variables used in 
this analysis represent value judgments by an agent rather than strict financial analysis, 
which extends the conclusion to indicate that the analysis can be largely based on 
intuition and experience.  More specifically, companies that appear to have cost 
structures that appear to be more expensive than what their reported revenues can support 
are 2.64 times more likely to be involved in tax evasion than those with cost structures 
supported by reported revenue.  Likewise, companies that indicate poor control over their 
operations, as identified through late reporting, writing insufficient funds checks, and not 
properly registering for all taxes for which they are liable, are 3.541 times more likely to 
be involved in tax evasion than those that are not.  The profit structure variable was not 
significant in this analysis.   
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Table 7.2 Classification Table for Survey Fraud Flag to Theft Comparisons 
USING SURVEY DATA Number 
Theft 
Amount 
Percent 
Companies 
Percent 
Theft 
Total correctly classified 244 $15,231,235 66.12% 74.96% 
Total cases 369 $20,452.673   
     
Total correctly identified as no theft 59 N/A 38.56% N/A 
Total with no theft 153    
     
Total correctly identified with theft 185 $15,231,235 85.65% 74.96% 
Total with theft 216 $20,452,673   
     
False positives 94    
Theft not identified 31 $5,121,438   
     
USING CHRONIC DELINQUENCY 
AS INDICATOR 
    
Total correctly classified 208 $6,216,452 56.37% 30.39% 
Total cases 369 $20,452,673   
     
Total correctly identified as no theft 121 N/A 79.08% N/A 
Total with no theft 153    
     
Total correctly identified with theft 87 $6,216,452 40.28% 30.39% 
Total with theft 216 $20,452,673   
     
False positives 32    
Theft not identified 129 $14,236,221   
  
 
Table 7.3 Results of Logistic Regression – Tax Evasion Prediction 
Variable B SE Wald df Sig 
Exp (B) 
(Odds 
Ratio) 
Cost Structure .971 .308 9.960 1 .002 2.640 
Profit Structure .313 .295 1.122 1 .289 1.367 
Management 1.264 .303 17.362 1 .000 3.541 
Constant -.741 .202 13.452 1 .000 .477 
N=369 
(a) Reference category is no theft. 
(b) Nagelkerke R Square = .183 
(c) See Table 8 for complete analysis of prediction results. 
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 The model provides a good fit to the data as evidenced by the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test results (x2 = 2.069, df = 4, p = .723), where a lack of significance, i.e., 
p>.05 is an indicator of model fit.  However, the nonparametric correlations between the 
dependent variable for sales tax theft and the independent variables were not strong as is 
indicated in Table 7.4. 
 The weak correlations between the dependent and independent variables explain 
the large number of false positives identified through the use of the three fraud flags.  The 
present study shows that intuitive analysis is likely to identify a large majority of sales 
tax cheats, but it will also result in the false identification of many non-cheating 
businesses as cheating businesses, leading to a waste of resources.   
 
Table 7.4 Correlations among Theft and Fraud Flag Variables 
 Theft Indicator Cost Structure Profit Structure Management 
Theft Indicator  .296** 
N=369 
.246** 
N=369 
.265** 
N=369 
Cost Structure   .653** 
N=369 
.169** 
N=369 
Profit Structure    .172** 
N=369 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
 
 It is therefore necessary to expand the analysis beyond intuition.  Intuition is a 
necessary, efficient, and effective first step (Gladwell, 2005), but cannot be the final step 
in target selection unless resources are plentiful.  Intuition can be used to identify 
potential targets to subject to more detailed investigative techniques to narrow the field. 
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 It was also noted that profit structure and cost structure are moderately 
correlated.  This is to be expected since cost and profit are similar measures and profit is 
to a large degree dependent on cost structure.  The fact that cost structure is significant in 
the analysis and profit structure is not indicates that cost constraints on a business are 
more likely to create an environment where sales tax theft is likely than the simple desire 
to make more profit (greed).  It would therefore seem appropriate to fix intuitive efforts 
on cost rather than profit factors. 
 The weak correlation between filing history and sales tax theft was expected.  It 
was previously noted that the 192 dealers in the targeted industry enforcement program 
discussed in the next chapter were responsible for $21,421,312 of sales tax theft and 
those same dealers had delinquencies booked of just over $300,000, and most had no 
delinquencies.  Most companies that are involved in the theft of large amounts of sales 
tax will likely be filing on time, reporting a substantial amount of sales tax collected 
every month, and remitting the tax without insufficient funds problems.  In fact, the 
correlation between sales tax theft and chronic delinquency (late filing or payment in 
more than ten percent of filing periods) is only .204 (N = 369, p = .001).  These data 
indicate that companies most heavily involved in sales tax theft are aware of the theft and 
make an effort to conceal it.  As an additional test of this theory an additional binary 
logistic regression model was developed including one additional variable identifying 
those members of the sample who participated in the Florida amnesty program in 2003.  
The results are presented in Table 7.5. 
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Table 7.5 Results of Logistic Regression – Tax Evasion Prediction Flags and 
Amnesty 
Variable B SE Wald df Sig 
Exp (B) 
(Odds 
Ratio) 
Cost Structure 1.103 .318 11.995 1 .001 3.012 
Profit Structure .224 .302 .549 1 .459 1.251 
Management 1.280 .306 17.525 1 .000 3.598 
Amnesty Participant in 2003 1.925 .805 5.723 1 .017 6.856 
Constant -.843 .209 16.257 1 .000 .477 
N=369 
(a) Reference category for the dependent variable is no theft. 
(b) Nagelkerke R Square = .208 
(c) Hosmer and Lemeshow (x2 = 1.868, df = 4, p=.760) 
(d) Overall percentage correctly classified = 67.5%; no theft = 42.5% correct; theft = 85.2% correct 
 
 These results indicate that amnesty programs, while generally responsible for 
raising a lot of money, do not result in more compliant behavior on the part of those who 
participate.  In this study, amnesty participants were 6.856 times more likely to be 
involved in sales tax theft than those members who did not participate, which is the 
largest indicator in the analysis by a wide margin.20
 The data and analysis from this portion of this study make it clear that simply 
trusting businesses to remit the sales tax they collect is bad policy.  My study indicates 
that a large percentage of companies are involved in sales tax theft.  Companies that steal 
the most conceal the theft carefully, and may even participate in amnesty programs to 
provide additional cover for their illegal activities or to deter the taxing authority from 
taking a closer look at the business.  Delinquent filers and payers, who currently receive 
the majority of the attention and resources of DOR, account for a very small percentage 
 
                                                          
20 This statistic is problematic in that it suggests that amnesty participants should be singled out for audit or 
investigation.  But such a response would certainly dampen taxpayer enthusiasm for participating in 
amnesty programs.  In the author’s opinion, adding more resources to enforcement activities is preferable to 
amnesty programs and, ultimately, more cost effective. 
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of the theft of state funds that occurs.  Intuitive analysis utilized at a lower level in the 
compliance enforcement process can be a critical component of improved enforcement 
efforts.  As a result of this analysis, the alternative hypothesis set forth in chapter 3 is 
accepted: 
H2: Agent intuition applied to intelligence data yields effective identification of 
candidates for targeted enforcement efforts. 
 But it has also been shown that such analyses can yield a large number of false 
positives which have the potential to cause an enforcement agent to waste precious time 
and resources on nonproductive endeavors.  To realize the efficiency promised by this 
type of analysis and minimize the waste caused by false positives, two additional 
requirements are necessary: 
1. The time-consuming process of proving compliance must be transferred to the 
target by requiring the presentation of records required by law to be maintained in 
support of the returns filed.  Businesses that are in compliance with the 
recordkeeping requirements of the law will be able to prove the veracity of the 
returns filed with little effort. 
2. Informal contacts and engagement with the target are substituted, at least initially, 
for the more formal and structured approaches present in audits and criminal 
investigations. 
 In the next chapter the author provides an analysis of how such a program can be 
successfully implemented with minimal resources. 
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CHAPTER 8 
TARGETED INDUSTRY ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS:  
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 On any given day an agent with the Florida Department of Revenue may interact 
with owners of convenience stores, car rental companies, car sales lots, restaurants, bars, 
secondhand dealers, consignment shops, 99 cent stores, gas stations and every other type 
of business that can be imagined.  Collection employees in the Service Centers are 
assigned by zip codes, not by business type.  Audits are conducted as a result of audit 
case selection activities.  Criminal investigations are initiated based on complaints or 
other leads related to fraudulent activities.  While there are industry experts within DOR, 
none of the employees in the Service Centers specialize in any particular industry by 
design.  Periodically, DOR does initiate enforcement programs designed to increase 
compliance in an industry where compliance is deemed to be low.  An example of this 
was the commercial rental enforcement program discussed in Chapter 4.  Using the data 
warehousing capabilities of the SUNTAX system DOR was able to identify a large 
number of commercial landlords that were not registered to collect and remit sales tax.  
This program resulted in the collection of more than $30 million in unreported sales tax 
revenue.  In addition, the registration of these entities provided an annuity of $10 million 
per year in future revenues through the same effort.  Discovery operations and campaigns 
generate about $50 million on average per year.  These enforcement programs are not 
common at the local level in the Service Centers.  When they are initiated, they have 
largely been discovery-oriented projects run centrally out of Tallahassee with little, if 
any, involvement at the local level.  Additionally, they normally are of limited duration. 
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 An opportunity arose within Southern Region Criminal Investigations for me to 
study the impact of targeted industry enforcement activities at the local level.  As 
mentioned in Chapters 5 and 7, for every used car sold in the state an application for title 
is filed with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) to cause 
the transfer of title from the dealer to the purchaser of the car.  Car dealers are required to 
include their sales tax number and the amount of sales tax collected with respect to the 
transaction on the title application.  Sales tax data from these title applications can be 
accumulated and compared to amounts reported to DOR on monthly sales tax returns to 
identify discrepancies that need to be reconciled.  (See Figure 5.2 in Chapter 5 for a 
diagram of this process).  The data from the applications for title is provided to DOR on a 
quarterly basis.21
 On average, more than $357,000 of the sales tax theft identified would be lost to 
the five-year statute of limitations for theft every month that passed.  It was, therefore, 
important that action be taken fairly quickly.  Resource limitations dictated that 192 
criminal investigations, more than doubling the current case load, could not be conducted 
quickly enough so alternative treatments had to be found in order to address the identified 
  For purposes of the present study, this comparison was performed for 
every dealer in Miami-Dade County.  The initial comparisons yielded 192 used car 
dealers in Miami-Dade County with potential sales tax theft of $21,421,312.22 over the 
last five-year period. 
                                                          
21 The comparison of sales tax collected as reflected on title transfer applications to amounts reported to the 
Department of Revenue on monthly sales tax returns is a time-consuming, laborious task.  An effort was 
made to match the data statewide in 2001, but only about 60 percent of the data could be matched easily 
because of difficulties in matching Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles licensees to 
Department of Revenue tax accounts.  As a result, no overall matching of data is performed on a regular 
basis.  When needed, investigators accumulate and compare the data manually. 
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potential theft through a combination of full investigations and activities designed to 
quickly identify those cases that did not involve criminal activity. 
 
The Interventions 
 As noted in Chapter 4, the comparison of sales tax collected per the DHSMV title 
applications to amounts reported to DOR yields potential sales tax theft.  Explanations 
other than theft are possible.  Part of the difference is sometimes explained by timing 
differences.  Some dealers report the sales tax collected only after the title to the car is 
issued, resulting in a one- or two-month delay in reporting the tax to DOR.  It is not 
correct to report in this manner, but over time, no theft occurs.  Technically the dealer 
owes a penalty and interest on the sales tax remitted late.  Additionally, those dealers that 
finance car sales internally, known as “buy here pay here” dealers, usually have high 
numbers of repossessions, which result in credits against their sales tax liabilities.  They 
are required to report the entire amount of sales tax collected on the date of sale.  If they 
do not collect all the payments under a deferred payment arrangement, they are allowed a 
credit essentially for the tax rate times the principal amount of the sales price not 
collected.22
                                                          
22 The actual calculation as set forth on Form DR-95b seems significantly more complex to most small 
dealers who have no training in accounting or finance.  The calculation guides the dealer step by step 
through the process of allocating payments between principal and interest to determine the principal 
balance due at the date of repossession, which is simple enough conceptually, but most dealers struggle 
with the calculation and many claim the entire amount of sales tax originally collected as the credit amount. 
  The credits taken are required to be reported on the monthly sales tax 
returns, but some dealers do not understand this requirement and simply report the 
current month sales tax collected net of any repossession credits they are due.  Therefore, 
those companies with smaller discrepancies and those where the sales tax reported was a 
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high percentage of the total tax collected might be companies that are reporting the sales 
tax when the title is actually issued and/or they may have claimed repossession credits 
that were not formally reported that explain the differences.  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
handle those companies in a manner other than a full criminal investigation, and in a 
manner that does not pull investigative resources away from those cases where they are 
obviously required.  It was decided to send these dealers a letter explaining the need for a 
reconciliation of amounts reported to the DHSMV versus the amount reported to DOR.  
In this manner, the companies with smaller amounts or percentages of possible theft 
could be handled more quickly, and those where it appeared a civil rather than criminal 
solution was warranted could be identified rapidly and referred to collections employees 
within DOR.   
 A review of the accounts for classification purposes identified 34 companies that 
could be classified in what was labeled the low-theft group, representing a total of 
$606,016.10 in potential sales tax theft.  Five companies were identified that were already 
the subject of a separate investigation, audit, or other compliance enforcement activity 
and were thus removed.  These five companies represented $279,167.30 in potential sales 
tax theft.  Companies classified as having major theft probability totaled 43 and 
represented $14,164,214.64 in potential sales tax theft.  These companies would require 
full investigation.  This left 110 companies representing $6,371,914.18 in potential sales 
tax theft to be initially contacted via letter and asked to provide reconciliation.  Table 8.1 
presents a summary of the companies as classified. 
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Table 8.1 Classification of Dealers with Potential Sales Tax Theft 
 Number 
Revenues 
Reported 
Sales Tax 
Reported 
Potential 
Theft 
Collection 
Balance 
Contact by 
Letter 110 $486,633,327 $22,188,274 $6,371,914 $182,054 
Criminal 
Investigation 43 $339,418,780 $9,270,420 $14,164,215 $89,552 
Low Theft 34 $164,670,689 $3,717,882 $606,016 $27,456 
Removed 5 $27,323,885 $1,610,648 $279,167 $3,164 
Totals 192 $1,018,046,681 $36,787,224 $21,421,312 $302,226 
 
 The “Revenues Reported” and “Sales Tax Reported” columns in Table 8.1 are the 
amounts of gross sales and sales tax collected as reported on the Sales and Use Tax 
Returns filed by the companies.  The “Potential Theft” column reflects the additional 
amount of sales tax reported to DHSMV on title applications over and above what was 
reported on the returns filed with DOR.  The “Collection Balance” is the amount of 
delinquent taxes subject to DOR collection activities as reflected in SUNTAX and 
included in DOR receivables. 
 Note from Table 8.1 that the collection balance associated with the dealers 
included in this study was only $302,226.  That is the amount that the local service center 
collections personnel were attempting to collect from the 192 dealers included.  Absent 
this study or the generation of other leads or complaints that might have resulted in an 
audit or criminal investigation of one or perhaps a few of these dealers, DOR would have 
recovered $302,226 either through cash collection or through levy against a warrant or 
lien at some point in the future.  In reality, these businesses owed $21,421,312 in sales 
tax, not $302,226.  This comparison points to the very large hole in the compliance 
umbrella previously discussed.  With collections personnel concentrating solely on 
delinquencies; audits or criminal investigations few and far between because of resource 
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limitations; and no third-party verification of sales taxes collected by business agents of 
the state, the vast majority of sales tax theft goes unnoticed and unchallenged.   
 To facilitate the handling of and allocation of resources to the accounts to be 
contacted via letter, 64 dealers were selected for contact in the first mailing to gauge 
response and determine if any changes in procedure were needed before contacting the 
remainder.  This mailing is designated as “Wave 1.”  The letter simply requested that the 
dealer review their records to determine why the amount of sales tax collected as reported 
to DHSMV differed from the amount of sales tax collected reported to DOR on monthly 
Sales and Use Tax Returns.  To assist them with their reconciliation, the dealers were 
provided with a schedule listing the differences in the amount of sales tax reported to 
DHSMV versus the amount reported to DOR for each month over the last five years or 
the time during which they were in business if shorter.  The dealers were also supplied 
with a listing of every transaction reported to DHSMV with the amount of tax reported 
on the title application and sufficient detail to enable them to identify the car sold and the 
customer to whom it was sold.  With this information, the dealer could review their 
records transaction by transaction to determine that each transaction was indeed a sale 
consummated by their business and that the amount of tax reported to DHSMV was 
correct.  They were informed that if the transactions reported to DHSMV were found to 
be correct, then the additional tax shown on the monthly comparison would be due and 
payable to DOR.  There was no indication in this letter that the reconciliation being asked 
for was part of a criminal investigation. 
 Only 69 percent of the dealers contacted in the first mailing responded.  Those 
who responded did so quickly.  Many asked for additional time to complete the 
124 
 
reconciliation.  Carrying the analysis back five years proved a problem for some, 
highlighting a disconnect between the required period for maintaining records, three 
years, and the statute of limitations for sales tax theft which is five years.   The following 
Table 8.2 presents the resolutions that followed the first mailing over a 12-month period 
of time: 
 
Table 8.2 Resolutions from the First Mailing – Wave 1 
Resolution Number of Dealers Sales Tax Amount 
Payment made or payment 
arrangement made 9 $337,037 
Adjustments or credits verified for 
those dealers making payments N/A $83,595 
Preliminary agreement with tax due, 
but pending completion of review 4 $312,275 
Closed business 11 $543,816 
Provided documentary evidence that 
filings were correct – received training 
on proper reporting of repossession 
credits 8 $562,150 
Certified correct, but no verification 
provided 2 $175,388 
Already in prosecution 1 $70,247 
Moved to full criminal investigation 8 $634,372 
Total resolved 43 $2,718,880 
Total mailings 65 $4,129,232 
Percentages resolved 66.15% 65.84% 
Responded, but analysis is still 
pending 6 $705,064 
Open dealers that did not respond 16 $705,288 
Percent of dealers who did not respond 
(closed and open, 20 dealers, $906,828 
in tax) 30.77% 21.96% 
Time required to date to achieve indicated resolution 12 months 
  
 The non-responsive dealers, those who closed their business after receiving the 
inquiry and those who certified their returns were correct but provided no corroborating 
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evidence will be subject to other enforcement efforts, including possible full criminal 
investigation or referral for audit. 
 The second mailing was targeted to the remaining 46 dealers in the group 
designated for the receipt of letters with a request for reconciliation of taxes reported to 
DHSMV and DOR.  This mailing was designated as “Wave 2.”  Because of the low and 
slow response rate to the first letter, the letter used for the second group mailing included 
language making it clear that the request was being made as part of a criminal 
investigation, but was similar in all other substantive respects.  The change in response 
was immediately noticeable: 85 percent of the recipients of the second letter responded 
within 30 days of their receipt of the letter and 91 percent eventually responded within 
the first four months.  For the first mailing, only 57 percent responded within the first 30 
days of receipt and only 69 percent responded in total over the following 12 months.  
This result appears to provide empirical support for the assertion that whether or not the 
consequences of tax evasion are criminal or not is important as per Varma and Doob 
(1998).   
 Table 8.3 presents the resolutions that followed the second mailing over a 4-
month period of time: 
 It is striking that the results of the two mailings are similar, except that virtually 
the same results were achieved in the second mailing in one-third of the time.  The 
percentage of dealers who failed to respond dropped from 31 percent in the first mailing  
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Table 8.3 Resolutions from Second Mailing – Wave 2 
Resolution Number of Dealers Sales Tax Amount 
Payment made or payment 
arrangement made 9 $288,150 
Adjustments or credits verified for 
those dealers making payments N/A $94,449 
Preliminary agreement with tax due, 
but pending completion of review 4 $184,629 
Closed business 10 $520,720  
Verified filings were correct – 
received training in proper reporting 
of repossession credits 5 $300,486 
Certified correct, but no verification 
provided 0 $ -  
Already in prosecution 0 $ -  
Moved to full criminal investigation 3 $100,200 
Total resolved 31 $1,488,634 
Total mailings 46 $2,312,930 
Percentages resolved 67.39% 64.36% 
Responded, but analysis is still 
pending 11 $632,740 
Open dealers that did not respond 4 $191,556 
Percent of dealers who did not 
respond 8.70% 8.28% 
Time required to achieve indicated resolutions 4 months 
  
to nine (9) percent in the second mailing.  It appears that the threat of criminal 
consequences is a potent enforcement tool if used judiciously.23
                                                          
23 Note that all of the contacts were, in fact, in connection with a criminal investigation.  However, the 
mailings to the first wave of subjects did not stress that fact. 
  These results show that 
enforcement operations driven by intelligence data gathered from available resources can 
be utilized to drive industry-wide enforcement campaigns at the local level to yield solid 
results with the relatively small resource commitment of one individual working on the 
project part time.   
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 The question now becomes: did the activities and contact with a large number of 
dealers over a period of time produce improved compliance overall? 
 
Tests of Compliance after Interventions 
 Some of the dealers targeted either closed their businesses or greatly scaled back 
operations.  It should be noted that causing a noncompliant business to close operations is 
a compliance success because it causes the sales tax theft to cease.   Assuming that 
demand for used cars is not impacted by the closure of a dealership, it can be assumed 
that the customer will patronize another dealer who is compliant and remains open.  This 
impact will be quantified in total later in this chapter.   
 To gauge the initial and continuing impact of the interventions, the average sales 
tax theft for each company in Wave 1 (N = 64) was measured, prior to the intervention 
and at three intervals after the intervention, as noted in Figure 8.1.   
 The first measurement occurred four months after the intervention; the second 
three months later, just before the intervention on Wave 2; and the third five months later 
at the first measurement date for Wave 2 interventions.  Additional interventions were not 
applied at each measurement interval so the analysis measures the length of time the 
original intervention continued to have an impact on compliance.   
 Repeated-measures analysis of variance was used to evaluate the changes in 
average sales tax theft per month and to test the null hypothesis: 
H0: Any changes that occur in the mean monthly sales tax theft at the 
measurement dates are due to chance and not to the intervention and such 
differences will average to zero. 
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Figure 8.1 Intervention Mailing and Measurement Timeline 
 
 The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 8.4.  The repeated-
measures analysis of variance revealed that the intervention produced a significant 
decrease in sales tax theft per month over the course of this study, F(2.219, 139.779) = 
7.73, p = .000.  The Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon estimate was used because the 
assumption of sphericity was not met. 
 
Table 8.4 Average Sales Tax Theft for Wave 1 Companies at Future Measurement 
Dates 
 M SD 
Prior to intervention 1,296.61 1,046.87 
Measurement at 4 months after intervention 711.96 1,109.76 
Measurement at 7 months after intervention 965.67 1,541.77 
Measurement at 12 months after intervention* 500.92 1,547.42 
* The interventions for Wave 2 occurred at the beginning of this five-month period. 
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 The analysis of variance results in a rejection of the null hypothesis and 
conclusion that at least one mean measured at the measurement dates is different and not 
due to chance.  A review of pairwise comparisons of the results between periods reveals 
the following: 
 
Table 8.5 Wave 1 Pairwise Comparisons of Average Sales Tax Theft at 
Measurement Dates 
Start Period End Period Mean Difference Significance 
Pre-intervention 
09/30/08 
01/31/09 -584.65 < .001 
04/30/09 -330.94 .095 
09/30/09 -795.69 < .001 
  
 The pairwise comparisons indicate that the Wave 1 interventions had a significant 
impact on the amount of average sales tax theft during the four-month period following 
the intervention.  It also appears that the impact of the intervention began to wane at the 
second measurement date, seven months after the intervention when there was no 
significant difference in the amount of average sales tax theft compared to the periods 
prior to the intervention.  The results show that the mean difference between average 
sales tax theft prior to the interventions and average sales tax theft one year after the 
interventions was again significant.  It is surmised that this “renewal” of impact occurred 
due to the indirect impact of the interventions on Wave 2 and the effect of continued 
follow up with respect to those companies that had responded slowly to the initial 
inquiry. 
 In May 2009, the interventions emphasizing the connection to a criminal 
investigation were applied to Wave 2.  The means and standard deviations prior to 
intervention and five months after the intervention are presented in Table 8.6.  The 
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average monthly sales tax theft for the companies in the second wave of interventions 
decreased (M = 1,107.40, SD = 992.10) during the five months following the intervention 
applied to this second wave.  Applying a paired-samples t-test it was found that this 
reduction was statistically significant, t(45) = 7.571, p < .001. 
 
Table 8.6 Wave 2 Monthly Sales Tax Theft Means and Standard Deviations before 
the Interventions and at the Five-Month Measurement Date 
 M SD 
Prior to intervention 1,105.53 717.63 
Five months after intervention -1.87 970.34 
 
 Recall that the intervention applied to the second wave emphasized that the 
inquiry was in connection with a criminal investigation.  A one-way ANOVA was 
utilized to compare the impacts between the two types of interventions applied to the two 
groups based on the mean tax theft per month at the first measurement date after the 
application of the intervention.24
 
  The ANOVA revealed a significant difference between 
the two treatments, F(1, 103) = 10.941, p = .001.  Table 8.7 presents the means and 
standard deviations for each intervention. 
 
Table 8.7 Comparison of Mean Sales Tax Theft per Month between Waves 1 and 2 
M SD 
Intervention 1 – Wave 1 (N = 64) 711.96 1,109.76 
Intervention 2 – Wave 2 (N = 41) -2.10 1,129.59 
 
 The comparison of mean sales tax theft per month between Waves 1 and 2 
suggests that interventions that emphasize criminal consequences result in more 
                                                          
24 The first measurement date for each intervention was used in the comparison because that is the 
measurement date when the intervention should have its maximum impact. 
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compliance than interventions perceived as civil in nature in line with the findings of 
Varma and Doob (1998). 
 
The Indirect Impact of the Interventions 
 Did the interventions have an indirect impact on companies within the study that 
were not directly targeted by a specific intervention?  Again, monthly average sales tax 
theft calculated for those companies which were not directly targeted by the specific 
intervention was used in this analysis.  With respect to the first intervention which 
occurred in October 2008, companies that were not subject to an intervention until the 
second wave in May 2009 were included in the indirect analysis along with companies 
that were not subject to interventions at all (the Major Case and Low Theft groups).  With 
respect to the second intervention, only the Major Case and Low Theft groups were 
evaluated for indirect impact.  The measurement date with respect to the first intervention 
was four months after the intervention, and for the second intervention, five months.  A 
paired samples t test was used to test the null hypothesis: 
H0: Any changes that occur in the mean monthly sales tax theft of members of 
groups not subject to direct intervention are due to chance and not to the indirect 
effect of the intervention and such differences will average to zero. 
 Table 8.8 presents the means and standard deviations of the monthly tax theft 
before and after the interventions for companies that might have been indirectly affected 
by the interventions.   
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Table 8.8 Monthly Sales Tax Theft Means and Standard Deviations for Indirect 
Effects of Interventions 
  M SD N 
Interventions – Wave 1 Prior to Intervention 2,713.85 5,861.50 94 
After Intervention 2,486.70 8,253.97 94 
Interventions – Wave 2 Prior to Intervention 3,496.19 7,019.28 53 
After Intervention 1,973.85 4,164.90 53 
 
 With respect to the first set of interventions, monthly sales tax theft decreased (M 
= 227.14, SD = 4,172.41) in companies that might have been indirectly impacted by the 
intervention.  The decrease was not statistically significant t(93) = .528, p = .599. 
 With respect to the second set of interventions, monthly sales tax theft decreased 
(M = 1,522.34, SD = 4,449.48) in the companies that might have been indirectly 
impacted by the intervention.  The analysis indicates that the decrease was significantly 
more than would be expected by chance, t(52) = 2.491, p = .016. 
 On the basis of these tests, it can be inferred that direct interventions have a 
significant impact on monthly tax theft by the companies to which the interventions are 
applied.  The impact is significant regardless of whether the intervention implies 
compliance failure will be subject to civil consequences or criminal consequences, but it 
appears that the impact is stronger where the implied consequences are criminal in nature.  
Additionally, criminal interventions have a significant indirect impact on compliance 
while civil interventions do not. 
 The implication of these results is that to control sales tax theft, non-criminal 
interventions must be continuous and direct.  Further, interventions with implied or 
clearly criminal consequences do result in some indirect or “spillover” effect on 
companies not directly targeted by the intervention. 
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Enforcement and the “Major Case” Dealers 
 To this point the “Major Case” dealers, the 43 dealers responsible for potential 
sales tax theft of $14,164,215, have been ignored.  The amount of potential sales tax theft 
by these dealers dictated that normal criminal investigations be carried out as opposed to 
some lighter form of intervention.  Chapter 6 described how the Southern Region 
Investigations unit had increased participation in task forces with other federal, state and 
local agencies on large, multi-company cases where other agencies had enforcement 
interests that aligned with those of DOR.  With respect to the Major Case car dealers, it 
was decided that the same approach could be used with respect to a large group of similar 
companies that were unrelated by ownership, but related by business type.  The State 
Attorney’s Office assigned a prosecutor to participate and provide legal assistance and 
expedited review of search warrant affidavits.  The Special Investigations Unit of the 
Miami-Dade Police Department, Auto Theft Task Force, was approached for their 
assistance with the execution of search warrants.  They indicated they held 
complementary interests in many of these dealers and agreed to a cooperative operation.   
 Fifteen of the 43 dealers in this class had closed during the months that elapsed 
while search warrants were being drafted and approved; one was removed and referred to 
another region because their operations actually existed in that other region; and five 
were removed to be subjected to other types of interventions based on various other 
criteria.  This left 22 dealers to be investigated by the newly formed task force.  In mid 
October 2009 ten search warrants were executed in a single day with two alternates 
executed a few days later.  In early December 2009 the remaining search warrants were 
executed, again in a single day.  Executing ten search warrants per day in this manner 
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required five teams of at least five people each with two additional people “floating” for 
support.  Each team was responsible for executing one search warrant in the morning and 
one in the afternoon.  Since DOR Southern Region Investigations has only four agents 
and one support analyst to participate in search warrants, it would have been impossible 
to execute these warrants in such a short period of time without the task force format.  
The execution of DOR search warrants always requires the assistance of a law 
enforcement agency because DOR agents are classified as regulatory and not law 
enforcement.  Without a task force, however, it is difficult to obtain support for multiple 
search warrant executions in a single day.  Under ordinary circumstances these 22 search 
warrants would have likely been executed over the course of a year if executed singly as 
separate cases.  By conglomerating them into a single operation, DOR was able to obtain 
the evidence required to document criminal cases against all 22 entities in a very 
compressed period of time.  By the end of December, two cases had already been 
documented, approved, and submitted to the State Attorney’s Office for potential 
prosecution.  The State Attorney’s Office had also committed to expedite the handling of 
all 22 cases to minimize any further losses because of expiration of the statute of 
limitations.  
 
Summary of the Impact of the Targeted Interventions 
 Over the course of 14 months targeted interventions were applied to the used car 
industry in Miami-Dade County Florida.  The interventions included substantial contact 
with targeted dealers and the execution of search warrants on those with the largest 
amounts of identified potential theft.  The impact of these interventions is the 
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identification and collection of a portion of the unremitted sales tax in the short term; 
longer term additional annual collections of sales tax through increased compliance; 
pending additional collections through continuing contact with dealers who have not 
completed their analysis of DOR-provided data; potential restitution from dealers 
identified for full investigation and potential prosecution; and reduced sales tax theft from 
the closure of noncompliant businesses.   
 The short term impact of the interventions is measured by the amount of 
unremitted sales tax collected, the amount under payment arrangements, plus the amount 
of unremitted sales tax where the liability has been admitted but payment arrangements 
are not complete.  The short term impact measured in this manner is $1,122,090.41.  
There is an additional $2,542,817.82 of unremitted sales tax pending at this time that will 
likely be added to the short term impact. 
 The continuing monthly impact of the interventions with respect to open 
businesses is measured by the additional amount of monthly sales tax being remitted 
since the intervention by those companies that have become compliant.  The monthly 
increase in sales tax remitted since the interventions is $157,761.02, or $1,893,132.24 per 
year.  It will likely be necessary to maintain periodic contact with these businesses in 
order to sustain these savings. 
 The continuing monthly impact of the interventions with respect to closed 
businesses is measured by the monthly amount of sales tax no longer being stolen by 
these businesses.  Assuming the demand for used cars is not impacted by the closure of 
these businesses, the closing of noncompliant businesses should result in sales being 
transferred to compliant businesses that will remit the sales tax collected.  Therefore, the 
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closure of noncompliant businesses does increase future sales tax collections.  The 
increase in sales tax remittances by compliant businesses who inherit the sales volume of 
closed noncompliant businesses is $133,745.08 per month or $1,604,940.96 per year.  
Some businesses do close naturally, but the businesses in this study that closed had been 
in operation for more than five years indicating the intervention was likely a trigger for 
closing at this particular time. 
 There is $8,430,301.69 of potential criminal restitution that will be collected as a 
result of these interventions.  Of this amount, documentation supporting $7,269,212.70 of 
unremitted sales tax has been obtained through the execution of search warrants.  
Analysis of the evidence and drafting of the probable cause affidavits for bringing 
criminal charges against these entities and owners is underway, with two cases already 
complete and submitted to the State Attorney’s Office for charging.  Criminal charges 
related to the remaining $1,161,088.99 of potential restitution will be documented 
through a combination of subpoenas and the use of title applications certified by 
DHSMV.  All criminal charges should be in place within four months of the execution of 
the search warrants.  The State Attorney’s Office has the option of negotiating payment 
of these liabilities, plus interest, investigative costs, and a plea to lesser charges in lieu of 
prosecution. 
 Dealers that closed during the course of the interventions owed $5,818,319.74, 
with a single dealer owing $2,442,177.37 of that amount.  These dealers will be subject to 
a complete criminal investigation and referral for prosecution. 
 A total of 35 dealers have been identified for the next wave of interventions 
representing $1,296,174.82 in unremitted sales tax.     
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 Table 8.9 summarizes the impact of these interventions at the time of this 
writing. 
 
Table 8.9 Summary of the Impact of Interventions 
Category Companies Amount 
Short term collections 26 $1,122,090.40 
Pending short-term collections 42 $2,542,817.82 
Continuing annual collections – open 
compliant businesses 107 $1,893,132.24 
Continuing annual collections – 
transferred from closed noncompliant 
to open compliant businesses 37 $1,604,940.96 
Potential restitution – search warrants 
executed 
22 $7,269,212.70 
Potential restitution – alternate 
documentation 13 $1,161,088.99 
Potential restitution – prosecutions of 
closed businesses 35 $5,818,319.74 
Next wave of interventions 35 $1,296,174.82 
Totals N/A due to overlaps $22,707,777.67 
 
 As pending cases are resolved, full investigations and prosecutions proceed, and 
the next wave of interventions take place, the analysis of the industry will continue in a 
cycle designed to continuously identify potential theft and begin to intervene before the 
amount of theft by any given dealer becomes large enough to require a full investigation 
or prosecution. 
 You may recall the following hypothesis set forth in Chapter 3: 
H1: The effectiveness of compliance enforcement efforts will be improved if 
active, well-informed enforcement activities characterized by substantial contact 
initiated by the agents of the state are substituted for passive or reactive activities.   
138 
 
 To test this hypothesis the above results were compared with the results that 
would have been achieved without this project.  Without the interventions, it is possible 
that the collection balances because of delinquencies would have been recovered, even 
though recovery from companies that closed would be unlikely.  It is also possible that 
audits would have been performed for those companies identified in the System for 
Unified Taxation (SUNTAX) as audit leads, even though some of these leads had already 
been rejected.  To be conservative, it is assumed that all collection balances would 
eventually be collected ($302,226.49) and that audits would be performed for all 
identified audit leads and that such audits would result in identification of the unremitted 
sales tax identified.  There were 14 companies identified as audit leads representing 
$1,946,053.89 in sales tax theft.  Therefore, without the interventions it is possible that 
DOR would have recovered a total of $2,248,280.38 of unremitted sales tax.   
 Amounts recovered as a result of the interventions are calculated excluding 
additional monthly sales tax in future periods or sales tax theft avoided because of closed 
companies and includes only theft balances that existed at the time the interventions 
began.  This total is $19,209,704.47.  The means and standard deviations of the tax theft 
amounts identified with and without the interventions are presented in Table 8.10. 
 
Table 8.10 Means and Standard Deviations of Sales Tax Theft Identified and 
Recoverable With and Without Interventions 
 M SD 
Identified and recoverable through interventions 100,050.54 220,100.00 
Identifiable and recoverable without interventions 11,709.79 48,504.86 
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 Using a one-way ANOVA to compare means before and after (with and without) 
the intervention, the interventions resulted in an increase (M = 88,340.75, SD = 218,997) 
in sales tax theft identified.  The Brown-Forsythe F-ratio is being reported because the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated.  The increase in sales tax theft 
identified and recoverable was statistically significant, F(1, 209.509) = 29.498, p < .001.  
As a result, the null hypothesis is rejected and it is concluded that the effectiveness of 
compliance enforcement efforts are improved by active, well informed enforcement 
activities characterized by substantial contact initiated by agents of the state. 
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CHAPTER 9 
EXPLAINING SALES TAX THEFT THROUGH THE 
THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR AND CRESSEY’S FRAUD TRIANGLE 
 It is claimed that the U. S. income tax system is built on voluntary assessment 
and payment (Flora v. United States, 1960).  A review of the income tax return clearly 
illustrates it is more a case of trust but verify.  An Internal Revenue Service agent 
reviewing an income tax return has enough financial data provided on the return itself to 
visualize the financial position of the individual or company and make a preliminary 
determination of the veracity of the income tax reported.  Income tax returns provide a 
frame of reference because deductions are reported along with revenues.  One can readily 
see that the amount of revenue reported supports the level of expenses claimed, or that it 
does not.  Corporate income tax returns also include a balance sheet with supporting 
statements which allow a fuller financial analysis of the business.  The sales tax return, 
on the other hand, is all trust with no verification.  The return, at least in Florida, provides 
one line of data containing gross sales, exempt sales, taxable sales, and the sales tax 
collected.   
 Perhaps one of the most important findings in this study is that trust is misplaced 
in the tax environment.  Remember that Martinez-Vazquez, Harwood, and Larkins (1992) 
found in their experiments that given the safe opportunity to evade taxes, a near-majority 
of people would take that chance and, if in an illiquid position, a significantly larger 
proportion of people would choose to evade.  The findings in this study support this 
premise. 
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 The framework for this study seeks to explain sales tax theft utilizing the theory 
of planned behavior for analysis of the decision to evade, incorporated into Cressey’s 
fraud triangle, and to use this framework to set forth enhanced enforcement 
methodologies to combat sales tax theft.  My study has provided analysis to support 
arguments for the adoption of new methods and empirical evidence that the proposed 
methodology works.  At this point a qualitative review of this study is appropriate to 
match observations to the theory underlying this study. 
 The theory of planned behavior posits that for an individual to perform a given 
behavior, it is necessary that the person be able to decide at will to perform or not 
perform the behavior.  The theory postulates three independent determinants of intention: 
• The person’s attitude toward the behavior, as in whether the person has a 
favorable or unfavorable view of the behavior; 
• Perceived social pressure to perform or not perform the behavior; and 
• Perceived behavioral control: the perceived ease or difficulty of performing the 
behavior based on past experience and anticipated obstacles (Ajzen, 1991). 
 Cressey’s fraud triangle adds the element of need to the analysis to account for 
how the individual arrives at the point where the intention to steal is formed.  Need is the 
element that leads the individual to the decision point.  Need pushes the individual into 
the realm where intention to steal or not to steal is formed by the determinants of the 
theory of planned behavior.  The need arises; the individual forms an intention to steal to 
satisfy that need. 
 This study provided the opportunity to meet and talk to more than 100 business 
owners, all of whom were under investigation for theft of state funds.  Nearly all of those 
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who received inquiry letters requiring a reconciliation of sales tax reported to DHSMV 
versus DOR and responded were extremely concerned by the inquiry and desired to 
resolve their tax issues expeditiously.  All of them stated that if it were found they owed 
the taxes, they would make arrangements to pay the amount due.  Indeed, several 
immediately paid the entire difference identified.  It was clear from the responses that 
most knew they owed the money.  One stated that he had come upon hard times and held 
back some of the taxes to subsidize his operations with the intention of making it up in 
later months, but once behind on his payments it became difficult to make good on his 
intentions, a Borrower in the typology of tax evaders.  Twelve dealers claimed that errors 
had been made by employees or accountants and ten pled misunderstanding of the rules 
regarding the calculation and reporting of repossession credits (Incompetents in the 
evader typology).  Ten dealers identified other individuals utilizing their DHSMV dealer 
number to sell cars without reporting the sales tax.  Four dealers had allowed others to 
use their dealer number and trusted them to properly report the sales tax.  These fourteen 
dealers were “Negligent Evaders” in the typology.  Four had lost all their records and 
could not perform an analysis to enable a response, potential “Proficient Evaders” using 
the excuse of lost records to confound proving a theft case.  Two dealers pointed to 
illness as a cause of the problem, Incompetents of the subtype citing medical problems 
afflicting the primarily responsible party.  Ten dealers claimed to be victims of fraud 
perpetrated by a partner, employee, or manager of the business, “Negligent Evaders” due 
to lack of internal controls.  One dealer was deceased and another was incarcerated in 
another state, confounding proper classification.  As predicted by Cressey’s fraud 
triangle, some form of need requiring retention of the state funds existed in most cases as 
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evidenced either by an admission during discussions, payment difficulties evidenced in 
the records of DOR, or in difficulties in arranging down payments on payment plans to 
resolve their tax issues.  Few were able to repay the tax immediately.  Most cited the 
horrible downturn in the economy, although such excuses disregard the fact that the theft 
began five years prior, when the economy was booming, and further ignores the fact that 
sales of used cars actually increased because of the economic downturn as was evidenced 
by their own increased sales.  These excuses appeared to be rationalizations based on 
generalized causes that, on the surface, made sense given the current state of the 
economy, but were not grounded in fact. 
 Some of the business owners decided to close their businesses and fade from view 
in order to avoid the repayment of the tax.  There were 21 of these owing $1,064,536, and 
these are of the “Hardcore Evader” typology progressing toward “Proficient Evader.”  It 
is curious that so many business owners would believe that closing their business would 
solve their tax problem.  To a great degree this is because they have learned this behavior. 
 In Chapter 6 a task force case was mentioned where 30 search warrants were 
executed in a single day.  One of these companies had been audited five years before and 
had a $146,000 audit assessment outstanding.  It had been outstanding for five years 
because the company purportedly closed.  However, the investigation determined that the 
business had been transferred to a new corporation ostensibly owned by the daughter of 
the owner of the predecessor company.  In fact, the company had not closed for a single 
day.  It continued to operate as it had before and continued to steal sales tax during the 
entire period from the audit assessment to the execution of the search warrant five years 
hence.  Failure to follow up the assessment and resulting lien with a levy and seizure of 
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property resulted in the infrastructure for theft being left intact for the new straw owner.  
Experience shows this to be a common occurrence in Florida because the state exercises 
so much restraint in seizing property to satisfy levies that seizures essentially never occur.  
Some business owners understand this and have come to accept and rely on the state’s 
passivity in this area.  This particular evader was a “Proficient Evader” but was caught 
through association with “Hardcore Evader” companies who were identified through their 
failure to cover all indicators of fraud. 
 One of the accountants representing two of the car dealers who had received 
intervention letters mentioned that his clients had asked him what would happen if they 
simply ignored the letter from DOR since they were aware that some companies that 
received the letters were doing so, an indication that the dealers were talking among 
themselves.  The execution of the first set of search warrants on the “Major Case” group 
had just been completed and a large number of boxes sealed with red evidence tape were 
in the author’s office for review.  The accountant was told that the boxes were from 
search warrants executed on companies that chose to ignore the letters, a fact 
communicated by the accountant to his clients.  Not only did his clients no longer think 
ignoring the letters was viable, but two additional companies that had not previously 
responded to their letters contacted the author within 24 hours to seek guidance on how to 
proceed with their review.   
 While this evidence is merely anecdotal, these two stories illustrate an important 
fact that officials responsible for compliance enforcement need to understand: businesses 
talk to each other.  They know what is happening in their industry and analyze activities 
to ascertain what they need to be concerned with and what can be ignored.  A business 
145 
 
owner is faced with a tax assessment; they close down and reopen under a relative’s 
name; a lien is filed against the old business but the authorities never take any further 
enforcement action against the owners to collect.  The end result is that the owners have 
learned how to avoid enforcement action and that knowledge is passed on to others in 
their industry.  The author has personally witnessed this pattern repeated many times.  It 
can be assumed that subsequent investigations of the car dealers that closed will reveal 
that several are still in business at a new location with a new name and with a relative or 
trusted associate listed as the owner.  One of the dealers in the “Major Case” group has 
owned four previous dealerships through which she stole more than $2 million in sales 
tax collections.  More than one year prior to this study she was served with a subpoena 
for the business records of those four businesses.  Her response was to close the current 
business and ignore the subpoena.  Being aware that she had opened yet another business 
under her sister’s name, the new business was included in the “Major Case” search 
warrants.  Records obtained from the search warrant indicate she had stolen another 
$250,000 through the new business in the course of a year.  She is a prime example of a 
“Hardcore Evader” struggling to become “Proficient” but stymied by her prior 
identification as a “Hardcore Evader.”  True “Proficient Evaders” must learn from others 
before they are caught and marked, or they must be able to transfer their operations to an 
individual who cannot be connected to them. 
 While participating in the execution of search warrants on two convenience stores 
the author overheard a young lady outside one of the stores say “They’ll just change the 
name,” as she watched the operation unfold.  She had made the connection between 
enforcement action and transfer of ownership.  Subsequent review indicated that there 
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had indeed been previous search warrants executed on companies with different names at 
these same locations within the past few years and that the current owners of record were 
related to the owners of the previous entities.25
 In the case of the car dealers who received intervention letters, it was observed 
and heard from third parties that many of the dealers were watching and biding their time 
to see if DOR would actually follow through on collecting the taxes due as reflected in 
the letters.  The execution of the search warrants on the Major Case group helped in this 
regard.  One of the owners of a business subjected to a search warrant commented that he 
had received calls from “everyone I know and everybody I used to know” regarding the 
search warrant.  He stated that “bad news travels fast” and that everyone wanted to know 
what he had done wrong.  He stated that he had not heard from many of these people in 
years (Anonymous, Personal communication, 2009).  The speed at which information 
travels in industry circles cannot be underestimated.  Just as bad news travels fast, as this 
dealer learned, news about how to beat the system travels fast as well.  An accountant 
who represents many car dealers was in DOR offices on another matter and mentioned to 
one of the investigators that the “yellow envelopes,” (the mailed interventions), were now 
famous with local used car dealers and his clients were dreading receiving one.  There are 
significant indications that the subjective social norms in the theory of planned behavior 
  It is unknown whether this problem is 
unique to Florida, but it is commonly recognized by DOR personnel as a significant 
problem for Florida tax enforcement. 
                                                          
25 The owner was subsequently convicted on the strength of the evidence obtained in the final search 
warrant and sentenced to four years in prison. 
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are at work with respect to tax enforcement in this project and that these norms are 
coloring individual attitudes toward compliance. 
 There was a distinct tendency for dealers to let deadlines slip.  For example, a 
dealer would call and request an additional 60 days to complete their analysis because 
records had to be retrieved from storage.  If a follow up call was not initiated at the end of 
the 60 days, the dealer generally would not contact the Department once the additional 
time granted had expired.  In several cases the author waited for several weeks after the 
deadline passed to see if the dealer would call and they did not.  They appeared to be 
testing their limits in their interaction with the state.  Continuous and consistent follow up 
is critical.    
 So why do people steal sales tax dollars?  Sales tax theft can be explained within 
the expanded theory of planned behavior framework presented in this study and evaders 
can be categorized within the evader typology set forth herein.  It was noted in this study 
that dealers who failed to remit sales tax dollars had a need for the funds, a framework 
component supplied by Cressey’s fraud triangle.  The need was not necessarily one where 
the company was faced with bankruptcy absent embezzlement of the tax funds, for most 
of these dealers drove expensive cars, wore nice clothes and jewelry, operated well-
maintained business locations, and paid for extensive help at the car lots even though 
they reported few, if any, employees.  Their need was for the funds required to support 
the lifestyle to which they had become accustomed or to which they aspired. 
 Information sharing between dealers with respect to this project was witnessed, as 
discussed above, during this project and was confirmed in interviews with DOR 
personnel and analysis of other DOR cases that provide evidence of the information 
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sharing that occurs among industry peers specifically and taxpayers in general.  This 
information sharing is sophisticated enough that it has become a learning system where 
taxpayer activities adjust constantly to enforcement efforts.  Members of the 
investigations unit noted that as they execute search warrants on, for example, 
convenience store locations, which have historically low rates of compliance, and 
complete criminal cases against stores based on certain types of evidence, they find that 
the nature and quality of evidence obtained in subsequent search warrants tends to 
deteriorate.  Several years ago an investigator could prepare a case covering several years 
with documentation obtained through the execution of a search warrant on a convenience 
store.  Currently, it is difficult to get more than a month’s worth of data on site because 
owners have learned to remove the documentation from the store premises as soon as it is 
no longer required there for business operations.  The response was not one of becoming 
more compliant, but one of destroying the evidence of noncompliance. These situations 
constitute substantial evidence of the existence of social norms that support tax evasion 
and tax theft activities.  They are also examples of Proficient Evaders who adjust and 
adapt as enforcement efforts progress, but never choose compliance as a response option.  
 Based on this study I conclude that businesses collecting sales tax perceive they 
have a high level of behavioral control with respect to the decision to retain the sales tax.  
They do not believe they will be caught and a shockingly high percentage of businesses 
make the decision to retain taxpayer funds for their personal use.  Even when they are 
caught through audit activities many have learned that they can ignore the assessment and 
avoid consequences fairly easily.  Few of them actually own the property from which 
their business is run, so a tax lien matters little. 
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 The final component of the theory of planned behavior as it relates to sales tax 
theft is the business owner’s attitude toward sales tax theft.  From interaction with 
business owners during this study the author has developed the distinct impression that 
most do not view their failure to remit the full amount of sales tax collected as theft of 
state funds.  Social norms help to explain this attitude.  If the circles to which business 
owners belong treat sales tax theft as just another governmental fee to be avoided; and if, 
in fact, the circles to which they belong embrace avoidance of remitting sales taxes 
collected and proactively share strategies that enable the businessman to avoid paying the 
sales tax even when assessed; then the stigma of theft does not attach to the activity.  
From this grows an attitude that sales tax theft is acceptable, commonplace, and not 
immoral. 
  Just as the theory of planned behavior assists in understanding sales tax theft, it 
can also provide the key for improved enforcement.  Enforcement efforts must be brought 
to bear simultaneously against the business owner’s perception of behavioral control and 
the social norms that feed the attitude that sales tax theft is acceptable.  This is most 
readily achieved through the use of targeted industry enforcement activities informed by 
strategic intelligence and data analysis that result in continuous and consistent 
engagement with the businesses collecting taxes as an agent of the state.   
 It is important to make it clear that this approach is not merely better targeting of 
the deterrence model to evasion, but an attempt to use engagement to educate taxpayers, 
change attitudes, and ensure continued compliance in the future.  It may appear that this 
study is primarily focused on increasing compliance by targeting enforcement in such a 
way as to preclude the assumption of behavioral control on the part of a potential evader.  
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While that is certainly a major thrust of the approach, the intended impact of engagement 
on attitudes and subjective norms is equally as important, but more difficult to illustrate 
in a time-limited study.  Such impacts can only be measured over time and, indeed, 
require much time to take effect.  A single encounter with a tax enforcement agent, no 
matter how “pleasant” the agent attempts to make it, has little chance of completely 
negating the repeated government bashing and tax hate that grips a substantial portion of 
the population and is reinforced by some politicians.  However, it is my belief that such 
encounters do make a difference.  All of the subjects in this study and the attorneys some 
of them engaged indicated repeated and sometimes emotional gratitude for the 
professional manner in which they were treated and for the reasonableness of the 
approach.  Most of them understood that the first encounter could have been much more 
confrontational, accusatory, and might have included the drafting of a probable cause 
affidavit for their arrest with only a single opportunity to consent to an interview, which 
their attorney’s would have advised against anyway.  All too often the first approach in 
enforcement is a severe one, as dictated by the still influential but often misinterpreted 
deterrence model, involving assessments, penalties, and fees equal to several times the 
amount of the tax not remitted, and sometimes being charged with a felony tax crime 
before any real effort is made to resolve the deficiencies.  While the impact of this 
approach on attitudes and social norms cannot be specifically illustrated using only 
evidence from this study and statistical analysis, the author’s interactions with these 
individuals provides an indication that the approach does indeed have an impact.  Over 
time it will be possible to measure this impact if the approach is adopted more 
universally. 
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CHAPTER 10 
MAKING ENFORCEMENT WORK 
 The state of the compliance enforcement environment is not always as clear as it 
may seem.  Florida reports voluntary sales tax compliance rates based solely on 
delinquent returns, late remittances, and audit assessments and these reported voluntary 
compliance rates are generally around 98 percent (Florida Department of Revenue, 
2007).  Other states, Washington for example (Washington Department of Revenue, 
2008), follow this procedure as well.  Due (1975) estimated the sales tax gap at five 
percent of actual collections.  My study indicates these reported and estimated rates bear 
little resemblance to reality.  There is an enormous gap in the enforcement tools currently 
in use that exists between the collection of delinquent taxes on one end of the spectrum 
and audit and investigation activities on the other.  The ability to fill this gap rests on the 
realization that more collection efforts, more audits, and more investigations are not the 
answer, although more of all three are indeed needed.  Filling the gap requires a new type 
of enforcement methodology focused on managing the principal-agent relationship 
between the state and the businesses that collect sales tax on behalf of the state.  It is not 
sufficient to wait until a business is late filing a return to develop an enforcement-related 
relationship with that business.  That business must understand that they are an agent of 
the state, collecting funds that become the property of the state at the moment of 
collection, and that representatives of the state are there to manage that agency 
relationship and protect the state’s interest in those funds.  In the present study that 
function was portrayed as “interventions” on the part of the state with respect to 
businesses identified that had collected and failed to remit sales taxes collected from their 
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customers.  In this case “interventions” is probably an appropriate term to use because the 
businesses identified had been involved in sales tax theft for five years or more.  Moving 
forward, I think it is more appropriate to describe this relationship as one of 
“engagement” rather than “intervention.”  Engagement is possible as long as enforcement 
operations are proactive, as the author believes they must be. 
 This new enforcement methodology is based on current activities known as lead 
development and discovery operations.  Lead development is how companies are 
identified for audit, the specifics of which are not well publicized, but involves analysis 
of data and available information to identify anomalies in reporting habits of businesses.  
Discovery operations are similar but are much more targeted.  An industry or other 
grouping of businesses is targeted for enforcement operations based on evidence of 
noncompliance.  The discovery operation is sometimes referred to as a “campaign.”  The 
targeted industry enforcement program described in Chapter 8 is similar to a discovery 
operation based on leads generated from a lead development program.  This specialized 
type of discovery operation is precisely the type of enforcement operation that needs to 
be made a permanent part of local enforcement activities, operating constantly rather than 
only when a new “campaign” is deemed necessary.  The targeted industry enforcement 
program described in Chapter 8 is the first stage of such an operation.  Moving forward, it 
would involve constant monitoring of the industry and identification of new leads.  As 
new leads are identified, new waves of “interventions” would be rolled out.  As the 
industry becomes more compliant because of consistent and timely monitoring, the focus 
would shift to engagement, with noncompliant activities quickly identified and 
corrections initiated before the business finds itself mired in felonious activities far too 
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deeply to be easily extracted.  A relatively common comment heard from dealers during 
the targeted enforcement portion of this study was that they wish the discrepancies had 
been identified earlier instead of the problem being compounded over five years.  It is far 
easier for a dealer to become compliant again if they are faced with unremitted taxes for 
three months totaling $6,000 rather than unremitted taxes for 60 months totaling 
$120,000.  In ten cases the owners of the businesses were not actively involved in the 
day-to-day operations of the business but had a business manager or partner who handled 
daily activities, a not uncommon situation in business.  These owners (Negligent 
Evaders) were shocked to learn that hundreds of thousands of dollars of sales taxes had 
not been remitted by their businesses.  State enforcement operations could have actually 
provided these owners a benefit by identifying the theft earlier.  Granted it is not the 
state’s responsibility to do this, and there is no doubt that some of these absentee owners 
understood that sales tax theft was occurring, but from the state’s standpoint, it is much 
harder to collect unremitted taxes that have gone unnoticed for five years.  You can 
punish the owners at that point, but the liability has grown too large for the owners to 
readily repay.  It is better for the owner and the state to not allow the liability to reach that 
level.   
 It may appear that this study advocates an enforcement approach that is 
tantamount to auditing everyone.  The point was made that there are nearly 1 million 
businesses in Florida.  How can you “engage” with all of them?  Of course, you cannot.  
That is where intuition and strategic lead development come to bear as was indicated in 
Chapter 7.  This study was designed to show that the solution is not as resource intensive 
or expensive as it might intuitively appear to be.  It has taken many months to mount and 
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administer the targeted enforcement project that is the subject of this study, but that is a 
result of having only one individual assigned to the project, part time.  Additionally, 
because the project covered a five-year period and records are only required by law to be 
retained for three years, it has taken the dealers longer to analyze and reconcile their 
records.  If such a program were instituted where an individual in each region were 
assigned full time to the used car dealer industry, for example, the results of this study 
suggest that the industry could be analyzed and brought into compliance within two 
years.  Going forward, updating comparison data and maintaining contacts with the 
dealers would require less time.  An additional component of this plan would be 
unannounced records inspections at the dealers similar to those already carried out by 
inspectors from DHSMV.  In fact, the revenue inspections could be carried out in 
conjunction with those of the DHSMV. 
 Used auto dealers represent a fairly easy industry in which to enforce compliance.  
Third-party data are available for comparison and the businesses in the industry are 
selling fewer items at higher prices making the analysis easier to perform.  Compliance 
has not been enforced to the extent it should only because the resources required have not 
been provided.  The comparison of sales tax reported on title applications to DHSMV to 
sales tax reported to DOR should be an automated process that immediately flags 
problems for follow up before five years pass and dealers manage to retain $20 million in 
state funds for their own use, and that from just one county.  That a system has not been 
put in place to automate this process is probably an indication of the difficulties in 
obtaining approval and financing of interagency projects.  The ease of identifying 
potential sales tax theft in this industry, by comparing information supplied to two 
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separate state agencies by the subject company, is the factor that made this industry ideal 
for this type of project.  In effect, the companies indicted themselves by supplying 
conflicting information regarding the same sale to two different agencies of the state.  But 
how will such an investigative structure work in other industries? 
 Each industry has unique characteristics that can be used to define a fraud 
signature.  To implement a similar compliance enforcement project in other industries, 
data from various sources is utilized to create the fraud signature for that industry.  Data 
specific to individual companies can be compared to this fraud signature to identify 
potential targets for enforcement operations.  Again, this is not unlike current lead 
development activities, but involves an expansion of data sources and devolution to the 
local level. 
 Simultaneous to carrying out the auto dealer project, Southern Region 
Investigations began developing a database for identifying fraud in another industry in 
Miami-Dade County that has long been known to be largely noncompliant.  The industry 
will not be identified herein because the project is ongoing.  Data were accumulated from 
SUNTAX and a variety of public and private databases to create a profile for every entity 
within this industry within Miami-Dade County.  Without disclosing the details of the 
analysis, the data can be analyzed to, for example, look for companies reporting revenues 
too low to support the rent applicable to the location or companies reporting exempt sales 
that are out of line with standards.  The database is designed to allow analysis of many 
factors that might indicate fraud and the assignment of relative weights to each factor to 
arrive at a score that functions as a fraud indicator.  Using this data, 142 preliminary 
targets have been identified with high fraud signatures representing an estimated $17 
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million in sales tax evasion solely from Miami-Dade County, and the database is only 
half complete.   
 The factors involved will vary industry-by-industry, but factors can be developed 
for every industry where sales tax theft or fraud is known to be significant.  One or more 
individuals at the local Service Center level should be allocated to each targeted industry.  
While a core group of individuals could be tasked with the projects across industry lines, 
the author believes there is much to be gained by allowing those who perform these types 
of tasks to specialize by industry because the interpretation of the data is enhanced by 
familiarity with the industry and its standards. 
 From the standpoint of cost, this type of enforcement activity is low cost, high 
return investment.  Using the used auto industry that is the subject of this study and the 
additional target industry mentioned above for example, the author estimates a minimum 
requirement of two dedicated employees allocated to each industry at a fully-loaded cost 
of $70,713 each (salary, benefits, taxes, specialized database access, travel expenses, and 
annual training costs).  This $282,850 investment has the potential to return more than 
$53 million dollars in the year of inception and safeguard $10.6 million per year 
thereafter in direct impact.  The recovery per hour invested is $6,395 per hour in the 
initial year and $1,279 per hour thereafter, which is a higher return than either audit or 
criminal investigation activities.  The indirect impact of highly visible enforcement 
activities would augment this return.  Such high returns are possible because the projects 
move the burden of proving compliance to the dealer by requiring the dealer to justify 
reporting that is out of range or not supported by known facts.  The targeted enforcement 
structure set forth in the present study effectively closes the large enforcement gap that 
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exists between collections activities and audit/investigations activities in a very cost-
effective manner.  More importantly, this type of activity maintains enforcement contact 
between DOR and businesses that exhibit fraud indicators.  Continuous contact attracts 
notice and makes it appear that the risks of being caught stealing sales tax are higher than 
they actually are.  That continuous contact works can be seen by looking at another 
example from the used car industry.  As noted, the potential sales tax theft by the used car 
dealers was identified by comparing sales tax collections reported on title applications 
filed with DHSMV to monthly reporting to DOR.  As noted, smarter thieves tend to make 
sure they file the same amounts with both state agencies, but why do some dealers file 
accurate information with DHSMV but are comfortable underreporting to DOR?  The 
answer involves continuous contact.  Filing a false title application is a third-degree 
felony and can easily lead to loss of the dealer’s license to sell cars.  Most dealers are 
very sensitive to this possibility and those who steal sales tax will generally file accurate 
title applications even though they have no intention of remitting all the sales taxes 
collected.  Dealers understand that at least once per year inspectors from DHSMV will 
perform a site inspection which will include review of randomly selected contracts for 
compliance.  If an inspector finds a fraudulently prepared title application, the dealer 
understands that the loss of his or her license and livelihood is the likely outcome.  The 
probability of getting caught falsifying a title application is much greater than getting 
caught underreporting sales tax.  That must change.  The ingredients for change have 
been provided in this paper. 
 Chapter 7 provides evidence that intuition based on good data can be used to 
identify fraud indicators within an industry.  DOR certainly has access to sufficient data 
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to enable this process for any and every industry in the state.  Since the process more than 
pays for itself, there is little reason not to supply the resources and adopt the approach. 
 Chapter 8 provides a blueprint for initiating a targeted industry enforcement 
program within a given industry.  Time must be provided at the inception of the project to 
properly analyze the industry and identify the initial group of companies for which 
contact is required.  It is important to adopt an approach that requires the business to 
provide documentation and/or justifications in response to DOR generated concerns.  
Auditing or investigation requires DOR employees to do the time-consuming work.  
Responses to intervention-type inquiries require the business to do the time-consuming 
work required to respond if they have not properly maintained their support for the 
returns filed.  It is important to understand that in all cases, the DOR representative will 
be asking for documentation that is already required by law to exist.  Some businesses 
will have to put this documentation together after the fact because that is the way they 
customarily operate.  Some file returns with little organized support for the numbers they 
write on the returns.  For those that do get their documentation in order before filing, the 
DOR inquiry will cause them little additional work.  Those businesses that do not prepare 
the documentation before filing will begin to do so after they learn that DOR does indeed 
monitor their reporting and expects the law regarding maintenance of books and records 
to support tax filings to be followed.  For example, in the targeted industry enforcement 
project in this study, some of the targeted companies contacted were able to explain the 
differences between what they reported as sales tax collected to DHSMV and what they 
reported to DOR by repossession credits.  Those companies where repossession credits 
explained the entire difference would not have been on the intervention list had they 
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reported their repossession credits properly.  Further, the law requires they maintain 
proper documentation related to repossessions along with a detailed calculation of the 
amount of the credit allowed with respect to each instance.  Repossession documentation 
is supposed to be available whenever requested by a DOR agent.  While these companies 
were cleared of suspicion and further action was not necessary, the contact provided the 
opportunity to educate the taxpayer on the proper way to report the repossession credits 
and the proper documentation to keep on hand supporting the credit claimed.  This 
educational aspect was an important additional benefit of the contact. 
 The targeted industry enforcement program should be the primary strategic 
compliance enforcement tool utilized.  Currently, audits are more strategic than random, 
but the random component will need to be increased to identify Proficient Evaders who 
have learned to elude strategic analysis based on fraud indicators. 
 The present study has concentrated on state sales tax only, but it is important to 
mention that this study helped identify other violations as well.  During the collection of 
data for the survey the following additional leads were developed: 
• Of the dealer locations that were rented, the landlords for 123 of the locations 
were found to be unregistered for commercial rental activities, representing an 
estimated $626,399 in monthly rental proceeds and $43,848 in additional 
monthly sales tax due to the state; 
• Nineteen of the dealers were not registered for corporate income tax; 
• 185 dealers were not registered for unemployment tax; and 
• 62 dealers who internally financed the sale of used cars were not registered for 
the documentary stamp tax. 
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 Targeted enforcement efforts should be holistic and not be directed at a single 
tax.  The goal is to increase compliance with respect to every tax for which a business is 
obligated.  The identification of the unregistered commercial properties mentioned above 
provides an example of how targeted enforcement programs can identify leads outside of 
the targeted group. 
 Targeted enforcement projects will indentify some businesses where a full audit 
or full criminal investigation will be required.  In order to make the process work 
effectively, audit and criminal investigations management must be prepared to allow 
audits and criminal investigations to be assigned directly from the targeted enforcement 
process rather than going through a centralized lead development and assignment 
process.  Alternatively, the centralized process can be utilized, but cases identified 
through the targeted enforcement process must be given priority.  In Florida, the ability to 
immediately respond with a criminal investigation already exists since that process is 
decentralized, but the audit process is not.  Speed in response is critical. 
 It is also critical that those responsible for enforcement in any capacity be mindful 
of the benefits of task force type approaches to enforcement as analyzed in Chapter 6.  
The present study has dealt solely with task force utilization in the context of criminal 
investigations, but it is possible to utilize this structure in civil compliance enforcement 
efforts as well.  In Florida, there are a number of other agencies that are involved with 
regulation of businesses that have interests that are complementary to those of DOR, such 
as the Division of Corporations, the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 
numerous subunits of the Department of Professional Regulation, and, of course, the 
Internal Revenue Service at the federal level.  Further, Florida Statutes Section 212.19 
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requires that other agencies provide any information required by DOR and needed in the 
enforcement of revenue laws, and Florida Statutes Section 213.053 has sufficient 
exceptions to the confidentiality rules to allow DOR to advise many other state regulatory 
agencies of noncompliant status.  While it is easier to envision task force operations in a 
criminal investigation scenario, it is nevertheless possible to utilize this technique in civil 
enforcement.  For example, a business that refuses to comply with Florida tax laws 
should not be able to register as a corporation in Florida or obtain a needed business 
license from the Department of Professional Regulation, or be licensed as a Lotto retailer, 
or be able to accept Electronic Benefit Payments (food stamps); yet noncompliant 
businesses are allowed to do all of those things because coordination is lacking.  A task 
force approach to noncompliant taxpayers would make it easier to have all relevant 
licenses revoked unless and until the company comes into compliance with all state 
agencies. 
 The legislature has a crucial role as well.  There needs to be recognition that 
unenforceable laws and laws that simply are not enforced as they should be affect social 
norms regarding sales tax compliance and help to spread a culture of noncompliance.  It 
is understandable that legislatures have a desire to make their revenue departments more 
“taxpayer friendly,” but elected representatives must understand that the businesses 
collecting sales taxes are not the taxpayer.  If businesses fail to remit sales taxes collected 
they are stealing from the actual taxpayers the legislators were elected to protect.  They 
are defrauding the citizens of the state by using the guise of sales tax collection to 
enhance their own profitability.  Citizens expect their tax dollars to be used by the state to 
provide services, not to be redirected to the personal use of the owners of the business 
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that collects the tax.  If legislators truly want to be “taxpayer friendly,” they will provide 
DOR with the tools required to enforce compliance by business agents of the state. 
 In summary, the tasks performed by collections personnel, auditors, and criminal 
investigators are critical to the mission of a revenue agency, but there remains a gap in 
the enforcement coverage that allows unacceptably large amounts of sales tax theft to 
escape detection.  This gap can be effectively and efficiently bridged through the use of 
sustained targeted industry enforcement strategies that result in continuous engagement 
between revenue agency employees and the business agents who collect sales tax for the 
state. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Tax evasion has been the subject of much study over the last four decades.  
Since Allingham and Sandmo (1972) proposed the application of a rational choice 
approach to evasion many other researchers have proposed dozens of drivers of tax 
evasion utilizing multiple decision, choice, and behavioral theories in an attempt to 
explain evasion and isolate the ultimate trigger which could lead to the perfect antidote.  
In the midst of this struggle it appears that most researchers, other than Watrin and 
Ullmann (2008), assumed tax evasion was one-size-fits-all and that the solution for one 
type of evasion would fit other types of evasion equally well.  In fact, it appears that most 
researchers labored under the mistaken belief that evasion does not exist with respect to 
consumption taxes (Watrin & Ullmann, 2008).  The present study has the distinction of 
firmly and completely segregating the study of sales tax evasion and theft from the study 
of income tax evasion and leaves little room for doubt that sales tax theft or evasion not 
only exists, but is a much larger problem than revenue agencies will publicly admit.  It is 
the author’s hope that this study will stimulate the same level of interest in studying sales 
tax theft that has existed with respect to income tax evasion.  In 2008 the 45 states who 
administer a sales tax collected more than $240 billion in sales tax, representing almost 
31 percent of total state tax revenue (U. S. Census Bureau, 2008).  The levels of sales tax 
theft suggested in this study combined with these figures make it clear that sales tax theft 
is a topic worthy of additional targeted research, particularly by state finance scholars and 
practitioners who have access to real time data.  This study has been limited to the State 
of Florida but other state’s approaches to enforcement are worthy of study.  Additionally, 
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a wealth of potential information is available from comparative studies that could be 
conducted.  The author does not believe that Florida is unique in the enforcement 
problems it faces primarily because the belief that consumption taxes are evasion free is 
so widespread.  The author particularly recommends much more quasi-experimental 
research, which would likely require partnerships between practitioners and academicians 
to maximize data access.  It is critical that researchers move beyond the belief that 
delinquencies and audit assessments are the universe of noncompliant activity in a sales 
tax structure. 
 There are those who advocate a national retail sales tax to replace all other taxes 
at the federal level.  Some of those advocates attempt to “sell” the idea by playing to 
populist anger and frustration with the income tax system generally and the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) specifically.  They argue that the IRS would no longer be 
necessary in a sales tax regime.  The author believes such arguments are disingenuous at 
best.  As discussed previously and illustrated with data, the income tax has significant 
built-in protections against evasion that the sales tax does not.  It is the author’s opinion 
that a national sales tax with no enforcement body and a very high tax rate would simply 
be disastrous.  This study has illustrated why that is the case.  At best, existing IRS 
employees could be moved to the state level to bolster existing state tax agencies, but 
enforcement would still be required, likely at much higher levels.  But even then, unless 
the enforcement paradigm is changed as indicated in this study, the result would be far 
more evasion and theft than is currently present with an income tax.  What is surprising is 
that with 45 sales tax systems in existence in this country, no one advocating a national 
sales tax has bothered to study sales tax theft and evasion at the level necessary to support 
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some of the critical assumptions inherent in such a massive tax policy shift at the federal 
level. 
 The opportunity to study sales tax theft in the field is an incredible opportunity 
that the author is grateful to have had.  It does, however, have its limitations.  Since this 
study involves interaction with individuals potentially facing harsh consequences and 
punishment it was not possible to manipulate interventions and provide alternative 
treatments to different groups within the study as could have been done with an 
experimental design.  It was critical that DOR policy be followed throughout the study 
and that all businesses and individuals that came under scrutiny were treated similarly 
and fairly throughout.  As a result, this study was a bit less quantitative and experimental 
than the author would have preferred.  But the advantages of studying actual processes in 
the field and the access to live data far outweighed the limitations.  Access to data has 
been a perennial problem for tax evasion researchers because of confidentiality issues and 
the same holds true with respect to the retail sales tax.  It is difficult to acquire data that 
has not been summarized to the point of being useless as was noted by Alm (1991).  In 
fact, with respect to the sales tax, the data available to the taxing authority is already 
summarized to the point of being useless.  A state sales tax return in Florida has a single 
line of data reporting gross sales, exempt sales, taxable sales and sales tax collected.    
For this reason, even if raw sales tax data cleansed of personal and corporate identifiers 
were provided to researchers, it would be virtually useless because it can only be 
evaluated when it can be matched and compared to other data that is not available on the 
tax return and therefore not available under any circumstances once the identifiers 
required for matching are removed.  This was the advantage obtained in this study and is 
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the advantage of any researcher who can study from within the agency: they can match 
the data to outside data sources and bring observation and interaction to bear.   
 Additional research is needed to identify innovative approaches to enforcement 
adopted by other states.  For example, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New York are all 
advanced users of data accumulated from a large number of databases in the development 
of enforcement leads, and Georgia has begun cross-checking sales tax filings with 
information obtained from outside databases.  Comparative research into varying 
approaches to intelligence generation is of great interest to the author who believes there 
is much to be learned from such studies. 
 And finally, the author hopes that states will make a stronger effort to identify 
the true tax gaps that exist with respect to the sales tax.  It is easier to measure, and 
certainly more politically expedient, to use delinquency and audit data as a measure of 
voluntary compliance, but as this study has shown, such estimates are a poor indicator of 
the true tax gap and tend to lead researchers and lawmakers to incorrect conclusions 
regarding compliance.  It will be difficult to convince legislatures to devote more 
resources to enforcement efforts unless the true cost of sales tax evasion and theft is 
identified and reported. 
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Appendix 1 – Analysis of Income and Deduction Items on the Federal 
Individual Income Tax Return for Verifiability 
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Appendix 1 
   
All returns, total Total Verifiable 
Income Items:   
Salaries and Wages 5,842,269,820 5,842,269,820 
Taxable Interest 268,058,182 268,058,182 
Ordinary Dividends 237,052,127 237,052,127 
State Income Tax Refunds 27,046,648 27,046,648 
Alimony Received 8,759,334 8,759,334 
Business or profession net income 334,585,650  
Business or profession net loss -54,849,389  
Capital Gain Distributions 11,981,884 11,981,884 
  Taxable Net Gain 912,182,379  
  Taxable Net Loss -16,508,394  
Sales of property other than capital assets - net gain 15,112,589  
Sales of property other than capital assets - net loss -10,755,848  
Taxable IRA distributions 147,959,327 147,959,327 
Pensions and annuities - taxable 490,581,465 490,581,465 
Rent net income 56,510,400  
Rent net loss, including nondeductible loss -74,090,927  
Royalty net income 17,875,464  
Royalty net loss -235,788  
Farm rental net income 3,988,998  
Farm rental net loss -587,605  
Partnership and S Corporations net income 547,401,480  
Partnership and S Corporations net loss -132,696,270  
Estate and Trust net income 20,612,089  
Estate and Trust net loss -2,505,195  
Farm net income 9,931,284  
Farm net loss -24,624,543  
Unemployment compensation 29,415,079 29,415,079 
Social Security Benefits - Taxable 167,186,633 167,186,633 
Foreign earned income exclusion -19,888,233  
Other income - net income 41,578,697  
Other income - net loss -5,438,442  
Net operating loss -86,369,141  
Gambling earnings 30,139,091 30,139,091 
Cancellation of debt 1,881,848 1,881,848 
   
Income Items Totals 8,793,560,693 7,262,331,438 
   
Percentage of income verifiable  82.59% 
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Appendix 1 (continued)   
   
Deductions for AGI: Total Verifiable 
   
IRA Payments 12,876,504 12,876,504 
Student loan interest deduction 7,463,755 7,463,755 
Educator expenses deduction 925,997  
Tuition and fees deduction 10,578,961 10,578,961 
Domestic production activities deduction 6,780,483  
Health savings account deduction 1,500,881 1,500,881 
One-half of deduction for self-employment tax 24,759,998 24,759,998 
Moving expense adjustment 2,903,022  
Payments to a KEOGH plan 22,262,415 22,262,415 
Penalty on early withdrawal of savings 352,592 352,592 
Alimony paid 9,496,674 9,496,674 
Self-employed health insurance deduction 21,283,306  
Medical savings account deduction 21,748 21,748 
Certain business expenses of reservists, performing 
artists, etc. 420,756  
Other Adjustments 1,295,091  
   
Deductions for AGI Totals 122,922,183 89,313,528 
   
Percentage of adjustments for AGI subject  to 
verification  72.66% 
   
Other Deductions:   
   
Basic standard deduction 635,824,934 635,824,934 
Additional standard deduction 18,356,722 18,356,722 
Total itemized deductions 1,333,036,542  
Exemptions 943,171,372 943,171,372 
   
Other Deductions Totals 2,930,389,570 1,597,353,028 
   
Percentage of other deductions subject to verification  54.51% 
   
Source: Internal Revenue Service. (2007). Internal 
Revenue Service Source of Income Tax 
Statistics, Table 1, Individual Income Tax, All 
Returns: Sources of Income and Adjustments. 
Internal Revenue Service.    
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Appendix 2 – Auto Dealer Survey Used in Chapter 6 – Predictors of Tax Evasion 
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Auto Dealer Survey 
 
 
 
 
Business Name:   
Tax Number:    
Address:   
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Cost 
Structure 
 1 Surrounding neighborhood type   
  1 2 3 4 
  Poor   Wealthy 
  1 2 3 4 
  Industrial   Retail 
     
 2 Property appearance   
  1 2 3 4 
  Appears low rent   Appears high rent 
     
 3 Rent Analysis (In-office analysis)   
  Approximate square footage (Property tax records)   
  Approximate rental value per sf (CBRE Survey)   
  Approximate monthly rent   
  Average Monthly Sales   
  Sales minus rents    
  Rent coverage (Sales divided by rent)  
  
(Note: Rent can be used as a proxy for mortgage payments if owned or as a 
proxy for asset use value.) 
      
 4 Type of dealer    
  1 2 3 4 
  Other 
Office/Ware
house 
Repair 
Shop Traditional 
      
 5 Size of operation    
  1 2 3 4 
  Small Medium Large Multi-location 
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 6 Observations    
          
        
      
      
          
    
Profit Structure    
 1 Condition and type of cars   
  1 2 3 4 
  Inexpensive   Expensive 
  1 2 3 4 
  Disrepair Fair Good Excellent 
  1 2 3 4 
  General Mixed Luxury Specialty 
      
 2 Cleanliness and maintenance of facilities  
  1 2 3 4 
  Dirty   Very Clean 
  1 2 3 4 
  Poorly maintained  Well maintained 
      
 3 Location    
  1 2 3 4 
  Low traffic   High traffic 
  1 2 3 4 
  Difficult access and parking  
Easy access and 
parking 
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  1 2 3 4 
  Not meant for retail  Meant for retail 
      
 4 In-house financing? (Yes/No) 1 = Y; 2 = N  
      
 5 Inventory Size    
  1 2 3 4 
  0 - 15 16-30 31-45 45-over 
  Small   Large 
      
 6 Observations    
          
        
        
        
      
        
      
        
        
          
      
Management     
 1 Historical filing review   
  Files round numbers?  (Yes/No)   
  
Files incomplete returns?                
(Yes/No)   
  (Missing signature, only taxable sales - no gross and exempt, etc) 
      
183 
 
  Number of returns filed late   
  
Out of how many months 
reviewed?   
  Returned items? (#)   
  Average exempt sales   
      
 
2 Not registered for other taxes they should be registered for?  
(0 = Registered; 1 = Not registered) 
  Corporate    
  Doc Stamps (If they provide financing)  
  Unemployment    
  Solid Waste (Sec 403.718 - New Tire Fees)  
      
 3 Observations:    
          
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
          
      
Churn      
 1 String of corporations owned by same or related people, 
  with ownership change or corporation change every few 
  years? (Yes/No)    
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Appendix 3 – Case Frequencies from Auto Dealer Survey  
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Appendix 3 
Frequency Table 
 
Theft indicator 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No theft 153 41.5 41.5 41.5 
Theft indicated - more 
than 10% stolen 
216 58.5 58.5 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
 
Neighborhood classification 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Industrial 83 22.5 22.5 22.5 
Moderate 
industrial 
282 76.4 76.4 98.9 
Moderate retail 4 1.1 1.1 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
 
Neighborhood type 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Poor 149 40.4 40.4 40.4 
Moderate low 38 10.3 10.3 50.7 
Moderate high 105 28.5 28.5 79.1 
Wealthy 77 20.9 20.9 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
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Appendix 3 
Frequency Table (continued) 
 
Neighborhood appearance 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Appears low rent 79 21.4 21.4 21.4 
Moderate low rent 162 43.9 43.9 65.3 
Moderate high rent 107 29.0 29.0 94.3 
High rent 21 5.7 5.7 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
 
Dealer type 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Other 38 10.3 10.3 10.3 
Office/warehouse 117 31.7 31.7 42.0 
Repair Shop 24 6.5 6.5 48.5 
Traditional sales lot 190 51.5 51.5 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
 
Size of dealer operation 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Small 228 61.8 61.8 61.8 
Medium 82 22.2 22.2 84.0 
Large 52 14.1 14.1 98.1 
Multi-location 7 1.9 1.9 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
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Appendix 3 
Frequency Table (continued) 
 
Price range of cars on the lot 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Inexpensive 111 30.1 50.5 50.5 
Moderate low 81 22.0 36.8 87.3 
Moderate high 16 4.3 7.3 94.5 
Expensive 12 3.3 5.5 100.0 
Total 220 59.6 100.0  
Missing 0 149 40.4   
 Total 369 100.0   
 
State of cars on the lot 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Disrepair 3 .8 1.4 1.4 
Fair 34 9.2 15.5 16.9 
Good 166 45.0 75.8 92.7 
Excellent 16 4.3 7.3 100.0 
Total 219 59.3 100.0  
Missing 0 150 40.7   
 Total 369 100.0   
 
Type of cars sold 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid General 139 37.7 63.5 63.5 
Mixed 54 14.6 24.7 88.1 
Luxury 8 2.2 3.7 91.8 
Specialty 18 4.9 8.2 100.0 
Total 219 59.3 100.0  
Missing 0 150 40.7   
 Total 369 100.0   
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Appendix 3 
Frequency Table (continued) 
 
Cleanliness of premises 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Dirty 36 9.8 9.8 9.8 
Fair 89 24.1 24.1 33.9 
Clean 139 37.7 37.7 71.5 
Very clean 105 28.5 28.5 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
 
Maintenance status of premises 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Poorly maintained 29 7.9 7.9 7.9 
Moderate low 
maintenance 
95 25.7 25.7 33.6 
Moderate high 
maintenance 
140 37.9 37.9 71.5 
Well maintained 105 28.5 28.5 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
 
Customer traffic 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Low traffic 110 29.8 29.8 29.8 
Moderately low traffic 45 12.2 12.2 42.0 
Moderately high traffic 37 10.0 10.0 52.0 
High traffic 177 48.0 48.0 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
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Appendix 3 
Frequency Table (continued) 
 
Access to premises 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Difficult access and 
parking 
8 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Moderately difficult 
access and parking 
54 14.6 14.6 16.8 
Moderately easy access 
and parking 
149 40.4 40.4 57.2 
Easy access and 
parking 
158 42.8 42.8 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
 
Retail location indicator 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Not meant for retail 123 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Retail possible but not 
relied on 
29 7.9 7.9 41.2 
Retail encouraged 19 5.1 5.1 46.3 
Full retail 198 53.7 53.7 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Buy Here Pay Here lot 
  
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 289 78.3 78.3 78.3 
Yes 80 21.7 21.7 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
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Appendix 3 
Frequency Table (continued) 
 
Inventory size 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Small 0 to 15 68 18.4 31.8 31.8 
Moderate 15 to 30 65 17.6 30.4 62.1 
Moderate 31 to 45 42 11.4 19.6 81.8 
Large over 45 39 10.6 18.2 100.0 
Total 214 58.0 100.0  
Missing 0 155 42.0   
 Total 369 100.0   
 
 
Registered for corporate tax 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 350 94.9 94.9 94.9 
No 19 5.1 5.1 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
 
 
In-house financing offered 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid No 289 78.3 78.3 78.3 
Yes 80 21.7 21.7 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
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Appendix 3 
Frequency Table (continued) 
 
Registered for documentary stamp tax 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 42 11.4 11.4 11.4 
No 327 88.6 88.6 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Registered for unemployment compensation tax 
  
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 184 49.9 49.9 49.9 
No 185 50.1 50.1 100.0 
Total 369 100.0 100.0  
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